Coffey v. County of Hennepin

• Decision Date: 10 September 1998
• Docket Number: Civil No. 3-96-1191(PAM/JGL).
• Citation: 23 F.Supp.2d 1081
• Parties: Carol COFFEY, Plaintiff, v. The COUNTY OF HENNEPIN; Rafael Viscasillas, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Director of the Hennepin County Personnel Department; Margit Hallberg, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Senior Human Resources Representative for Hennepin County; Barbara J. Fici, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Human Resources Benefits Administrator for Hennepin County; Thomas G. Lavelle, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Director of the Juvenile Corrections Program at Hennepin County; Kathryn A. Van de Steeg, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Division Manager of Family Court Services at Hennepin County; and John Does 1-30, Individually and in Their Official Capacities as Employees of Hennepin County, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

23 F.Supp.2d 1081

Carol COFFEY, Plaintiff, v. The COUNTY OF HENNEPIN; Rafael Viscasillas, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Director of the Hennepin County Personnel Department; Margit Hallberg, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Senior Human Resources Representative for Hennepin County; Barbara J. Fici, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Human Resources Benefits Administrator for Hennepin County; Thomas G. Lavelle, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Director of the Juvenile Corrections Program at Hennepin County; Kathryn A. Van de Steeg, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Division Manager of Family Court Services at Hennepin County; and John Does 1-30, Individually and in Their Official Capacities as Employees of Hennepin County, Defendants.

Civil No. 3-96-1191(PAM/JGL).

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Third Division.

September 10, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Heidi A. Schneider, Gartner & Schupp, Minneapolis, MN, for Carol Coffey.

Beverly Jean Wolfe, Martin Daniel Munic, Cheri Sudit, Hennepin County Attorneys Office, Minneapolis, MN, for County of Hennepin, Rafael Viscasillas, Margit Hallberg, Barbara J. Fici, Thomas G. Lavelle, Kathryn A. Van de Steeg and John Does, 1-30.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MAGNUSON, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants' motion.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Coffey filed the present lawsuit against Defendants after the EEOC dismissed two of Plaintiff's charges in which she alleged discrimination by Hennepin County. Defendants then filed their first motion for summary judgment. This Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. (See Coffey v. County of Hennepin, No. 3-96-1191 (D.Minn. Apr.30, 1998)) (order granting summary judgment as to Plaintiff's violation of due process claims, respondeat superior claim under § 1983, and dismissing individual defendants from Plaintiffs ADA, MHRA, and FRA claims.) After further discovery, Defendants have now filed a second summary judgment motion renewing its motion on the surviving counts.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Carol Coffey was employed as a social worker in family services for Hennepin County from 1969 to 1979. In 1979, she became a probation officer and continued in that capacity until 1991, at which time she became disabled. Diagnosed with chronic fatigue syndrome and multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome, Coffey depleted her sick leave and her 160 hours of special leave without pay. Therefore, on May 11, 1991, she requested and was granted six months medical leave. On November 11, 1991, Hennepin County also granted her request for medical layoff. This layoff, though limited to a maximum of three years, allowed Plaintiff to retain her eligibility for recall until November 11, 1994. Eligibility for recall allowed reinstatement with seniority and salary if she worked again within a three year time span. However, if the three year recall eligibility period expired before Plaintiff was placed in a recall position, Plaintiff would become ineligible for recall and her employment would be terminated. (Defs.' Exs. 2B §§ 7.5c, 12.12a; 5 at 2.) Further, the recall was not guaranteed, but was dependent upon whether available vacancies existed in Plaintiff's job class. (Defs.' Exs. 2B §§ 10.11, I 1.1; 3B at 3.) During her medical leave, Coffey sought treatment for her illness while she obtained disability pay from the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), Public Employees Retirement Association ("PERA"), UNUM Life Insurance Company ("UNUM"), and Defendant Hennepin County ("the County").

In the fall of 1994, Plaintiff notified Defendant Hennepin County by letter that she could return to work by October 17, 1994. (See Defs.' Exs. 42A; 43B.) Attached to this letter she included a physician's letter delineating the accommodations Plaintiff needed. (See Defs.' Ex. 42B.) The doctor's recommendations included that Plaintiff's office should be in a building with windows that manually open and that the environment be free of cigarette smoke, building materials, adhesives, glues, epoxies, paints, varnishes, car exhaust fumes, room deodorizers, perfumes, hair sprays, cleaning products, copy machines and computers. In addition, the doctor recommended that Plaintiff should not work in the Government Center and the Health Sciences Building, the two main buildings used by Hennepin County. Further, Plaintiff's use of phone, computer, and photocopier were to be minimized. Plaintiff offered to bring her own air filter and agreed to supply her own speaker phone and lighting. However, she provided Defendant Hennepin County no suggestions as to how the County could satisfy the other needed accommodations. Moreover, because of her illness the doctor stated that even if these accommodations were provided, Plaintiff would experience "mental slowdown"; therefore, her workstressors would have to be reduced to a minimum, and her tasks limited to three or four. (See id.)

Hennepin County operates a Work Return Assistance Program ("WRAP") to assist those employees who return from disability leave. (See Pl.'s Ex. E.) The policy requires that the WRAP administrator place a returning disabled employee "in an alternative position within the County or with another employer" if the employee's original department finds the employee's return to be "an undue hardship" or the return requires "unreasonable accommodation." (Id. at 3.) Defendants assert that Plaintiff did not request a WRAP placement until her eligibility period had expired with the County. In contrast, Plaintiff argues that she did indeed contact Barbara Fici, Hennepin County WRAP administrator, asking about the program well before the expiration period. (See Coffey Aff. ¶ 16.) Despite her requests, Plaintiff contends that she was "repeatedly denied" WRAP placement. (See id. ¶¶ 19-20.)

In January 1995, the County offered Plaintiff a position as a juvenile corrections director. Though this position met Dr. Eckerly's recommendation that Plaintiff not be officed in the Government Center or the Health Services Building, it did not come close to providing the other requested accommodations. (See Defs.' Ex. 4A; Pl.'s Ex. F.) However, the County advised Plaintiff that it would "endeavor to make whatever reasonable accommodations are necessary in view [her] medical issues." (Defs.' Ex. 5.) Because the offered position was a relatively new position, Plaintiff requested additional time, beyond the expiration of her recall eligibility, to review the demands of the position in light of her disability. The County granted her request, but informed her that the extension was only for that one position; thus, if she declined the position, her layoff eligibility would expire. She would, however, continue to be eligible as a reinstatement candidate. (See Defs.' Ex. 4A at 1-2.)

On January 19, 1995, the County received a letter stating that Plaintiff was declining the offered position "because she determined that the position could not satisfy her requested accommodations." (Defs.' Mem.at 5 (emphasis in original); Defs.' Exs. 4B at 9; 5 at 2.) She further requested placement in a probation officer vacancy, and only if these positions were not suitable did she request referral to the WRAP program. (See Defs.' Ex. 4B at 9-10.) Therefore, Plaintiff was terminated on February 10, 1995, and became a reinstatement candidate for the next five years. In a reinstatement position, Plaintiff lost any preference, seniority, or specific salary she had maintained while an eligible employee.

Rafael Viscasillas, Director of Hennepin County Human Resources Department, contacted Plaintiff for three positions in the Community Corrections Department when Plaintiff was a reinstatement candidate, but she failed to interview for any of the positions. (See Defs.' Ex. 5 at 1-2.) Also in July 1997, the County sent Plaintiff a written offer for a probation officer vacancy. The County offered to restore her previous seniority level, rehire her at the highest step of the salary scale, and fully reinstate her vacation and sick leave. (See Defs.' Ex. 8.) However, Plaintiff declined the position and maintains that the County only offered the position as an attempt to settle the present lawsuit.

In summary, Plaintiff contends that the County refused to offer her available positions before her termination and that the County refused to rehire her for reinstatement, despite the fact that she had demonstrated her ability to work. Defendants now move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's remaining claims: the Americans With Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, Minnesota Human Rights Act, violations of equal protection, reprisal and retaliation violations, negligent supervision, training, retention and hiring practices, aiding and abetting, respondeat superior, and breach of contract. The Court maintains jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Unigroup, Inc. v. O'Rourke Storage & Transfer Co., 980 F.2d 1217, 1219-20 (8th Cir.1992). The court determines materiality from the substantive law governing the claim. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit according to applicable substantive law are material. See id. A material fact dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. See id. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

DISCUSSION

A. Defendants' Motion in Limine

Defendants have filed a motion in limine to exclude "any expert testimony,...