Cohen v. Stein

• Decision Date: 25 November 1884
• Parties: COHEN AND OTHERS v. STEIN AND OTHERS.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

61 Wis. 508

21 N.W. 514

COHEN AND OTHERS

v.STEIN AND OTHERS.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Filed November 25, 1884.

Appeal from county court, Milwaukee county.

Chapin, Dey & Friend, for respondents.

Jenkins, Winkler & Smith, for appellants.

COLE, C. J.

It is clear that the contract set up in the complaint was void under the statute of frauds. It was a verbal agreement, and by its terms was not to be performed within one year from the making thereof. As stated in the complaint, the plaintiffs and defendants, about the twenty-sixth of February, 1883, entered into a verbal agreement by which the plaintiffs, for a term commencing April 15, 1883, and ending May 1, 1884, agreed to render their joint services to the defendants for a compensation of $50 a week. It will be seen that this contract comes within the express language of the statute, (section 2307, Rev. St.,) but it is alleged that the plaintiffs entered into the service of the defendants about April 15, 1883, and continued such employment until June 2d, following, when the defendants discharged them without cause. The plaintiffs seek to recover the value of the services rendered, which they claim were reasonably worth $2,500. Under the decision of this court there can be no doubt as to the correctness of the proposition that where a person renders services under a contract which is void, he can recover upon a quantum meruit the value of such services. Cole v. Clarke, 3 Wis. 323;Brandeis v. Neustadtl, 13 Wis. 142;Thomas v. Sowards, 25 Wis. 631;Northwestern U. P. Co. v. Shaw, 37 Wis. 655;Clark v. Davidson, 53 Wis. 317;S. C. 10 N. W. REP. 384. The rule rests on the strongest equity, compelling a party who has received a benefit from a part execution of a contract which binds neither party to make compensation for the benefit which he has received. As a matter of course the defendants were at liberty to discharge the plaintiffs from their employment at any time, as the plaintiffs were at liberty to leave. The logic of the rule is, inasmuch as the contract has no legal validity, it is not admissible in evidence to determine the value of the services, but the servant recovers what he can show his services were reasonably worth. Acting upon this idea, with other testimony produced to show the value of plaintiff's services, the deposition of one Sylvester, of Chicago, was read in evidence on the part of plaintiffs. He testified that he was a designer of cloak patterns, etc., and had known the plaintiff Morris for a few months, and had known his reputation as a cloak-designer for some years. This testimony was objected to as being incompetent and immaterial. But the witness was allowed to state that from the general reputation of Mr. Cohen he considered him a competent and skillful designer of cloak patterns.

It is said by the learned counsel for the defendants that the fact in issue was whether Cohen was a competent and skillful designer, as bearing on the question of the value of his services, and not what his reputation was. It seems to us it was incompetent to establish the fact of skill in this way. It was more proper to show by witnesses who could speak from their own knowledge as to his qualifications. The evidence given was in the nature of hearsay testimony as to a fact which was susceptible of being proved by witnesses who could testify as to...