Cogan, In re
Decision Date | 31 May 1979 |
Citation | 485 Pa. 273,401 A.2d 1142 |
Parties | In re Dennis J. COGAN, Contemnor. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Mark E. Kogan, Norris E. Gelman, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Robert B. Lawler, Chief, Appeals Div., Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ.
Appellant Dennis J. Cogan, Esq. entered an appearance as defense counsel on behalf of a client charged with murder of the first degree. On December 15, 1976, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, Sabo, J., conducted a suppression hearing. Over the course of the hearing, there were several exchanges between counsel and the court. At the end of one exchange appellant was summarily convicted of criminal contempt of court and fined $100. On appeal, we are asked only to review whether the record supports the conviction. We reverse.
At the suppression hearing, the defendant disputed that his arrest was based on probable cause. The defendant had been arrested on the basis of statements obtained during the interrogation of another suspect. A police officer was called by the Commonwealth at the suppression hearing to describe the suspect's interrogation. The officer's cross-examination was interrupted by an exchange between appellant and the court. To properly evaluate the consequences of appellant's conduct on the orderly progress of the suppression hearing, we must refer to the relevant portions of the record.
The dispute concerning probable cause arose again later.
Q. Did you make any notations regarding the defendant's physical condition at the time you were interrogating him?
A. Mentally only, sir.
Q. Excuse me.
A. Mentally only.
Q. And again you are relying only on your recollection; is that right?
A. That is right.
Q. How many defendants have you interrogated since August tenth, 1976?
Q. In other words, this is a result of your independent recollection, your mental recording of what happened that day, and not as a result of any reference to any written recording anywhere; is that right?
A. If you are referring to his condition at the time of this statement, yes.
Q. You have a vivid recollection . . .
Q. I am asking did you have a vivid recollection that day . . .
Q. Do you have a vivid recollection of what occurred that day regarding his physical condition?
Q. Do you know what I mean when I use the word "vivid"?
A. Detailed.
Q. Yes. Do you have a detailed recollection of what my client's physical condition was that day?
A. No, sir.
A. And I take it, then, that you are not in a position to say whether he was sleepy that day, for example?
The court cited the above exchanges as the basis for sustaining the criminal contempt conviction.
Courts have the power summarily to convict those before them of criminal contempt of court. Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 784, § 23, 17 P.S. § 2041, reenacted as 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4131; see also ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to The Function of the Trial Judge § 7.1 (Approved Draft 1972). This Court has previously construed the criminal contempt statute, In re Johnson, 467 Pa. 552, 359 A.2d 739 (1976) and we note that immediately after our decision in Johnson, supra, the Legislature reenacted the Act of 1836 contempt statute using identical language. 1 Each subsection of the statute is intended Criminal contempt of court is a criminal offense and thus every element of the offense must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson, supra, 467 Pa. at 557, 359 A.2d at 742. "To prove criminal contempt of court which may be acted upon under authority of subsection III of the Act of June 16, 1836, the Commonwealth must prove an improper intent, an action and an obstruction of the administration of justice." Johnson, supra, id.
to penalize a different class of contemnor. In re Johnson, 467 Pa. at 556-57, 359 A.2d at 741-42. Subsection I permits the court to compel proper performance of a ministerial duty by a Commonwealth official....
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...494 Pa. 2, 8, 427 A.2d 1154, 1157 (1980); Commonwealth v. Rubright, 489 Pa. 356, 363, 414 A.2d 106, 110 (1980); In re Cogan, 485 Pa. 273, 281, 401 A.2d 1142, 1146 (1979); Commonwealth v. Garrison, 478 Pa. 356, 371, 386 A.2d 971, 979 (1978); In re Johnson, 467 Pa. 552, 557, 359 A.2d 739, 742......
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