Cohen v. Industrial Finance Corporation
Citation | 44 F. Supp. 491 |
Parties | COHEN v. INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION et al. |
Decision Date | 15 January 1942 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Bondy & Schloss, of New York City (Eugene L. Bondy, of New York City, of counsel), for complainant.
Jay Leo Rothschild, of New York City (Walter S. Beck, of New York City, of counsel), for defendants.
This is a suit by a stockholder of Industrial Acceptance Corporation against two corporations, Industrial Finance Corporation and Morris Plan Corporation which are alleged to have conspired to deprive Industrial Acceptance Corporation of its working capital, to transfer its liquid assets to Industrial Finance Corporation for investment in Morris Plan Corporation and thus to put Industrial Acceptance Corporation out of business. The latter corporation is a nominal defendant.
Defendants move under Rule 12, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, to dismiss the complaint herein on the ground that the plaintiff stockholder does not have the legal capacity to sue because of an alleged failure to comply with a provision of Rule 23(b) F.R.C.P. and on the further ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Plaintiff's attorneys, opposing the motions, contend that she has fully complied with Rule 23(b) by pleading with great particularity valid reasons for not making a demand upon the managing directors of Industrial Acceptance Corporation that they bring the suit for the relief demanded herein.
The complaint alleges that "Acceptance" was engaged in the business of financing automobile purchases; that from the year of its organization 1924 until 1929, the year of the last published report of its transactions, the approximate annual volume of business transacted by "Acceptance" varied between $68,000,000 and $87,000,000; that the average annual net income of "Acceptance" for such period was approximately $875,000.
The gravamen of the complaint is the alleged conspiracy by defendants "Finance" and "Morris Plan".
Paragraphs 20 and 21 state:
The line of "credit" was later increased to $6,000,000 and the interest was reduced from 6% to 1%.
It is alleged that at the time of the execution of the transactions complained of, at least thirteen of the seventeen directors of "Acceptance" were also directors of "Finance", and that the president, vice-president, secretary and assistant secretary of "Finance" held the same offices in "Acceptance". It is also alleged that after these transactions had been completed, "Finance" continued to dominate "Acceptance", by the device of electing controlled employees and nominees of "Finance" to the Board of directors of "Acceptance"; that this was possible because "Finance" owned or controlled from 85% to 90% of the voting stock of "Acceptance". All the outstanding second preferred stock of "Acceptance" is also owned by "Finance".
The complaint further alleges that "Finance" so successfully consummated the conspiracy to siphon all the assets of "Acceptance" into "Finance" and "Morris Plan" that the amount of commercial paper, in which "Acceptance" dealt, declined from $35,000,000 in 1930 to less than $175,000 at the end of 1932.
The complaint alleges that these acts greatly damaged "Acceptance" and especially its first preferred stockholders. It is also alleged that actions have been brought by stockholders of "Acceptance" to secure redress for the wrongs alleged in the complaint but that those actions were caused to be settled and discontinued without profit to "Acceptance" by the directors of "Acceptance".
Paragraph 18th of the complaint alleges:
The plaintiff herein concededly made no demand herself upon the directors of "Acceptance" to institute the present suit. Instead the complaint alleges such a demand was rendered unnecessary and futile because of facts pleaded with considerable particularity.
The complaint states:
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