Coffman's Adm'r v. Coffman

• Decision Date: 17 November 1921
• Citation: 109 S.E. 454
• Parties: COFFMAN'S ADM'R. v. COFFMAN et al.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

109 S.E. 454

COFFMAN'S ADM'R.

v.COFFMAN et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Nov.17, 1921.

Error to Circuit Court, Page County.

Suit between Rebecca S. Coffman and others and H. M. Coffman's administrator, to construe a will. From the decree, the administrator brings error. Reversed and remanded.

Geo. N. Conrad, of Harrisonburg, for plaintiff in error.

Wm. F. Keyser and H. V. Strayer, both of Luray, for defendants in error.

KELLY, P. This suit involves the construction of the will of H. M. Coffman, deceased, which, omitting the formal parts, was as follows:

"I give and bequeath unto my beloved wife, Rebecca S. Coffman, my entire interest in the farm that we now live on and all bonds, notes, and money that I possess or may be coming to me as long as she, Rebecca, lives. After her death I will and bequeath unto Martha M. Zirkle, Maud O. Zirkle, five hundred dollars each, making $1,000 divided between the two of my nieces for living with us and comforting us during our sad bereavement in losing our dear son, the remainder of my effects I leave with my wife to dispose of as she thinks proper."

The controversy in the case is between Mrs. Rebecca S. Coffman, the widow, who claims the whole estate, subject to the payment of the two legacies of $500 each, and the heirs and distributees of the testator, who claim that he died intestate as to certain of his real and personal property. The lower court sustained the latter claim.

The will was dated May 5, 1900, and the testator died in January, 1920. He left no children or descendants, his only child, a son having died in 1898, but he was survived by his widow, Rebecca S. Coffman, three sisters, Mary A. Coffman, B. Frances Coffman, and Mrs. Martha E. Modesitt, and one brother, David J. Coffman, who were his heirs and distributees.

The testator and his wife were old people. The two unmarried sisters and the brother, a man of unsound mind, were likewise advanced in years, all of them being over 70 years of age. The married sister was considerably younger. The latter, with her husband, S. H. Modesitt, owned and resided on a valuable farm which had formerly belonged to her father, and which she had acquired by deed from her brothers and sisters. The two unmarried sisters and the unmarried brother lived on the same farm, were comfortably situated, and their support was reasonably well provided for.

The testator and his wife had resided for nearly 40 years prior to his death on a farm which had been conveyed to them jointly shortly after their marriage. The consideration for that conveyance was $3,205, $1,000 of which was paid for Mr. Coffman by his mother, $2,000 of which was paid for Mrs. Coffman by her father, and the residue of which, $205, the grantees perhaps paid jointly. Subsequently Mrs. Coffman, out of money realized from her father's estate, contributed $3,000, which went into the place in the way of improvements. Mr. Coffman was a good farmer, and his wife was industrious and frugal. They kept the farm in good condition, continuing to improve it, and that fact, together with the advance in the market price of farming land, made it worth perhaps $20,000 at the time of the testator's death. When the will was written the property of the testator consisted of his interest in the farm and of a considerable amount of personal property, made up of household furniture, farming implements, live stock, money, notes, bonds, and stock in various corporations. At the time of his death his indebtedness was very small, and the amount of his personal property of every kind had been increased to an aggregate amount of something more than $9,000. He had also acquired subsequent to the execution of the will two tracts of mountain land of somewhat uncertain value, but worth perhaps $2,000.

Before undertaking to construe the will we may dispose of a preliminary question raised by one of the assignments of error, and discussed at considerable length in the oral and written arguments in this case. A good deal of testimony was introduced for the purpose of showing that the testator did not want any of his property to go to his brother and sisters. The evidence relied on for this purpose was of two kinds or classes: First, evidence of a general nature tending to show that he did not feel kindly towards them; and, second, evidence of particular alleged declarations by him that he would exclude them or had excluded them by his will from any share in his estate. Some of this evidence of both classes was objected to, and some of it was introduced without objection. In rebuttal of such evidence, without waiving objection thereto, the heirs produced witnesses who testified to the contrary, some of them being offered to show that the testator was on good terms with his brother and sisters, and others to show that they had heard him make declarations indicating that he intended his estate to go to his own relations in blood.

In a memorandum opinion the learned judge of the circuit court says:

"Declarations of intention, etc., not admissible to aid in the construction of will. Objections of that character sustained."

It is contended that the court excluded "all evidence relating to the situation, and declared purposes and intentions of the testator in the disposal of his property." We do not understand that the court went this far. It excluded evidence of the testator's declarations of Intention, but not evidence of his situation, and this ruling was in accord with the law as applied to the facts of this case. The proper use of extrinsic evidence In aid of the interpretation of wills may be regarded as reasonably well settled. It cannot be used at all if the will is plain and unambiguous, for "it is not permitted to interpret that which has no need of interpretation." But there are many different ways of expressing the same thought; there are many varying shades of meaning which a group of words may have; men differ much in their knowledge of lexicography and grammar, and in their facility of expression; and the necessary result is that in many cases language is to be found in a will which appears to bo susceptible of more than one interpretation. In such cases resort may be had to extrinsic evidence, subject to certain reasonably well defined limitations.

Professor Charles A. Graves made a valuable contribution to the law on this subject in a paper which he read at the annual meeting of the Virginia State Bar Association in 1893, published in volume 4 of the Bar Association Reports, page 183 et seq.; also published in 14 Va. Law Reg. p. 913 et seq.

He divides the extrinsic evidence which may be offered in aid of the interpretation of a wilt into two classes, and says:

"Of these the first consists of material facts, and these may concern the testator, his property, his family, the claimant or claimants under the will, their relations to the testator, etc. The second class, on the other hand, is confined to direct evidence of the testator's actual intention, such as his declarations of intention, his informal memoranda for his will, his instructions for its preparation, and his statements to the scrivener or others as to the meaning of its language. And this division of extrinsic evidence not only exists in the nature of the case, but is of the utmost practical importance in the interpretation of wills, as the rules for the admissibility of the two kinds of evidence are not the same. Let us call the first kind the facts and circumstances, and use the expression 'declaration of intention' to describe all extrinsic statements by the testator as to his actual testamentary intentions—i. e., as to what he has done, or designs to do, by his will, or as to the meaning of its words as used by him."

Having made this classification, Professor Graves proceeds to show that evidence of the first kind, "the facts and circumstances, " is always admissible in a case of disputed interpretation, saying:

"For the object of interpretation is to ascertain the meaning of the words as used by the testator; what the words represented in his mind; what he understood to be signified by them; and for this purpose it is indispensable that the expositor should know the situation of the testator; the state of his family and property; his relations to persons and things; his opinions and beliefs; his hopes and fears; his habits of thought and of language; in a word, that the interpreter should identify himself with the testator as to knowledge, feeling, and speech, and thus, scanning the words of the will from the testator's point of view, decide as to their meaning as used by him."

In support of this conclusion the learned author cites Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. 74, 8 L. Ed. 322. Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300, 8 Sup. Ct. 1164, 32 L. Ed. 138, Hatcher v. Hatcher, 80 Va. 169, and Miller v. Potterfield, 86 Va. 876, 11 S. E. 4S6, 19 Am. St. Rep. 919; to which we may add, from a number of recent Virginia decisions to the same effect, Stark v. Berry, 118 Va. 706, 711, 88 S. E. 68, and Penick's Bx'r v. Walker, 125 Va. 274, 278, 99 S. E. 559. In the last-named case we said:

"The primary consideration and rule of construction is to determine the intention of the testator from the language which he has used. If the meaning of that language is plain, the will must be given effect accordingly. This rule is familiar and elementary, and to it all others are subordinate and subservient. If there be doubt as to the meaning, then the auxiliary or subordinate rule to be first applied, and the one of most usefulness and importance, is for the court to place itself as nearly as possible in the situation of the testator at the time of the execution of the will."

With reference to the second of the two classes of...