Coffin v. Blessey Marine Servs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–20144.,13–20144. |
| Citation | 771 F.3d 276 |
| Parties | Keith COFFIN, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated ; Eric Jones; Jose L. Rangel; Josh Fox; Gregory Robinson; Jason J. Villareal; Dustin Akins; Mason Fulkerson; Zachary Latiolais, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. BLESSEY MARINE SERVICES, INCORPORATED, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Mark Joseph Oberti (argued), Oberti Sullivan, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs–Appellees.
Steven Franklin Griffith, Jr. (argued), Matthew Charles Juneau, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., New Orleans, LA, for Defendant–Appellant.
Jane Blair Jacobs, Klein, Zelman, Rothermel, Jacobs & Schess, L.L.P., New York, N.Y., James C. Winton, Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., Houston, TX, Lynn Elizabeth Blais, Austin, TX, Amicus Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
Blessey Marine Services, Inc. (Blessey) brings this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. The district court declined to decide as a matter of law whether nine individual plaintiffs (collectively the Plaintiffs), former vessel-based tankermen on Blessey barges, who brought suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) seeking overtime pay, were exempt from the FLSA as seamen.1 Although the district court conditionally certified a class action, only eleven individuals joined, and the parties decided to proceed individually.
Blessey produced extensive evidence during discovery suggesting that the Plaintiffs' loading and unloading duties were done as part of the vessel crew and aided the seaworthiness of the vessel, and at the close of discovery it moved for summary judgment. In response, the Plaintiffs largely ignored responding to Blessey's evidence and arguments, and countered that loading and unloading a vessel is nonseaman work as a matter of law, a question that was decided by our opinion in Owens v. SeaRiver Maritime, Inc., 272 F.3d 698 (5th Cir.2001). The Plaintiffs argued that Owens forecloses any factual inquiry into the nature and character of loading and unloading duties. The district court accepted this interpretation of Owens and concluded that loading and unloading the vessel was in and of itself, without regard to attachment to a specific vessel as seamen for other purposes, nonseaman work as a matter of law. It set the case for trial so that a jury could determine whether those duties were a substantial amount of the Plaintiffs' overall work.
Our review of the applicable law and record evidence leads us to a contrary conclusion; we believe that the district court misapplied Owens. Furthermore, the record establishes that these vessel-based tankermen performed only seaman work, making them exempt from the FLSA's overtime provisions. Accordingly, we VACATE the district court's denial of summary judgment and REMAND the case to the district court for entry of judgment in favor of Blessey.
We begin with a discussion of the relevant facts, which are largely undisputed. Blessey's business primarily consists of shipping liquid cargo along inland and oceanic waterways. Blessey uses a system of equipment called a unit tow, which consists of a towboat and two tank barges, to ship the liquid. The towboat contains the navigation controls, machinery space, and propulsion, and it pushes the barges through the waterway. Meanwhile, the barges are connected to the towboat through a series of lines and wires. Each Blessey barge consists of several separate tanks that can be used for storing liquid, and loading and unloading such a barge is a complex process.
The unit tow is manned by a crew that lives and works on the towboat for a designated period of time (called a hitch). Typically, crew members work for 20 days on a unit tow followed by 10 days off (called a 2–for–1 day hitch). Each day, a crew member generally works two six-hour shifts. Crew sizes may vary from as few as four to as many as ten people.
The crew consists of a wheelman, a pilot, tankermen, and deckhands. The wheelman is usually a captain or relief captain, and all members of the crew work at his or her direction. A tankerman has gained deckhand experience and received required training in the loading and unloading of liquid cargo from a barge. Blessey's tankermen are vessel-based and share the nineteen duties that deckhands perform along with various additional tasks related both to the maintenance of the barges and the loading and unloading process. The parties agree that most of these tasks are seaman work.2 Relevant here, Blessey requires its tankermen to perform the loading and unloading process for the unit tow. Thus, the tankermen both load and unload the barges and perform other tasks related to the loading and unloading process.3 The Plaintiffs argue that these categories of duties are nonseaman work, while acknowledging their many other duties are seaman work.
The Plaintiffs typically worked as seamen aboard a vessel for approximately 84 hours during a seven-day period and were paid a day rate, or a flat daily sum. They were not paid overtime for any work, as is customary and lawful with respect to seamen.
We review the district court's decision to deny summary judgment de novo and apply the same standards as the district court. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Doubletree Partners, L.P., 739 F.3d 848, 856 (5th Cir.2014). Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). We may consider the record evidence before the district court, but we may not assess credibility or weigh evidence. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 739 F.3d at 856. The motion for summary judgment in this case is based on the FLSA exemption for seamen, and the ultimate determination of whether an employee is exempt ... is properly characterized as a conclusion of law, subject to plenary review. Dalheim v. KDFW–TV, 918 F.2d 1220, 1226 (5th Cir.1990).
To decide whether the Plaintiffs are exempt seamen, we turn to the relevant statutory and regulatory language setting out obligations with respect to the FLSA. The FLSA generally forbids employing workers for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment ... at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). An employee is not protected by this broad prohibition, however, if he falls within an exemption from statutory coverage. Meza v. Intelligent Mexican Mktg., Inc., 720 F.3d 577, 580–81 (5th Cir.2013). Relevant here, the FLSA exempts from overtime any employee employed as a seaman. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6). Congress did not define seaman, and it is left to us to interpret the term to resolve this appeal.
For guidance, we turn primarily to the Department of Labor (DOL) regulations, which we have held to be entitled to great weight. Dole v. Petroleum Treaters, Inc., 876 F.2d 518, 521 (5th Cir.1989) (citing Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 297, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985) ). Generally, a vessel's crew members are seamen, so long as they meet the criteria in 29 C.F.R. § 783.31. 29 C.F.R. § 783.32. Section 783.31 outlines these criteria as follows:
[A]n employee will ordinarily be regarded as employed as a seaman if he performs, as master or subject to the authority, direction, and control of the master aboard a vessel, service which is rendered primarily as an aid in the operation of such vessel as a means of transportation, provided he performs no substantial amount of work of a different character.
Id. § 783.31. The regulations provide that work other than seaman work becomes substantial if it occupies more than 20 percent of the time worked by the employee during the workweek. Id. § 783.37.
The use of the word ordinarily in § 783.31 evinces that the FLSA eschews a fixed meaning of the term seaman. The regulations emphasize flexibility, indicating that the term's meaning is governed by the context in which it is used and the purpose of the statute in which it is found. Id. § 783.29(c). Similarly, we must evaluate an employee's duties based upon the character of the work he actually performs and not on what it is called or the place where it is performed. Id. § 783.33. As we have recognized, the FLSA as a whole is pervaded by the idea that what each employee actually does determines its application to him. Walling v. W.D. Haden Co., 153 F.2d 196, 199 (5th Cir.1946). Accordingly, the application of the seaman exemption generally depends on the facts in each case. See McLaughlin v. Bos. Harbor Cruise Lines, Inc., 419 F.3d 47, 51–52 (1st Cir.2005) ().
With this framework guiding us, we will address both categories of duties at issue in this suit, beginning with the loading and unloading duties and concluding with those responsibilities related to loading and unloading.
The district court concluded, and the Plaintiffs urge on appeal, that our decision in Owens establishes that loading and unloading a vessel is always nonseaman work. We consider this reading of Owens to be erroneous.
First, Owens involves significantly different facts from this case. The plaintiff in Owens only sought overtime pay for his work loading and unloading barges as a member of SeaRiver's land-based Strike Team. Although he had previously worked as a vessel-based tankerman, he did not pursue any overtime for that work. We emphasized that during the relevant time period Owens was not a crew member of a tow and not tied to a particular vessel for a voyage. 272 F.3d at 700. Similarly, Owens worked on unattended or ‘tramp’ barges that...
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