Coger v. Connecticut

• Decision Date: 12 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 3:98-CV-1593 (EBB).,3:98-CV-1593 (EBB).
• Citation: 309 F.Supp.2d 274
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Jessie COGER, Plaintiff v. State of CONNECTICUT, Department of Administrative Services, et. al., Defendants

309 F.Supp.2d 274

Jessie COGER, Plaintiff v. State of CONNECTICUT, Department of Administrative Services, et. al., Defendants

No. 3:98-CV-1593 (EBB).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

March 12, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kenneth Alan Beck, Beck & Beck, Stratford, CT, Rebecca L. Johnson, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff.

Jane B. Emons, Loida John-Nicholson, Margaret Quilter Chapple, Maria C. Rodriguez, Michael J. Lanoue, Tammy D. Geathers, Laurie Adler, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BURNS, Senior District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jessie Coger ("Coger" or "plaintiff") brings this employment discrimination action against the State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety and Department of Administrative Services, Bureau of Selection and Training ("defendants" or "State of Connecticut") pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 46a-60 et. Seq. Coger alleges that defendants discriminated against him because of his race by failing to hire him as a Connecticut State Police Officer-Trainee ("Trainee"). Defendants now move pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 for summary judgment on all claims. For the reasons detailed below, defendants' motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

The Court sets forth only those facts deemed necessary to an understanding of the issues raised in, and decision rendered on, this Motion. The facts are culled from the parties' Local Rule 56(a) Statements, affidavits, and the exhibits attached to their respective memoranda. Plaintiff is not in compliance with Local Rule 56(a), as he failed to set forth facts plaintiff contends are in dispute, as required by a party opposing a motion for summary judgment. Rule 56(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

The papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include a document entitled "Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement which states in separately numbered paragraphs corresponding to the numbered paragraphs contained in the moving parties Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement whether each of the facts asserted by the moving party is admitted or denied." The Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement must also include in a separate section entitled "Disputed Issues of Material Fact" a list of each issue of material fact as to which it is contended there is a genuine issue to be tried.

L.R. Civ. P. 56(a)2.

Further, each 56(a)(1) & (2) Statement is to be followed by "either a specific citation to (1) the affidavit of a witness competent to testify to the facts at trial, and/or (2) evidence that would be admissible at trial." L.R. Civ. P. 56(a)3. The purpose of Rule 56 is to aid the court, by directing it to the material facts that the movant claims are undisputed and that the party opposing the motion claims are disputed. Without such statement, "the court is left to dig through a voluminous record, searching for material issues of fact without the aid of the parties." N.S. v. Stratford Bd. of Educ., 97 F.Supp.2d 224, 227 (D.Conn.2000). Accordingly, Connecticut's Local Rules specifically state that "failure to provide specific citations to evidence in the record as required by this Local Rule may result in sanctions, including... when an opponent fails to comply, an order granting the motion [for summary judgment]." L.R. Civ. P. 56(a)(3).

Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts "Pursuant to Local Rule 9(c)¹" merely lists the numbered paragraphs in defendants' Rule 56(a)(1) Statement that the plaintiff agrees are undisputed, and then asserts "the balance of defendant's statements are denied." [Doc. No. 88]. This one-sentence blanket statement denying more than 50 statements of material fact asserted by defendant, without citations to affidavits or exhibits which support such denials of fact, is not in compliance with the local rule. While this court could grant defendants' summary judgment motion based on plaintiff's failure to comply with the local rules, in the interests of judicial fairness, this Court will consider the issues in this case and decide the case on the merits. However, all facts set forth in defendants' complying Rule 56(c)(1) statement will be deemed admitted by plaintiff for purposes of the decision on this Motion. See e.g. Dusanenko v. Maloney, 726 F.2d 82, 84 (2d Cir.1984) (facts set forth in the statement of undisputed facts were properly deemed admitted given opposing party's failure to file a local rule statement of disputed material facts; entry of summary judgment appropriate); Booze v. Shawmut Bank, 62 F.Supp.2d 593, 595 (D.Conn.1999).

The plaintiff is an African American male, who resides in Stratford, Connecticut. Plaintiff has made multiple attempts to gain employment as a Connecticut State Police Trainee, first in the spring of 1993 and subsequently in the winter of 1995. When plaintiff applied in 1993 and 1995, there were vacancies for the position and applications were actively sought for the position. As part of the selection process, applicants are required to take a written examination, an oral examination, a physical fitness and agility test, and a polygraph examination during which the applicant's social and criminal backgrounds are investigated.

The Department of Administrative Services (DAS) and Department of Public Safety (DPS) are in charge of the recruitment and administration of the examination for Trainee positions. Prior to the oral examination each candidate completes a Supplemental Background Investigation, and a pre-test self-examination booklet, which include questions regarding personal data, employment history, driving history, criminal activity, drug use, and other personal information. The polygraph examiner reviews these written responses with the candidate, using the polygraph instrument. The examiner then submits potentially disqualifying information to the Selection Management Committee, which consists of three to five sworn individuals, during which the candidate's identity or characteristics are not revealed. The committee may eliminate a candidate from further consideration or permit him or her to continue in the process.

Plaintiff first applied to become a Trainee on October 14, 1992, and passed the written, oral and physical fitness portions of Exam No. 9290500, which was administered to all applicants for the position. Plaintiff received a 64 on the written exam, and a nine out of ten on the oral exam. During his polygraph examination, plaintiff admitted use of unprescribed steroids in the 1980's, and to a series of motor vehicle violations, including misuse of license plates, operating a vehicle without insurance, and operating an unregistered vehicle. Based on his polygraph examination report, the Selection Management Committee decided to terminate Coger's application for Trainee. Captain John Leonard, the Commanding Officer of Selection and Training, wrote plaintiff a letter informing him that he would not be proceeding further in the selection process. After receiving an inquiry from Coger regarding the reasons for his rejection, Captain Leonard wrote plaintiff another letter explaining that the decision not to hire him was based on his traffic infractions and steroid use.

On March 14, 1995, Coger applied again to become a Connecticut State Trooper Trainee. Plaintiff took Exam No. 9415000, in which he received a 63 on the written exam, which is a passing score. Plaintiff failed the oral exam, however, receiving a three out of ten. The oral exam was administered by two employees of the Department of Public Safety; Sergeant Randolph Howell, an African American male, and Trooper First Class Stephan Castagliulo a white male. A Department of Administrative Services Monitor, Miriam Bassock, a white female, was also present to oversee the test administration. During the exam, plaintiff was shown a videotape of a series of four situations and asked questions concerning what he observed while watching the tape. The same questions were asked of each candidate, and model answers for each question had previously been prepared. The examiners gave plaintiff points for any correct observations he made during the test. Because he failed the oral exam, plaintiff was not given the opportunity to continue with the process and take the other examinations.

Plaintiff filed dual employment discrimination complaints with the State of Connecticut, Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CHRO") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on April 4, 1996. Plaintiff asserts that defendants denied his applications on the basis of his race, and that the reasons provided by defendants as to why he was not hired in 1993 and 1995 were pre-textual. Plaintiff argues that white applicants with similar or worse histories of drug use or motor vehicle violations were hired, whereas he was not. He further argues that the record of his 1993 application continues to prevent him from being hired, and that his low score on the 1995 oral examination was a result of discriminatory treatment based on his race, and not an accurate reflection of his performance on the test.

On May 7, 1998, the EEOC issued a Notice Of Right to Sue, enabling him to file this action pursuant to 29 CFR 1601.28(a)(1), et seq. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in federal court on August 6, 1998, alleging he was discriminated against based on his race and color, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 46a-60 et. Seq. On August 1, 2002, Judge Warren Edginton granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment based on plaintiff's failure to respond to the motion. However, upon motion by plaintiff and after a hearing on the issue, Judge Edginton entered...