Coggins v. Carpenter

Decision Date22 March 1979
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 78-2246.
PartiesIris COGGINS v. R. R. M. CARPENTER, Jr., William H. Lamb, Mary Kaye Carpenter Murray, County of Chester, John H. Wollman, Edward G. Conroy, James H. McQueen, Larry Smith, James Shaefer and Thomas Smith.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

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David S. Shrager, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Richard A. Kraemer, Gregory M. Harvey, Philadelphia, Pa., Thomas O. Malcolm, John S. Halsted, West Chester, Pa., Lawrence E. Grant, Paoli, Pa., William T. Hangley, G. Wayne Renneisen, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BECHTLE, District Judge.

Plaintiff Iris Coggins ("Coggins"), allegedly a citizen and resident of the State of New York, brought this civil rights action1 against the following defendants: (1) R. R. M. Carpenter, Jr. ("Carpenter"), a citizen and resident of the State of Delaware; (2) William H. Lamb ("Lamb"), a citizen and resident of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, who is sued in his capacity as a member of the bar of Pennsylvania maintaining offices in West Chester, Pennsylvania, and in his capacity as the District Attorney of Chester County, Pennsylvania; (3) Mary Kaye Carpenter Murray ("Murray"), a citizen and resident of Delaware and who is Carpenter's daughter; (4) the County of Chester ("County"); (5) John H. Wollman ("Wollman"), a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania, who is sued in his capacity as a member of the bar of Pennsylvania maintaining offices in West Chester, Pennsylvania, and in his capacity as Deputy District Attorney of Chester County; (6) Edward G. Conroy ("Conroy"), a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania, who is a member of the bar of Pennsylvania maintaining offices in West Chester, Pennsylvania; (7) James H. McQueen ("McQueen"), a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania, who is sued solely in his capacity as Sheriff of Chester County; (8) Larry Smith ("Smith"), a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania, who is sued solely in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Chester County; (9) James Shaefer ("Shaefer"), a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania, who is sued solely in his capacity as the Chief of Police of the Borough of Kennett Square, Pennsylvania; (10) Thomas Smith, an accountant who is a citizen and resident of Delaware; and, (11) William DuPont ("DuPont"), a citizen and resident of Delaware.2 Lamb, Wollman and Conroy are alleged to be partners and/or associates in the law firm of Lamb, Windle and McErlane; and Thomas Smith is alleged to be employed by Carpenter. In her amended complaint ("complaint"), Coggins alleges claims against each of the defendants based upon: (1) 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985; (2) the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as that amendment incorporates her rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and, (3) state law. The specific state law claims asserted by Coggins against each of the defendants are: (1) negligence; (2) outrageous conduct; (3) assault and battery; (4) malicious prosecution and abuse of process; and, (5) civil conspiracy. In addition, she alleges a state constitutional claim against the County based upon Article I, § 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1332(a) and 1343, and the amount in controversy is alleged to exceed $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs. No pendent jurisdiction is alleged.

The facts, as alleged in the complaint and as pertinent to this Opinion, are as follows: Murray, the estranged wife of Coggins' brother, Peter Coggins, has since July of 1976 been represented by Lamb, Wollman and Conroy and the firm of Lamb, Windle and McErlane in connection with certain domestic relations and property matters then pending between Murray and Peter Coggins. In connection with this representation, Murray, Lamb, Wollman and Conroy conspired among themselves and with one or more of the other defendants to obtain a writ of seizure ("writ") authorizing the removal of certain personal property from the home of Peter Coggins. On July 16, 1976, Murray, Wollman, Smith, DuPont, Thomas Smith, a secretary, a photographer and moving-van personnel appeared at Peter Coggins' home to execute the writ. In the course of this execution, the burglar alarm was neutralized, a maintenance man was advised to remain in the barn, lookouts were posted and virtually every item of personal property was removed from Peter Coggins' home.

Coggins, driving Peter Coggins' car, arrived at her brother's home at approximately 4:00 p. m. while the defendants named above were executing the writ. Discovering that property was being removed from her brother's home, she removed the keys from Murray's car, which she had recognized, and, intending to notify her brother and the State Police attempted to drive away. Murray recognized Coggins and requested one or more of the other defendants to stop her. Smith, who was dressed in civilian clothes, attempted to prevent Coggins from leaving by, inter alia, assaulting and battering her. Coggins managed to drive away from the area but was followed by Smith in an unmarked car with which he repeatedly rammed and smashed into Coggins' car. Smith then forced Coggins into a roadblock set up by the Kennett Square Police Department, acting under the direction of Shaefer. When Coggins stopped her car, Smith, Shaefer and/or one or more of their agents or employees committed various torts against Coggins which caused her bodily and psychological injury. She was then handcuffed and transported to the Kennett Square Police Headquarters, where she was denied adequate medical attention.

Subsequent to these events, criminal charges were brought against Coggins in the Count of Common Pleas of Chester County by one or more of the defendants acting with the knowledge and approval of Lamb. Coggins was acquitted by a jury on all counts. Coggins alleges that these criminal charges were maliciously initiated and brought without reasonable or probable cause.

Lamb, Wollman, Conroy, Murray and Carpenter have each moved to dismiss Coggins' complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of diversity of jurisdiction. Murray and Carpenter have also moved to dismiss, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) and (5), for lack of personal jurisdiction and for insufficiency of service of process, respectively. In addition, the County, Lamb, Wollman, Conroy, Smith, McQueen, Murray and Carpenter have each moved to dismiss, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Shaefer and Thomas Smith have not filed any motions to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, we will: (1) grant the Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) motions of Lamb, Wollman, Conroy, Murray and Carpenter to dismiss Coggins' state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) grant Murray's and Carpenter's motions to dismiss the complaint as to them for lack of personal jurisdiction and for insufficiency of service of process, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) and (5), respectively; (3) grant the motions of Murray, Carpenter, the County and McQueen to dismiss the claims based upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and the Fourteenth Amendment for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); (4) grant the Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motions of Lamb, Wollman and Conroy to dismiss the claims based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and deny their Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss the claims based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) grant the Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion of Smith to dismiss the claims based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and the Fourteenth Amendment and deny his Fed.P.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the claim based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and, (6) dismiss sua sponte, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the claims against Shaefer and Thomas Smith based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

I. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)

In her complaint, Coggins alleges that she is a citizen and resident of the State of New York and that the defendants are all citizens and residents of either Pennsylvania or Delaware. She also alleges jurisdiction over these defendants with respect to her state law claims on the basis of diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Coggins does not invoke this Court's pendent jurisdiction.

In their Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss, Lamb, Wollman, Conroy, Murray and Carpenter argue that Coggins is, in fact, a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania and that, therefore, this Court lacks diversity jurisdiction to entertain Coggins' state law claims. However, none of these moving defendants has submitted any affidavits or other material to the Court other than legal memoranda to support their arguments. Coggins has responded to these particular allegations with a mere denial and, likewise, has submitted no material to this Court other than a brief reply memorandum.

It is well settled that there is a presumption against the existence of federal jurisdiction and that the party invoking the federal court's jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974). It is also well settled that there is a presumption in favor of an original or former domicile as opposed to an acquired one. Herzog v. Herzog, 333 F.Supp. 477, 478 (W.D.Pa.1971). On the face of the complaint, Coggins has overcome these presumptions by properly pleading subject matter jurisdiction based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). However, if a defendant properly challenges the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations, the burden of proof is again upon the plaintiff to support those jurisdictional allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936); Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S....

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