Coker v. Jesson, A11–1817.

Decision Date21 June 2013
Docket NumberNo. A11–1817.,A11–1817.
Citation831 N.W.2d 483
PartiesChristopher R. COKER, Appellant, v. Lucinda E. JESSON, Commissioner of Human Services, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus by the Court

1. When considering a motion to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b), a Supreme Court Judicial Appeal Panel is required to view the evidence produced at the first-phase hearing in a light most favorable to the committed person.

2. Because it conflicts with Minn.Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 2(d) (2012), the provision in Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b) allowing a court, as the trier of fact, to weigh the evidence and render judgment against the plaintiff based on the weight of the evidence does not apply to a petition for provisional discharge from civil commitment.

Marilyn B. Knudsen, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Steven H. Alpert, Assistant Attorney General, and Nathan A. Brennaman, Deputy Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN, for respondent.

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

In this appeal, appellant Christopher R. Coker challenges the denial of his petition for provisional discharge from civil commitment. Coker was indeterminately committed in 2000 as a Sexually Dangerous Person as a result of a series of sex offenses involving 15 to 17–year–old girls. Coker petitioned for provisional discharge from civil commitment. After weighing the evidence presented by Coker and respondent Commissioner of Human Services at the first-phase hearing, the Supreme Court Judicial Appeal Panel (“Appeal Panel) dismissed Coker's petition under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b).1 The court of appeals affirmed the Appeal Panel. Coker v. Jesson (Coker II), No. A11–1817, 2012 WL 896434, at *5–8 (Minn.App. Mar. 19, 2012).

Coker argues that the Appeal Panel and the court of appeals misapplied Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b) when they concluded that Rule 41.02(b) authorized dismissal of Coker's petition for provisional discharge from civil commitment. Coker argues in the alternative that the denial of his petition violated his constitutional right to due process. Because we conclude that the Appeal Panel and the court of appeals erred in applying Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b), we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Coker's long criminal history began when he was 14 years old and includes convictions for criminal sexual conduct, numerous assaults, disorderly conduct, aggravated robberies, and possession of marijuana and crack cocaine. In particular, Coker was convicted of promoting prostitution for coercing a 16–year–old girl to prostitute for him and three counts of third degree criminal sexual conduct for the sexual assaults of three teenage girls in 1991 and 1992.

In 1999, shortly before Coker was to be released from prison, the Hennepin County Attorney filed a petition for judicial commitment under Minn.Stat. §§ 253B.07, subd. 2, 253B.185, subd. 1 (2012), alleging that Coker was a sexual psychopathic personality (“SPP”) and a sexually dangerous person (“SDP”). The district court found there was clear and convincing evidence that Coker was a SDP, but insufficient evidence that Coker was a SPP, and committed Coker to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (“MSOP”). Following the 60–day review required by statute, Coker was committed as a SDP “for an indeterminate period of time.” Minn.Stat. § 253B.18, subds. 2–3 (2012).

A person committed as a SDP who seeks full or provisional discharge must petition the Special Review Board (“Review Board”) for relief. Minn.Stat. § 253B.185, subd. 9 (2012); see alsoMinn.Stat. § 253B.18, subds. 7, 15 (2012). If the Review Board recommends that the Commissioner deny the committed person's discharge petition, then the committed person may ask the Appeal Panel for reconsideration of the Review Board's recommendation. Minn.Stat. §§ 253B.185, subd. 9(f), 253B.19, subd. 2(b) (2012).

When appearing before the Appeal Panel, the committed person “bears the burden of going forward with the evidence, which means presenting a prima facie case with competent evidence to show that the person is entitled to the requested relief.” Minn.Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 2(d) (2012). 2 We have recently described that burden as a “burden of production,” which requires the committed person “to come forward with sufficient, competent evidence that, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief.” Braylock v. Jesson, 819 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Minn.2012). The proceeding in which a committed person produces evidence is commonly referred to as a “first-phase hearing.” E.g., Coker II, 2012 WL 896434, at *2. If the committed person satisfies his burden of production, then the party opposing the petition “bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that the discharge or provisional discharge should be denied.” Minn.Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 2(d). The proceeding in which the opposing party attempts to prove that the discharge petition should be denied is commonly referred to as a “second-phase hearing.” E.g., Coker II, 2012 WL 896434, at *3.

In 2006, Coker filed a petition with the Commissioner of Human Services under Minn.Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 5 (2012), requesting transfer to a nonsecure Department of Human Services facility, provisional discharge, and discharge. 3 The Commissioner set a hearing on the petition before the Review Board for January 10, 2007. The Review Board considered evidence that Coker had progressed to the MSOP Supervised Integration Unit (“MSI”), was appropriately participating in recreational and social activities as well as treatment groups, was complying with his journaling requirement, and passed his maintenance polygraph. The MSOP treatment team, however, identified Coker as a high risk to reoffend, recommended that he continue in the MSI to participate in on-campus activities, and stated that he needed to continue treatment in a secure facility. The Review Board also noted there was “no realistic less restrictive alternative to Mr. Coker's current placement.” The Review Board therefore recommended that the Commissioner deny Coker's petition.

The Commissioner denied Coker's petition on February 20, 2007, and the Appeal Panel affirmed the Commissioner's decision. Coker appealed the denial of his petition to the court of appeals. See Coker v. Ludeman (Coker I), 775 N.W.2d 660 (Minn.App.2009), rev. dism'd (Minn. Feb. 24, 2010). The court of appeals concluded that the Appeal Panel erred by requiring Coker to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he satisfied the statutory criteria for discharge. Id. at 664. The statute in effect at the time, Minn.Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 2(d) (2008), required the party seeking discharge to “bear[ ] the burden of going forward with the evidence,” but the court of appeals concluded that the Appeal Panel had erroneously required Coker to make a prima facie case for transfer or discharge.4Coker I, 775 N.W.2d at 664. The court of appeals concluded that this burden was higher than the statutory burden, which only required the petitioner to “present evidence on each element sufficient to avoid judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 664–65. The court therefore reversed the Appeal Panel and remanded the case for a hearing with the correct evidentiary burden. Id. at 665.

On remand, the Appeal Panel transferred Coker to the MSOP Community Preparation Services (“CPS”) program and remanded Coker's request for provisional discharge to the Review Board because his discharge plan was outdated. The Review Board again recommended that Coker's petition for provisional discharge be denied and Coker appealed to the Appeal Panel.

At the first-phase hearing, the Appeal Panel heard testimony from Coker, his fiancée, and the independent examiner, Dr. James Alsdurf, Ph.D. Coker testified that he was ready to be released into the community through provisional discharge. He stated that outpatient sex offender treatment would better address his needs by allowing him to get a job, permitting him more access to his family, and facilitating family therapy with his fiancée, all of which were not readily available at CPS. Additionally, Coker testified that he did not present any danger to the community. Coker did, however, acknowledge that the locations in which he proposed to live had not accepted him as a resident and that outpatient sex offender treatment was not available to him because he was only in the first of three stages of the CPS program.

Coker's fiancée testified that she met Coker in 2002 when he was in the Moose Lake facility. She further testified that the couple became engaged in 2003, they have a good relationship, and she is willing to participate in therapy by telephone with him.

Dr. Alsdurf testified that Coker had made considerable progress and had accomplished more than anyone else that he had evaluated at MSOP. Dr. Alsdurf stated that Coker's 2010 penile plethysmograph (PPG) produced a flatline response. In reference to one of Coker's earlier PPG tests that had produced a flatline, Dr. Alsdurf explained that “our concern about sexual deviance has essentially remitted.” Nevertheless, Dr. Alsdurf opined that Coker was not ready for provisional discharge because he had not recently progressed in treatment at CPS.5 Dr. Alsdurf noted that Coker saw himself as done with treatment and was often combative with his treatment team, even though there was no evidence that Coker's treatment team was attempting to impede his progress.

Over Coker's objection, the Appeal Panel allowed the Commissioner to admit numerous exhibits at the first-phase hearing. More specifically, the Commissioner presented the following evidence. A polygraph suggested that Coker had tried to influence the results of the PPG through deception. Coker had refused to discuss the polygraph result. Additionally, Coker demonstrated a lack of social awareness and poor interpersonal problem-solving skills when he called his fiancée 203 times and spent 23.5 hours...

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    ...sole judge of credibility, the jury "is free to accept part and reject part" of the testimony of a particular witness. Coker v. Jesson , 831 N.W.2d 483, 492 (Minn. 2013). Next, we identify the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved when viewed "as a whole and ......
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