Coffey v. Com.
| Decision Date | 28 April 1969 |
| Citation | 209 Va. 760,167 S.E.2d 343 |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Billy Wayne COFFEY v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. |
J. Murrell Daniel, Lynchburg, for plaintiff in error.
Anthony F. Troy, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Robert Y. Button, Atty. Gen., on brief), for defendant in error.
Before EGGLESTON, C.J., and BUCHANAN, SNEAD, I'ANSON, CARRICO, GORDON and HARRISON, JJ.
Billy Wayne Coffey, the defendant, appeals from a judgment order revoking the suspension of a penitentiary sentence earlier imposed upon him by the trial court.
On November 7, 1966, the defendant was convicted of the offense of concealing stolen goods and was sentenced to serve two years in the penitentiary. On the same date, he was also convicted of statutory burglary and was sentenced to serve three years in the penitentiary, the sentence 'to be computed from the date of expiration of sentence' imposed for concealing stolen goods. However, the judgment order imposing the sentence for statutory burglary contained the following provisions:
'On motion of the accused, and upon the recommendation of the Commonwealth's attorney, and it appearing compatible with the public interest, the court doth order that execution of the aforesaid sentence to the penitentiary be suspended upon condition that the said accused, Billy Wayne Coffey, be of good behavior in all respects for the term of five years from the date of his release after serving sentence this day imposed upon said accused for concealing stolen goods, and be and he is hereby placed on probation under the general supervision of the state probation and parole officer of this court, to report to the said probation and parole officer as and when he shall reasonably require and direct, to obey such reasonable rules and regulations as the said probation and parole officer shall prescribe for him, and not to leave the jurisdiction of this court without the permission of said probation and parole officer, during the term of five years aforesaid * * *.'
The defendant was transferred to the penitentiary to serve the two-year sentence imposed upon him for concealing stolen goods. On May 2, 1967, he was placed on parole from that sentence until November 2, 1968.
While on parole in June, 1967, the defendant was charged with three offenses of grand larceny and one offense of statutory burglary. He was convicted of each of the offenses on November 7, 1967. On the same date, a capias was issued for the defendant requiring him to show cause why the suspension of sentence and probation imposed upon him for statutory burglary on November 7, 1966, should not be revoked.
On December 4, 1967, the defendant was brought into court in response to the capias. The suspension of sentence and probation imposed on November 7, 1966, were revoked, and he was ordered to serve the sentence. He was granted a writ of error.
The defendant contends here, as he did in the trial court, that the suspension of sentence should not have been revoked because at the time he allegedly violated the terms of the suspension, he 'had not begun his probation' under the order of November 7, 1966. He argues that by its terms, the order would not have become effective until he had served the two-year sentence imposed for concealing stolen goods, and since he had not yet completed serving that sentence but was still on parole therefrom at the time he committed the new offenses in June, 1967, he was not subject to the terms of the suspension order.
The defendant says that one does not serve a sentence while on parole and is given no credit on the sentence for time spent on parole. That being true, the defendant concludes that the terms of the suspension order of November 7, 1966, would not have become effective until he had been released from parole or had actually served the two-year sentence imposed for concealing stolen goods.
The fallacy in the position of the defendant is that his obligation is not to be decided by the principles applicable to parole. Instead, his liability under the order of November 7, 1966, is to be determined by the rules relating to suspended sentences, by the grace of which he was given the suspension in the first instance.
Code, § 53--272 provides, in part, as follows:
'* * * (T)he court may suspend the execution of sentence * * * and may also place the defendant on probation under the supervision of a probation officer, during good behavior for such time and under such conditions of probation as the court shall determine. * * *'
Code, § 53--275 provides, so far as is pertinent here, as...
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Nicholson v. Commonwealth
...confinement.'" Price v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 443, 448, 658 S.E.2d 700, 703 (2008) (citation omitted); see Coffey v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 760, 762, 167 S.E.2d 343, 344 (1969) (discussing the "rules relating to suspended sentences, by the grace of which he was given the suspension in th......
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Matthews v. State
...Com. v. Dickens, 327 Pa.Super. 147, 475 A.2d 141 (1984); Wright v. United States, 315 A.2d 839 (D.C.1974); Coffey v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 760, 167 S.E.2d 343 (1969). In Wilcox, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that the trial court had authority to revoke the probation of the defendant bas......
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Cilwa v. Commonwealth
...include distinct conditions, but both carry a condition of good behavior, "whether expressly so stated or not," Coffey v. Commonwealth , 209 Va. 760, 763, 167 S.E.2d 343 (1969) (citation omitted). See also Burnham v. Commonwealth , ––– Va. ––––, ––––, 833 S.E.2d 872, 874 (2019) ("Even when ......
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U.S. v. Cartwright
...Wright v. United States, 315 A.2d 839 (D.C.1974); Martin v. State, 243 So.2d 189 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 4th 1971); Coffey v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 760, 167 S.E.2d 343 (1969). 6 In urging us to sustain the district court's decision, the government argues that cases from two other circuits have "e......