Cofield v. United States, Civ. No. 14–0055 KBJ

• Decision Date: 20 August 2014
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 14–0055 KBJ
• Citation: 64 F.Supp.3d 206
• Parties: Keenan K. Cofield, Plaintiff, v. United States of America, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

64 F.Supp.3d 206

Keenan K. Cofield, Plaintiff

v.United States of America, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 14–0055 KBJ

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed August 20, 2014

Keenan K. Cofield, Westover, MD, pro se.

Shuchi Batra, Kimberly J. Duplechain, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for United States Of America, Small Business Administration, Federal Communication Commission, Federal Trade Commission and Congress of the United States United States Senate.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Keenan K. Cofield (“Plaintiff”) is a Maryland state prisoner incarcerated at the Eastern Correctional Institution in Westover, Maryland.¹ In December of 2013, Plaintiff lodged a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against the United States and various federal agencies, President Barack Obama, the United States House of Representatives, and the United States Senate (collectively, “Federal Defendants”), as well as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) and that organization's President, Rod Beckstrom. Plaintiff demands billions of dollars in damages and injunctive and declaratory relief.

On January 15, 2014, the House of Representatives removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1446, with the consent of the remaining Federal Defendants. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.) On February 5, 2014, the Court granted the House of Representatives' motion to dismiss in light of Plaintiff's consent to the dismissal. (See Order, ECF No. 6.) Presently before the Court is the remaining Federal Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or for summary judgment under Rule 56. (See Fed. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 9, at 1.)² In addition, ICANN has moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process. (See Defs.' Internet Corp. for Assigned Name and Numbers & Richard Beckstrom's Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 27; Mem. In Supp. of Defs. Internet Corp. for Assigned Name and Numbers & Rod Beckstrom's Mot. to Dismiss (“ICANN's Mem.”), ECF No. 27–2, at 1.) Plaintiff has filed a response to the Federal Defendants' motion and has moved for summary judgment or a default judgment “specifically against Defendants ICANN[.]” (Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J., or in the Alternative Mot. for Default J. & Response to U.S. Gov't's Only Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 13.)

Because this Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against the Federal Defendants, the Court will GRANT the Federal Defendants' motion under Rule 12(b)(1), and will REMAND Plaintiff's case against ICAAN and Beckstrom to the Superior Court.³ A separate order consistent with this opinion will follow.

I. BACKGROUND

The two-count complaint in this matter is perplexing. The Court has read it liberally and considers the following information to be relevant to the disposition of the case.

Plaintiff alleges that, in approximately 1997 or 1998, the Department of Commerce (via the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration) issued a proposal that “allowed for the creation and formation of” ICANN. (Compl., ECF No. 1–1, at 7.) According to Plaintiff, ICANN is “a California non-profit, which ... oversees, the Internet, regulates Domain names, web addresses, the organization in charge of creating hundreds of additional address suffixes, and more.” (Id. ; see also ICANN's Mem. at 2 (explaining that ICAAN is a Los Angeles, California-based “not-for-profit public benefit corporation” that “administers the Internet's domain name system [ ] on behalf of the Internet community, pursuant to a series of agreements with the United States Department of Commerce.” (citation omitted)).) Plaintiff also describes ICANN as “a single white owned non-profit government controlled business monopoly[.]” (Compl. at 9.) He states that “[a]ll [he] wants is the legal right for the process and competition to be fair, to be open, and equal to all no matter, race and other factors, to provide and expand the existing internet/technology system to more people in different ways ... and the right to open and do business like ICANN [.]” (Id. at 7.)

In Count 1 of the Complaint, Plaintiff challenges the Defendants' alleged denial in September 2013 of his “several” Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests for records pertaining to ICANN, “includ[ing] the 1998 proposal that led to [its] creation[.]” (Id. at 6.) In Count 2 of the Complaint, Plaintiff accuses the federal government of engaging in widespread illegal and unfair business practices with a “non-government servant, agent, or contractor” to the detriment of “minority or blacks,” who, according to Plaintiff, cannot “engage with ICANN [ ] for assigned names and numbers[.]” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff alleges, among other wrongs, that the government has “issued a blank check to allow [ ] ICANN a[n] un-restricted license with a BIG expensive specific duty and title[.]” (Id. ) Plaintiff also states that he is Black, and “[w]e as a race of people have been intentionally omitted, to be left behind when it comes to technology [ ] by design[.]” (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff continues in this manner, directing his accusations in large part at ICANN. Ultimately, the complaint demands a judgment of $10 billion in punitive damages, $3 billion in compensatory damages, and “a guaranteed government loan, grants and/or line of credit of ... [one billion] dollars, to start and further develop[ ] Plaintiff[']s business ideas, business plans, business models to concepts into jobs and careers, in the tech profession.” (Id. at 23, 24.) In addition, Plaintiff seeks an injunction barring ICAAN from, among other conduct, issuing “any ... new web addresses or domain name suffixes” and declaratory relief. (Id. at 24–35.)

In their motion to dismiss, the Federal Defendants contend inter alia that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of four jurisdictional barriers: Sovereign Immunity; the derivative jurisdiction doctrine; the Speech or Debate Clause (as to the U.S. Senate); and Plaintiff's lack of standing as to Count II of the Complaint. (See Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Mot. for Summ. J. (“Fed. Defs.' Mem.”), ECF No. 9–1, at 11–18.) For their part, ICANN and Beckstrom have jointly moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(5) and 4(m), alleging that Plaintiff never properly served them with the complaint, and that they have never waived service of process. (ICANN's Mem. at 4–5.)

As explained below, this Court concludes that the claims against the individual federal officials in their personal capacities are not properly brought and that it does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against the Federal Defendants by virtue of sovereign immunity and the derivative jurisdiction doctrine; consequently, the Court declines to consider the Federal Defendants' other (alternative) grounds for dismissal. In addition, the Court will remand what remains of the case—i.e., Plaintiffs' claims against ICCAN and Beckstrom—leaving those defendants' service arguments for the Superior Court to resolve. See McKoy–Shields v. First Wash. Realty, Inc., No. 11–01419, 2012 WL 1076195, at *2–3 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2012) (remanding remainder of removed case after finding that court lacked jurisdiction over claims against federal agency).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(B)(1)

If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a claim, it must dismiss that claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3). Where, as here, a defendant files a motion to dismiss under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), “the court must first examine the Rule 12(b)(1) challenges” because a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction renders “the [other] accompanying defenses and objections [ ] moot[.]” Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F.Supp.2d 59, 64 (D.D.C.2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

It is well-settled that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citation omitted); Halcomb v. Office of the Senate Sergeant–at–Arms of the U.S. Senate, 209 F.Supp.2d 175, 176 (D.D.C.2002) (citation omitted). Indeed, when it comes to Rule 12(b)(1), it is “ ‘presumed that a cause lies outside [the federal courts'] limited jurisdiction,’ unless the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the Court possesses jurisdiction[.]” Muhamm a d v. FDIC, 751 F.Supp.2d 114, 118 (D.D.C.2010) (first alteration in original) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) and citing Hollingsworth v. Duff, 444 F.Supp.2d 61, 63 (D.D.C.2006) ).

“[T]he court must scrutinize the plaintiff's allegations more closely when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than it would under ... Rule 12(b)(6).” Schmidt, 826 F.Supp.2d at 65 (citing Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64, 69 (D.C.Cir.2003), Epps v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 719 F.Supp.2d 7, 12 (D.D.C.2010), and Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C.2001) ). Still, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Epps, 719 F.Supp.2d at 13 (citing Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C.Cir.2003) ), but it need not “accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual allegations[,]” Rann v. Chao, 154 F.Supp.2d 61, 64 (D.D.C.2001).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff's Individual–Capacity Claims

As an initial matter, Plaintiff states that “all defendants are being sued in...