Coker v. Mason

• Decision Date: 10 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 2:20-cv-02986,2:20-cv-02986
• Parties: CHRISTOPHER COKER, Petitioner, v. BERNADETTE MASON, THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA, and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

CHRISTOPHER COKER, Petitioner, v. BERNADETTE MASON,THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTYOF PHILADELPHIA, and THE ATTORNEYGENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondents.

No. 2:20-cv-02986

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

May 10, 2021

OPINION

Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 8 - APPROVED and ADOPTED

Habeas Corpus Petition, ECF No. 3 - DENIED

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

In this habeas corpus proceeding, Petitioner Christopher Coker challenges the correctness of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole's recalculation of his sentence for crimes he committed in 2003, following revocation of his parole for the commission of separate offenses in 2014. Coker also challenges the constitutionality of the Parole Board's actions under several legal theories. Coker's habeas petition was referred to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth T. Hey for a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") as to whether the petition should be granted. Judge Hey's R&R concludes that Coker is not entitled to habeas relief and recommends that his petition be denied and that no certificate of appealability be issued. Coker subsequently filed pro se objections in which he challenges the R&R's findings and recommendations on several grounds.

After a review of Coker's habeas petition, the R&R, and the objections thereto, and for the reasons set forth below, this Court overrules the objections, adopts the R&R, and denies the habeas petition without holding an evidentiary hearing or issuing a certificate of appealability.

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND¹

A. Coker's convictions and sentences

On July 19, 2005, after a jury trial, Coker was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and possessing an instrument of a crime, arising from the 2003 shooting death of Jermane Morgan.² See Commonwealth v. Coker, CP-51-CR-1200411-2003, at 1.³ On August 30, 2005, Coker was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of six to twelve years for manslaughter and one to two years for possessing an instrument of a crime, followed by ten years' probation. See id. at 4. His original minimum and maximum dates on this sentence were August 12, 2010, and August 12, 2017, respectively. Coker v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 376 C.D. 2018, 2018 WL 6613860, at *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 18, 2018).

On October 24, 2012, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole and the Department of Corrections released Coker on parole. See ECF No. 7-1 at 7.⁴ On February 10, 2014, Coker was arrested on new charges, resulting in the issuance of a parole violation detainer on February 11, 2014. See ECF No. 7-1 at 11-12. On February 12, 2014, Coker's bail on thenew (2014) charges was set at $25,000/10%. See id. at 19. That bail was not posted, and on June 3, 2014, Coker's bail on the new charges was reduced to "ROR," release on recognizance. See id. However, the Parole Board then held a detention hearing and subsequently issued a decision to keep Coker detained pending a resolution of the new charges. See Coker, 2018 WL 6613860, at *1; ECF No. 7-1 at 19.

On January 13, 2017, Coker was convicted at trial of several of the 2014 charges, specifically, recklessly endangering another person (two counts); burglary - overnight accommodation, person present; conspiracy to commit burglary - overnight accommodation, person present; and criminal trespass - breaking into structure. ECF No. 7-1 at 44-48. On April 6, 2017, he was sentenced to 22 to 44 years' imprisonment to be served consecutively to any previously imposed sentence.⁵ See id. at 38.

In an order dated April 24, 2017, the Parole Board recommitted Coker on the 2003 sentence as a convicted parole violator with a "Custody for Return" date of April 17, 2017. See id. at 77-78. He was given credit on his 2003 sentence for one day in February 2014 (February 11-12, the one day he was in custody prior to bail being set on the 2014 charges, and therefore the one day he was in custody in February 2014 solely on the parole detainer), and from June 3, 2014 (the date his bail was reduced to "ROR" and following which he was again held solely on the parole detainer) to January 13, 2017 (the date of his conviction on the 2014 charges). See id. This represented a period of 956 days, the total amount of time Coker was in custody solely on the parole detainer. See id. Coker's new maximum date on the 2003 sentence was calculated to be June 23, 2019. See id.

On June 13, 2017, Coker filed a petition for administrative review of the Parole Board's determination, arguing that his sentence was not properly credited with the time attributed to the parole detainer. See id. at 80. The Parole Board affirmed its decision on February 23, 2018, see id. at 83-84, and on March 26, 2018, Coker sought review in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, see id. at 87-97. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Parole Board's order denying administrative relief in a decision dated December 18, 2018. See generally Coker v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 376 C.D. 2018, 2018 WL 6613860 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 18, 2018). In the operative part of its decision, the Commonwealth Court stated as follows:

The Prisons and Parole Code (Parole Code) provides that any parolee who, during the period of parole, commits a crime punishable by imprisonment and is convicted or found guilty of that crime may be recommitted as a CPV. 61 Pa. C.S. § 6138(a)(1). If a parolee is recommitted as a CPV, he must serve the remainder of the term, which he would have been compelled to serve had parole not been granted, with no credit for the time at liberty on parole, unless the Board chooses to award credit. 61 Pa. C.S. §§ 6138(a)(2), (2.1). "When computing the time yet to be served on the original sentence, the [CPV's] street time is added to the original maximum expiration date to create a new maximum expiry." Armbruster v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 919 A.2d 348, 351 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Further, where a parolee is paroled from a state correctional institution and a new state sentence is imposed on him, the parolee must serve the balance of his original state sentence before serving the new sentence. 61 Pa. C.S. § 6138(a)(5)(i).

In addition, "where an offender is incarcerated on both a Board detainer and new criminal charges, all time spent in confinement must be credited to either the new sentence or the original sentence." Martin v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 840 A.2d 299, 309 (Pa. 2003). Time incarcerated shall be credited to a CPV's original term only when he has satisfied bail requirements on the new offense and, therefore, remains incarcerated solely by reason of the Board's detainer. Gaito v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 412 A.2d 568 (Pa. 1980). When bail is not posted, time incarcerated on both the new criminal charges and the Board's detainer must apply to the new sentence. Id.

Here, when the Board released Coker on parole in October 2012, his original maximum sentence date was August 12, 2017. C.R. at 12. Thus, at that time, Coker had 1,753 days remaining on his original sentence. C.R. at 156. The Board provided Coker with credit totaling 956 days on his original sentence for the periods he was incarcerated solely on the Board's detainer (February 11 through February 12, 2014,and June 3, 2014, through January 13, 2017). Id. Based on Gaito, the Board properly applied this credit to Coker's original sentence.

Subtracting the 956 days of credit from the 1,753 days remaining on Coker's original sentence at the time of his parole, results in a total of 797 days remaining on Coker's original sentence. C.R. at 156. Adding 797 days to Coker's custody for return date of April 17, 2017 results in a new maximum sentence date of June 23, 2019, as the Board properly determined. Id. Accordingly, we . . . affirm the Board's order denying administrative relief.

Id. *2-*3 (footnotes omitted). On August 12, 2019, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Coker's petition for allowance of appeal. See ECF No. 7-1 at 153.

B. The instant habeas petition

On June 9, 2020, Coker filed the instant habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See ECF No. 3. Coker's petition, which is filed with an accompanying memorandum, purports to state three grounds for relief.

First, Coker argues that 956 days should have been credited to his 2014 sentence rather than to his 2003 sentence. See id. at 18, 25-27, 50. Here, he argues that when his bail was reduced to "ROR," it constituted only "an agreement between County and State agencies for housing purpose[s];" it was not, he contends, satisfaction of a bail requirement. Id. at 25. Therefore, Coker asserts that he "never satisf[ied] bail requirement[s] on his new [2014] criminal charges," and because he was incarcerated on both the parole detainer and on the new charges, the 956-day credit that was applied to his 2003 sentence should have instead been applied to his 2014 sentence. Id. at 26.⁶

Next Coker contends that "contract PBPP-11 set forth by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole is unconstitutional." Id. at 27. According to Coker, form "PBPP-11," which the Parole Board requires individuals to sign before being released on parole, is somehow invalid because "the parolee is in a duress [sic] state of min[d] at the time he or she signs the contract PBPP-11." Id. at 28. Therefore, according to Coker, he cannot be bound by the conditions set forth therein. See id.

Finally, Coker argues that his "re-computed maximum date violates Constitutional and Statutory law, under Due Process[, ] the Separation of Power [sic] Doctrine," id. at 28, and "Double Jeopardy," id. at 35. Specifically, Coker contends that "the Board does not have the power to alter a judicially imposed sentence," and any statute that purports to give the Parole Board that authority is unconstitutional. Id. at 28.

C. The Report and Recommendation

Judge Hey's R&R first addresses Coker's argument regarding the Parole Board's authority to recalculate his 2003 sentence. See R&...