Cok v. Cok

Decision Date09 May 1989
Docket Number88-267-A,Nos. 88-109-,s. 88-109-
PartiesGladys COK v. Leo COK.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court
OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This case comes before us on the consolidated appeals filed by Dr. Gladys Cok (plaintiff). Although Dr. Leo Cok (defendant) did not file an appeal from any of the orders of which the plaintiff complains, he has filed a motion before this court and was permitted to argue in support thereof. Allen Kirshenbaum, who was appointed commissioner by the Family Court, made an oral report before us concerning his sale of certain properties pursuant to court order. He supplemented this oral report with a written account of these sales, expenses incident thereto, and net proceeds. The plaintiff in support of her consolidated appeals argued in respect to a number of issues that have been previously decided by this court in Cok v. Cok, 533 A.2d 534 (R.I.1987) (Cok II ), and Cok v. Cok, 479 A.2d 1184 (R.I.1984) (Cok I ). It is not our intention to respond again to issues that have already been decided. This opinion will deal only with those issues that have been raised on these appeals for the first time. Necessary facts will be supplied in regard to each issue.

I THE SUPPORT ORDER

As we noted in our earlier opinion, a justice of the Family Court had transferred physical custody of the minor child of the parties (Igor Cok) to the father, Dr. Leo Cok, in December of 1985. We also authorized the transfer of physical possession of the marital domicile to defendant in order that the child might reside in that domicile, which had been his home. Subsequently, on January 20, 1988, defendant filed a motion for child support.

After a hearing, a justice of the Family Court determined that plaintiff's earnings and income amount to one-half of the earnings and income of her former husband. The trial justice found that the minor child required the sum of $200 per week for his support. He therefore ordered the mother to pay $66 per week toward this support. The mother appealed from this order March 10, 1988. 1

We are of the opinion that this order was based upon competent evidence, considering the record as a whole, and was well within the discretionary power of a justice of the Family Court to issue. However, even more significant to our decision on this issue is the fact that such an order modifying payments of child support is not appealable. General Laws 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 14-1-52(b) as amended by P.L.1981, ch. 329, § 1, provides in pertinent part:

"Every person aggrieved by any decree, judgment, order, decision or verdict of the family court relating to modification of alimony or of child support, or a finding of contempt for failure to pay alimony or child support may, within twenty (20) days after entry of such decree, judgment, order, decision or verdict, seek review of questions of law in the supreme court by petition for writ of certiorari in accordance with the procedure contained herein."

The section goes on to provide that review of such orders will be discretionary with the court. In the instant case, plaintiff did not file a petition for certiorari but filed an appeal as of right. Consequently this issue is not properly before this court. Her appeal on this issue must be denied.

II THE COVENTRY LIS PENDENS

On January 8, 1988, a justice of the Family Court authorized the commissioner to sell two lots owned by the parties, located in the town of Coventry. This sale was in general implementation of the initial order of the Family Court that "[t]he balance of the real estate owned by the husband and wife was ordered to be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties after the payment of all outstanding mortgages, liens, and encumbrances." Cok I, 479 A.2d at 1187. After an appraisal of this property had been obtained by the commissioner, he offered these two lots to plaintiff. She declined to purchase them. Thereafter, the commissioner proceeded to enter into an agreement for the sale of these lots to Ray Reedy, Inc., who had offered to purchase the lots at the appraised price. For reasons that are not readily explainable, plaintiff filed a complaint together with a notice of lis pendens in order to block this sale. The prospective buyer moved to intervene in the proceedings and requested the Family Court to discharge the lis pendens. A justice of the Family Court granted this motion and discharged the lis pendens. The plaintiff appealed from this order on May 11, 1988.

Documents filed by plaintiff in the appendix to one of her briefs indicate that the commissioner offered the Coventry lots to plaintiff and, indeed, prepared a form of contract to be signed by her. The commissioner reported that plaintiff declined to purchase the lots or even to purchase one of them because she was unable to afford the purchase price. The plaintiff furnishes us with no evidentiary basis in support of her filing of a notice of lis pendens. Since a justice of the Family Court discharged this filing, the burden of persuasion is upon plaintiff to show wherein this ruling was erroneous. She has completely failed to sustain this burden of persuasion. She gives no reason why she would be entitled to prevent a sale by a commissioner appointed by the Family Court and whose appointment was specifically affirmed by this court in Cok II, 533 A.2d at 535. We have recently stated that the filing of a notice of lis pendens based upon a nonexistent or frivolous claim may constitute an abuse of process and malicious use of court process. DeLeo v. Anthony A. Nunes, Inc., 546 A.2d 1344, 1347 (R.I.1988). On this record plaintiff has shown no reason to support her attempting to block the commissioner's sale for the price ($27,500 per lot) at which the lots had been previously offered to her. Consequently we can only conclude (since the transcript sets forth merely tumultuous confusion) that she did not adequately support her complaint before the trial justice as she has not supported it here. As a result her challenge to this order has not been sustained and her appeal on this issue must be denied.

III THE PARTIAL DISTRIBUTION TO DEFENDANT

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10 cases
  • Cok v. Forte
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • February 3, 1995
    ...commissioner, and an order granting distribution of certain funds in the Family Court registry to plaintiff's ex-husband. Cok v. Cok, 558 A.2d 205 (R.I.1989). The First Circuit was equally inhospitable. Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District C......
  • Powell v. Stevens, No. 2000-0089 (MA 5/10/2004), 2000-0089
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • May 10, 2004
    ...(Ind. 1997); Montecalvo v. Mandarelli, 682 A.2d 918, 922-927 (R.I. 1996) (abuse of process and wrongful civil litigation); Cok v. Cok, 558 A.2d 205, 207 (R.I. 1989) (both abuse of process and malicious use of process). Other courts have rejected the action on the ground that the special inj......
  • Powell v. Stevens
    • United States
    • Massachusetts Superior Court
    • May 3, 2004
  • Powell v. Stevens, 17 Mass. L. Rptr. No. 26. 592 (MA 5/3/2004), 20000089.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • May 3, 2004
    ...(Ind. 1997); Montecalvo v. Mandarelli, 682 A.2d 918, 922-27 (R.I. 1996) (abuse of process and wrongful civil litigation); Cok v. Cok, 558 A.2d 205, 207 (R.I. 1989) (both abuse of process and malicious use of process). Other courts have rejected the action on the ground that the special inju......
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