Coffin v. Laskau
| Decision Date | 10 June 1915 |
| Citation | 94 A. 370,89 Conn. 325 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | COFFIN v. LASKAU. UMBROGIA v. SAME. |
Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Fairfield County; John J. Walsh, Judge.
Actions by John R. Coffin and by Antonio Umbrogia against Sieofried Laskau. Facts found and judgments rendered for the plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. No error.
Action to recover damages to the respective plaintiffs, Coffin for injury to his automobile, and Umbrogia, the driver, for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant's chauffeur in the management of a motor truck owned by the defendant Judgment rendered for the owner of the automobile to recover $599, and the driver $480.
Robert R. Rosan, of Greenwich, for appellant. Wilbur S. Wright, of Greenwich, for appellees.
These actions were tried together in the court below and upon appeal in this court by consent of counsel. It appears from the finding that at about the hour of 2 o'clock in the afternoon on May 30, 1903, there was a collision between the defendant's motor truck, driven by his son, and John R. Coffin's automobile, driven by Antonio Umbrogia. The place of the collision was in Greenwich, Conn., upon a highway known as the "post road." The road at this place is at the foot of quite a steep hill which slopes westerly. The highway at the foot of the hill consists of a fill of the natural depression in the surface of the ground, which constitutes what is called a causeway. This causeway is 300 feet long. There is an iron pipe rail upon uprights along both sides of the causeway. These uprights are fastened in the top of the stone walls which compose the sides of the causeway. A brook passes through a culvert under the causeway. The road at this point is about 26 feet wide. The surface of this road is paved with Warrenite. At the time of the accident it was slippery from grease dropped by passing automobiles. At the time of the accident there was another automobile standing at the foot of the hill which had stopped for repairs. This automobile was headed westerly and standing near the north side of the road. There was also an open surrey drawn by two horses proceeding easterly along the right-hand side of this highway. The plaintiff's car was a five-passenger touring ear, going in an easterly direction at a speed of about 18 miles an hour. The defendant's car was a heavy motor truck weighing three tons. Just before the accident it was coming down the hill and going westerly at a high rate of speed of at least 25 miles an hour. When the defendant's car was descending the hill the driver saw the automobile standing on the northerly side of the road, and swung his car to the middle of the road to avoid it. The motor truck then skidded and got beyond the control of the chauffeur, and with great force collided head on with the plaintiff's automobile, which at this time was on the southerly side of the highway and within 2 feet of the footpath used by pedestrians. There was sufficient room for the motor truck to have safely passed the plaintiff's car when the collision occurred had the defendant's motor truck been operated at a safe rate of speed and in a proper manner. The result of the collision was the telescoping of the front of the plaintiff's automobile back to the driver's seat. Umbrogia, the driver, by this collision was pinned down in the driver's seat and severely injured. Umbrogia at the time of the accident was in the exercise of due care and not guilty of contributory negligence.
The court of common pleas reached the conclusion that the direct and proximate cause of the accident was due to the negligence of the defendant's servant. The defendant contends that this conclusion is not warranted by the evidence which comes before us under section 797 of the General Statutes, and we are asked to make numerous corrections in the finding. A careful examination of the record shows that there was evidence tending to support the conclusions embodied in the finding, and it does not appear that the court refused to find any fact which was established by undisputed evidence. Therefore the motion to correct is denied.
The defendant's contention that "the plaintiff's chauffeur, and therefore the plaintiff, was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, in traveling at a speed exceeding ten miles an hour, when approaching and traversing a bridge, and while his view of the road and traffic was obstructed," is not supported by the record. It appears from the finding that the place of the collision was a highway or road. There is no precise legal meaning attaching to the word "bridge" applicable to all cases where the definition of this word is involved. It is more a question of fact than law "what is a bridge or a highway." This is to be determined by the particular circumstances of each case and the law applicable thereto. Philips v. East Haven, 44 Conn. 30; Norwalk v. Podmore, 86 Conn. 662, 86 Atl. 582.
In this instance the complaints in both cases describe the place where the accident occurred as a highway known as the "post road." The...
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State v. Baker
...the particular circumstances of the case before it, whether to admit a witness' testimony of the value of her property. Coffin v. Laskau, 89 Conn. 325, 329-30, 94 A. 370. Our cases have ruled that the competence of the witness to testify to the value of property may be established by demons......
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Katsetos v. Nolan
...City. "The determination of the qualification of an expert is largely a matter for the discretion of the trial court.' Coffin v. Laskau, 89 Conn. 325, 329, 94 A. 370, 372; Oborski v. New Haven Gas Co., 151 Conn. 274, 280, 197 A.2d 73. The trial court's decision is not to be disturbed on app......
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State v. Correa
...v. Palmer, 196 Conn. 157, 166, 491 A.2d 1075 (1985); Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 513, 325 A.2d 277 (1973); Coffin v. Laskau, 89 Conn. 325, 330, 94 A. 370 (1915)." State v. Esposito, 235 Conn. 802, 834, 670 A.2d 301 (1996). "Expert testimony should be admitted when: (1) the witness ha......
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State v. Esposito
...v. Palmer, 196 Conn. 157, 166, 491 A.2d 1075 (1985); Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 513, 325 A.2d 277 (1973); Coffin v. Laskau, 89 Conn. 325, 330, 94 A. 370 (1915). In State v. Wilson, supra, 180 Conn. at 488-89, 429 A.2d 931, we affirmed that the testimony of a police dog handler descr......