Coker v. S.M. Flickinger Co., Inc.

Decision Date02 June 1993
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court
PartiesWalter L. COKER, Appellant, v. S.M. FLICKINGER COMPANY, INC., Appellee.

Wendell G. Freeland, Freeland & Kronz, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Natalie Dwyer Haller, Paul F. Burroughs, Erie, for appellee.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.

OPINION

NIX, Chief Justice.

Today we clarify the standard by which an appellate court must review a trial court's decision to order a new trial. The last occasion we discussed this subject was in Westinghouse Elevator Co. v. Herron 514 Pa. 252, 523 A.2d 723 (1987). However, that case appears to have created some confusion in the Superior Court in this case. Our decision to grant allocatur was principally driven by our desire to rectify this situation.

Walter L. Coker, Appellant herein, sued the S.M. Flickinger Company for injuries he suffered when one of Flickinger's trucks collided with his automobile. Flickinger admitted liability; therefore the trial was limited to the issue of damages. Prior to trial, Flickinger filed a motion to exclude evidence relating to the circumstances surrounding the collision. The trial court granted that motion over Coker's objection and issued an order specifying that:

plaintiff shall not be permitted to introduce during trial, nor refer to either directly or indirectly, any evidence regarding the defendant's conduct at the time of the collision, the manner in which the defendant's vehicle was being operated, or the manner in which the collision occurred....

Coker v. S.M. Flickinger Co., No. 3110-A-1984 (Erie County, C.P. Feb. 9, 1988) (Order granting motion in limine).

Coker claimed that as a result of the accident, he sustained back and other injuries which produced pain and limited his mobility. In order to prove the existence and severity of these injuries, he offered his own testimony and the testimony of other individuals, including his treating physician. He personally testified how his body reacted to the collision. In addition, both he and his wife testified regarding his back injury. Flickinger attacked the credibility of Coker's testimony by introducing an expert who testified that Coker could not have suffered the injuries he claimed. Flickinger also introduced a video tape showing Coker performing physical activities which he denied being able to do.

Coker sought to respond to the attack on his credibility by introducing evidence relating to the accident. He argues that the court erred in precluding him from introducing a written "accident notice" and other evidence. It is asserted that this evidence would have established the force and impact of the collision. However, because of the trial court's evidentiary ruling, he was not permitted to offer this evidence.

The verdict of the jury as to damages was in favor of Appellee Flickinger. In response, Coker sought a new trial. The Erie County Court of Common Pleas sitting en banc granted a new trial limited to the issue of damages. Flickinger appealed the new trial order to the Superior Court where a divided panel of judges reversed the lower court order and reinstated the jury's verdict. The majority concluded that the basis for the order was "legally inadequate." Coker v. S.M. Flickinger Co., No. 1263 Pittsburgh 1988, slip op. at 4 (Sept. 5, 1989) [395 Pa.Super. 648, 570 A.2d 585 (table) ]. By contrast, the dissent stated it would have affirmed the order since its review of the record disclosed that the trial court "did not abuse its discretion" in granting a new trial. Id., dissenting slip op. at 3 (Sept. 5, 1989). This appeal followed. 525 Pa. 640, 581 A.2d 567 (1990).

The members of both the majority and the dissent of the Superior Court analyzed this case according to the instructions we articulated in Westinghouse Elevator Co. v. Herron, 514 Pa. 252, 523 A.2d 723 (1987). Since those instructions appear to have created some confusion, we begin by reviewing them. Westinghouse summarized the standard of review in the following way:

The standard for review of a trial court's grant of a motion for a new trial generally is whether the trial court palpably and clearly abused its discretion or committed an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case. When the trial court gives a single reason for the grant of a new trial, however, its discretion is not at issue, but instead, the validity of its legal justification for a new trial, and in that case, an appellate court must review for the legal adequacy of the reason given for the new trial:

When it clearly appears from the opinion of the court below in the new trial motion, "that except for the reason relied upon by the court for granting a new trial, judgement would have been entered on the verdict, the action of the lower court becomes reviewable, not for an abuse of discretion, but for the legal merit of the sole and exclusive reason assigned for the granting of a new trial: ....": Keefer v. Byers, 398 Pa. 447, 449, 159 A.2d 477....

Id. at 256, 523 A.2d at 725 (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Penneys v. Segal, 410 Pa. 308, 311, 189 A.2d 185, 187 (1963)). The Superior Court construed this passage to mean that cases receive different treatment depending on the number of reasons offered by the trial court as the basis for its decision. However, the Superior Court misunderstood both the distinction that was being drawn and the difference in treatment that was being described. 1

When reviewing new trial orders, we distinguish cases based on whether the trial court leaves open the possibility that it would have ordered a new trial for reasons other than those it specified. We acknowledged this in Westinghouse when we quoted Penneys and Keefer. Those two cases expressly indicated that we differentiate cases based on whether " 'except for the reason relied on by the court for granting a new trial, judgment would have been entered on the verdict.' " Penneys, 410 Pa. at 311, 189 A.2d at 187 (quoting Keefer, 398 Pa. at 449, 159 A.2d at 478). Thus, the issue is not simply whether the trial court cites one or multiple reasons. Rather, the issue is whether it indicates that but for any reason cited, it would not have ordered a new trial.

The quote from Penneys and Keefer only made reference to a single reason because the trial court specifically offered one reason: the inadequacy of the jury instructions. However, it has been clear ever since this Court first synthesized the rules pertaining to appellate review of new trial orders that it makes no difference whether the trial court cites one or more than one reason, as long as it is apparent from its opinion that it would not have ordered a new trial were it not for its stated reasons. Class & Nachod Brewing Co. v. Giacobello, 277 Pa. 530, 537, 121 A. 333, 336 (1923). Accord Mozino v. Canuso, 384 Pa. 220, 224, 120 A.2d 300, 302 (1956); Culver v. Lehigh Valley Transit Co., 322 Pa. 503, 511, 186 A. 70, 74 (1936); Marko v. Mendelowski, 313 Pa. 46, 47, 169 A. 99, 99 (1933). As a practical matter, a trial court's reference to a finite set of reasons is generally treated as conclusive proof that it would not have ordered a new trial on any other basis.

The quote in Westinghouse from Penneys and Keefer indicates that the distinction it referred to is important because it dictates whether the new trial order is reviewable for an abuse of discretion or for the "merit" of the reason assigned for granting a new trial. The Superior Court treated the latter inquiry as being more penetrating than the former. However, that is not the case. This is apparent from an examination of the confines within which a trial court may order a new trial.

It is a fundamental and longstanding precept that the decision to order a new trial is one that lies within the discretion of the trial court. E.g. Spang & Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 519 Pa. 14, 24, 545 A.2d 861, 865 (1988); Colosimo v. Pennsylvania Electric Co., 513 Pa. 155, 163, 518 A.2d 1206, 1210 (1986); Smyth v. Philadelphia & West Chester Traction Co., 263 Pa. 511, 516, 107 A. 20, 21 (1919). This means that the trial court has considerable latitude within which to act, but there are also very specific limits to what it can do.

The term "discretion" imports the exercise of judgement, wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, and discretionary power can only exist within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused when the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgement, but where the judgement is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.

P.L.E. New Trial § 2. One way of summing up all the qualities described in this definition of a valid exercise of discretionary power is to say that the decision had merit. Conversely, if the reason for performing a discretionary act had no merit, then the trial court abused its discretion. Thus, when viewed in terms of the degree of scrutiny that should be applied, an inquiry into an abuse of discretion is operationally equivalent as one into the merit of the trial court's decision.

While the two inquiries referred to in the quote from Penneys and Keefer demand the same degree of scrutiny, they differ in terms of the scope of review. Like many of our cases, Penneys and Keefer use the term "abuse of discretion" to connote a relatively broad scope of review. Under this procedure, if the trial court leaves open the possibility that it would have ordered a new trial for reasons other than those specifically mentioned, then an appellate court must affirm the decision if any...

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