Coffin v. South Carolina Dept. of Social Services, Civ. A. No. 82-803-15.

• Court: United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court of South Carolina
• Citation: 562 F. Supp. 579
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 82-803-15.
• Decision Date: 10 January 1983
• Parties: Byron H. COFFIN, III; William S. Comer; Robert D. Floyd; William M. Foley; Jimmie L. Gresham; Ralph T. Hagins; Gary M. Howard; Joel W. Lawson; William J. McCaw; John T. Molan; C.L. Oswald; James N. Stagg; Dr. Hazel E. Switzer; all individually and as representatives of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. The SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES et al., Defendants.

562 F. Supp. 579

Byron H. COFFIN, III; William S. Comer; Robert D. Floyd; William M. Foley; Jimmie L. Gresham; Ralph T. Hagins; Gary M. Howard; Joel W. Lawson; William J. McCaw; John T. Molan; C.L. Oswald; James N. Stagg; Dr. Hazel E. Switzer; all individually and as representatives of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs,
v.
The SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 82-803-15.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division.

January 10, 1983.

562 F. Supp. 580

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

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James L. Bell, Keith J. Perry and Brian Dumas, Columbia, S.C., for plaintiffs

Stephen T. Savitz, Scott A. Koch, John L. Choate, William C. Hubbard, C. Tolbert Goolsby, Jr., Vance J. Bettis, Columbia, S.C., for defendants.

HAMILTON, District Judge.

The complaint in this matter purports to state eight causes of action against fourteen defendants stemming from alleged employment discrimination based on age. Plaintiffs assert claims for monetary, declaratory and injunctive relief under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinafter "ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. and under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Also, plaintiffs seek to impose liability on defendants based upon pendent state law claims sounding in tort.

Before the court for ruling at this time are six motions. First, by motion filed June 1, 1982, all defendants have moved this court to dismiss the first and second causes of action on the ground that ADEA as applied to the states (agencies) is unconstitutional. Second, by motion filed June 1, 1982, defendants the South Carolina Department of Social Services (hereinafter "DSS") and the Board of the South Carolina Department of Social Services (hereinafter "Board of DSS" or "Board") have moved this court to dismiss the first and second causes of action as against them on the ground that neither is an "employer" under the ADEA. Also, defendants DSS

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and the Board of DSS have moved for dismissal of the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth causes of action as against them on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars these claims. Third, by motion filed June 1, 1982, the individual defendants have moved this court to dismiss the first and second causes of action as against them on the ground that none of them in either his/her official or individual capacity is an "employer" under the ADEA. Fourth, by motion filed June 1, 1982, all defendants have moved the court for an order striking certain language from the complaint on the ground that the matters sought to be stricken are redundant, immaterial, impertinent and prejudicial to defendants. Fifth, by motion filed June 1, 1982, all defendants have moved the court for an order severing plaintiffs' claims on the ground that the claims do not relate to or arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. Sixth, by motion filed June 28, 1982, plaintiffs in their representative capacities as similarly situated past and present employees of defendants have moved to add as additional plaintiffs two persons so consenting to be represented.¹ The respective parties have presented to the court memoranda of authorities in support of and in opposition to the various motions, and oral arguments were heard on August 3, 1982

MOTION OF ALL DEFENDANTS TO DISMISS

Asserting that plaintiffs have not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted in that the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., is an exercise of Congress' power under the commerce clause of the federal constitution and therefore the Tenth Amendment prohibits the application of the ADEA to the states, all defendants have moved the court pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for an order dismissing plaintiffs' claim that defendants have violated the ADEA. According to the position of the defendants, Congress exercised its power under the commerce clause and not under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted the ADEA and extended coverage to the states. Therefore, defendants urge that the ruling and analysis of the Supreme Court in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976), require this court to find that the ADEA is unconstitutional as applied to these defendants because the Act affects state sovereignty and results in the impairment of traditional state functions.

While defendants cite authority supporting their contentions, the law in this circuit is clearly to the contrary. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1270-71 (4th Cir. 1977), has held that "in enacting ADEA and in extending it to the states Congress exercised its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment" and not pursuant to the commerce clause as argued by defendants. This court is bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to follow the Arritt decision, and accordingly defendants' motion to dismiss based on the unconstitutionality of the ADEA as applied to the states is overruled.

MOTION OF DEFENDANTS DSS AND BOARD OF DSS TO DISMISS

As a second ground for their motion to dismiss the first and second causes of action as against them, defendants DSS and the Board of DSS contend that neither of them is the employer of plaintiffs as defined in the ADEA.²

According to this argument, the Board of DSS is authorized to employ only one person, the State Commissioner of Social Services. Section 43-1-50 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, as amended (hereinafter

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"South Carolina Code"). The State Commissioner, in turn, is authorized to employ, with the approval of the Board, the employees of DSS. Section 43-1-70 of the South Carolina Code. Therefore, neither DSS nor the Board, as entities, is the employer of plaintiffs, as contended by defendants

Defendants' efforts to persuade the court by this statutory sleight-of-hand fail. The relevant inquiry is whether DSS and the Board can be "employers" as that term is defined under the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) provides in pertinent part that the term "employer" means "a State ... and any agency or instrumentality of a State."

The State Department of Social Services (DSS) is a state agency and the Board of DSS is its governing body. Section 43-1-10 of the South Carolina Code provides:

State Department of Social Services; subordinate divisions.

There is created the State Department of Social Services, referred to in this Title as the State Department, with such subordinate divisions as may be created or authorized by law. The State Department shall operate under the South Carolina Board of Social Services. (emphasis added).

Also, case authority in this district dictates that DSS is a state agency which functions as an arm or alter ego of the State of South Carolina. Gourdine v. Ellis, 435 F.Supp. 882 (D.S.C.1977). This conclusion is in accord with cases finding other agencies to be alter egos of the state. Belcher v. South Carolina Board of Corrections et al., 460 F.Supp. 805 (D.S.C.1978) (involving the South Carolina Board of Corrections and the South Carolina Department of Corrections); United States v. State of South Carolina et al., 445 F.Supp. 1094, 1099-1100 (D.S.C.1977) (three judge court), aff'd, 434 U.S. 1026, 98 S.Ct. 756, 54 L.Ed.2d 775 (1978) (involving, inter alia, the South Carolina State Board of Education and the South Carolina Department of Education).

Thus, DSS and its governing body, the Board of DSS, are "employers" as that term is defined under the ADEA since they are "a State (or its alter ego) ... and any agency or instrumentality of a State." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2). (parenthetical matter added). Accordingly, the motion of defendants DSS and the Board to dismiss on the grounds that neither is an "employer" within the definition of the ADEA is accordingly denied.

Defendants DSS and the Board next address the third through eighth causes of action. The third, fourth and fifth causes of action are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1986 and 1985, respectively. In the sixth, seventh and eighth causes of action, plaintiffs allege three pendent state law claims — civil conspiracy, malfeasance in office by reason of breach of fiduciary duties and intentional infliction of emotional distress, respectively. The fourth cause of action is brought only against the Board of DSS, while the third, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth causes of action name DSS and the Board, inter alia, as defendants. Plaintiffs seek monetary, declaratory and injunctive relief as to these claims.

As grounds for their motion to dismiss the third through eighth causes of action as against them, defendants DSS and the Board submit that these claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and, consequently, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

Although, by its terms, the Amendment does not preclude suits against a state by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has held that a state is immune from suits brought in federal courts by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another state or citizens or subjects of any foreign state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1355, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), citing Hans v.

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Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311, 40 S.Ct. 154, 64 L.Ed. 280 (1920); Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 64 S.Ct. 873, 88 L.Ed. 1121 (1944); Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233...