Cohens v. Md. Dep't of Human Res.

• Decision Date: 19 March 2013
• Docket Number: Civil No. WDQ–11–3419.
• Citation: 933 F.Supp.2d 735
• Parties: Cheryl F. COHENS, Plaintiff, v. State of MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

933 F.Supp.2d 735

Cheryl F. COHENS, Plaintiff,

v.State of MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. WDQ–11–3419.

United States District Court,

D. Maryland,

Northern Division.

March 19, 2013.

Cheryl F. Cohens, Abingdon, MD, pro se.

Elise Song Kurlander, Office of The Attorney General, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM D. QUARLES, JR., District Judge.

Cheryl F. Cohens ¹ sued the Maryland Department of Human Resources (the “DHR”) ² for employment discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),³ the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (the “EPA”),⁴ the Maryland Equal Pay Act (the “MEPA”), ⁵ and Title 20 of the State Government Article of the Maryland Code (“Title 20”) ⁶. Pending are Cohens's motion for reconsideration of the Court's order dismissing her retaliation claim; the parties' cross motions for summary judgment; and Cohens's motion to amend the memorandum in support of her summary judgment motion.⁷ For the following reasons, Cohens's motion for reconsiderationwill be granted in part and denied in part; Cohens's motion to amend will be granted; Cohens's motion for summary judgment will be denied; and the DHR's cross motion for summary judgment will be granted.

I. Background ⁸

Cohens, an African–American woman, was hired as an Administrative Officer II at the DHR on November 4, 1993. Compl. ¶ 6. On November 30, 1994, she was promoted to Administrative Officer III, Grade 15, Step 11. Id.; see McMahan Decl. at 24 ¶ 10.⁹ On July 27, 2005, Frank Valenti, a white man, hired Cohens to work in the DHR's training unit (“HRDT”). McMahan Decl. at 24 ¶ 9. ¹⁰

Three male trainers and another female trainer worked in HRDT. See McMahan Decl. at 22–24 ¶¶ 5–8; ECF No. 28 at 2. The other members of HRDT were Doctor Marian Davis–Foster, an African–American woman; Osceola Edmondson, an African–American man; Ron Forbes, a white man; and Barry Simon, a white man. McMahan Decl. at 22–24 ¶¶ 5–8.¹¹ Edmondson possesses a bachelor of science in business and a masters in public administration; ¹² Forbes possesses a bachelor of science and a masters in education; ¹³ and Simon possesses a bachelor of science in business administration ¹⁴. Id. ¶¶ 6–8. Cohens did not obtain a college degree. See Cohens Dep. at 61 (31:14–17, 32:6–9). Cohens testified she “didn't know” whether the other HRDT members had received more training than her, but believed that she had more experience than them in “some areas.” Id. at 61 (31:18–21, 32:9–12).¹⁵

For the next four years, Cohens was denied pay increases and remained an Administrative Officer III. Compl. ¶ 7. In her complaint, Cohens alleges various discriminatory actions were taken against her during this time, by Valenti and others. See id. ¶¶ 8–9, 25–26.

In March 2009, HRDT employees received an email stating each person's pay. Compl. ¶ 8. Cohens learned that she was being paid between $25,000 and $30,000 less per year than the white or male trainers. Id.¹⁶ She “expressed her disappointment and concerns of discrimination and pay disparity with Valenti,” but her pay remained the same “and nothing changed around the office.” Id. ¶ 9. Thereafter, Cohens “felt that Valenti began trying to stifle her growth and retaliate against her.” Id. ¶ 10. For instance, Valenti refused to allow Cohens to be the keynote speaker for an event, despite the organizers' request that Cohens speak. Id. Valenti recommended a male speaker. Id.

Sometime before July 2009, Cohens “broke down in tears in Valenti's office” and told him that the work environment was “difficult” for her. Compl. ¶ 11; see ECF No. 10–1 at 4 n.6. Cohens's coworkers knew that she was terrified of mice, and “[s]omeone [had] put mousetraps in her office.” Compl. ¶ 11. Cohens's training schedule had also been reduced. Id. Cohens told Valenti that she “needed to take a leave of absence because of her mental state regarding work depression.” Id. Valenti allegedly told Cohens “she had to be a good girl” to get her leave approved, and “someone in [m]anagement was trying to terminate her.” Id.

On July 11, 2009, Cohens submitted a letter of resignation, effective September 29, 2009. Compl. ¶ 12; see ECF No. 27 at 21. On December 15, 2009, Cohens submitted an intake questionnaire to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”), alleging race and sex discrimination and retaliation. ECF No. 15–2 at 3. On March 2, 2010, Cohens filed a charge with the Maryland Commission on Human Relations (the “MCHR”) and the EEOC, alleging race and. sex discrimination and unequal pay. ECF No. 27 at 26 [hereinafter, “Discrimination Charge”]. On August 12, 2011, Cohens received a right-to-sue letter. Compl. ¶ 2.

On September 30, 2011, Cohens sued in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland, alleging race and gender discrimination and retaliation, in violation of the EPA (Count One), the MEPA (Count Two), Title VII (Count Three), and Title 20 (Count Four). ECF No. 2. On November 28, 2011, the DHR removed the lawsuit to this Court. ECF No. 1.¹⁷ On December 5, 2011, the DHR moved to dismiss Cohens's retaliation claim, and for summary judgment on her remaining claims. ECF No. 6; ECF No. 6–1. On December 20, 2011, Cohens opposed the motion. ECF No. 10. On May 11, 2012, 2012 WL 1712151, this Court granted in part and denied in part the DHR's motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. ECF No. 12.¹⁸

On May 24, 2012, Cohens moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of her retaliation claims. ECF No. 15. On June 14, 2012, the DHR opposed the motion for reconsideration. ECF No. 18. On August 8, 2012, Cohens's counsel moved to withdraw. ECF No. 19. On August 9, 2012, this Court granted counsel's motion. ECF No. 20. That day, Cohens indicated she would proceed pro se. ECF No. 21.

On August 16, 2012, Cohens moved for summary judgment on her equal pay claims. ECF No. 23; see ECF No. 23–1 at 3; see also infra note 26. On September 6, 2012, the DHR opposed Cohens's motion and cross moved for summary judgment. ECF No. 27. On September 10, 2012, Cohens opposed the DHR's cross motion and replied in support of her motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 28. On September 17, 2012, the DHR replied. ECF No. 29. On September 25, 2012, Cohens filed a surreply. ECF No. 35.

On September 20, 2012, Cohens moved to amend the memorandum in support of her motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 31. On September 27, 2012, the DHR opposed Cohens's motion to amend. ECF No. 37. On October 4, 2012, Cohens replied. ECF No. 40.

II. Analysis

A. Legal Standards

1. Motion for Reconsideration

Motions for reconsideration of an interlocutory order are governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), under which “any order ... may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).¹⁹ Thus, when warranted, a district court retains the power to reconsider and modify its interlocutory judgments at any time before final judgment. Am. Canoe Ass'n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514–15 (4th Cir.2003).²⁰ Resolution of the motion is “committed to the discretion of the district court,” id. at 515, and “the goal is to reach the correct judgment under law.” Netscape Commc'ns Corp. v. ValueClick, Inc., 704 F.Supp.2d 544, 547 (E.D.Va.2010) (internal citations omitted).

Although Rule 60(b) applies only to final judgments, a court may consider the reasons in that rule when deciding whether to grant relief under Rule 54(b).²¹See Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1470 (4th Cir.1991); Mateti, 2009 WL 3633339, at *4.

2. Motion for Summary Judgment

The Court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).²² In considering the motion, the judge's function is “not ... to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The Court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to ... the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in [its] favor,” Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir.2002), but the Court must abide by the “affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial,” Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir.2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

When cross motions for summary judgment are filed, “each motion must be considered individually, and the facts relevant to each must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Mellen, 327 F.3d at 363 ( citing Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir.2003)).

B. Cohens's Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 15)

Cohens asks the Court to reconsider dismissal of her retaliation claim, on the grounds that “new evidence” shows the claim was administratively exhausted. ECF No. 15. Specifically, Cohens argues that her December 15, 2009 EEOC intake questionnaire, which was not previously submitted to the Court, “includes very detailed information about the parties and claims,” exhausting the administrative process as to her retaliation claim. ECF No. 15–1 at 1–2. The DHR counters that an intake questionnaire “does not serve as an EEOC charge.” ECF No. 18 at 1; ECF No. 18–1 at 1.

A court's discretion to review an interlocutory order is “not subject to the strict standards applicable to motions for reconsideration of a final judgment,” ²³ but is “within the plenary power of the Court ... to afford such relief ... as justice requires.” ²⁴ Although Rules 59...