Colaizzi v. Walker, 80-1424
| Decision Date | 05 August 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-1424,80-1424 |
| Citation | 655 F.2d 828 |
| Parties | Samuel COLAIZZI and Samuel Indovina, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Daniel WALKER, Governor, State of Illinois; Donald Page Moore, etc., and Lauri Staples, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Gregory Freerksen, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.
John C. Tucker, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Before CUMMINGS, Chief Judge, SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge, and BROWN, Senior District Judge. *
In this action plaintiffs Colaizzi and Indovina, former non-tenured employees of the State of Illinois, 1 seek damages from defendants Daniel Walker, former Governor of Illinois, Donald Moore, former Director of the Illinois Office of Special Investigations, and defendant Staples, an investigator in that department.
Plaintiffs claim that they were discharged from state employment, with a public announcement that they were guilty of misconduct in office, without the benefit of a "due process" hearing in which they would have had an opportunity to answer charges against them. As initially filed, the complaint sought damages under federal civil rights statutes, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1343, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, as well as a claim for relief under pendant state defamation claims. In 1974 the district court dismissed the complaint against the public defendants upon the ground that they were protected by principles of absolute immunity, and upon the further ground that plaintiffs had failed to claim a violation of a protected interest. On appeal, this Court held that while no cause of action had been stated under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981 and 1985, since no racial or class based "invidious discrimination" had been alleged, plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim for relief under § 1983 for deprivation of a liberty interest without due process of law under Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971). Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d 969 (7 Cir. 1976). The Court stated,
... infliction of a stigma to reputation accompanied by a failure to rehire (or, a fortiori, by a discharge) states a claim for deprivation of liberty without due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this combination of stigma plus failure to rehire/discharge states a claim even if the failure to rehire or discharge of itself deprives the plaintiff of no property interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Colaizzi v. Walker, supra, 542 F.2d at 973.
In remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings, we held that while the complaint did state a claim against defendants under § 1983, a qualified good faith immunity defense, if properly pleaded, would be available to them. It was also noted that, immunity aside, defendants were entitled to raise, and to establish, the truth of the charges against plaintiffs by way of defense.
Following remand, defendants filed answers alleging the affirmative defense of the truthfulness of the charges, the adequacy of pre- and post-termination hearings, and the defense of qualified good faith immunity. Defendants raised these issues by Motion for Summary Judgment, supported by affidavits, deposition testimony, and copies of material contained in the state investigative file.
The district court granted Summary Judgment upon a finding that defendants had established the defense of qualified good faith immunity as a matter of law. Plaintiffs on this appeal contend that the district court misconstrued the good faith defense and erred in its application in this instance. In particular, plaintiffs contend that the charges against them were not true and that they are entitled to trial upon the issue.
It should be noted that the district court did not find that the charges in fact were "true" but that defendants had reasonable grounds to believe they were true and thus defendants were entitled to good faith immunity.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 at p. 103, the Supreme Court discussed the basis of qualified immunity, and emphasized that its scope may vary, depending upon facts as they may have appeared to the public executive at the time of the event:
... in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.
Applying the principles of Scheuer, the district court determined that the defendants Walker and Moore were justified in believing that plaintiffs had misused their public offices, and that therefore, the defense of qualified good faith immunity had been established as a matter of law. In reaching this conclusion the district court reviewed at length the investigative files of the Office of Special Investigations of the State of Illinois. As found by the district court, the investigation progressed as follows:
In the Spring of 1974, in the course of his duties as Director of OSI, Moore began investigations of Colaizzi due both to a variety of charges made against Colaizzi by the Better Government Association and instructions from the Office of the Governor....
While this investigation was pending, Moore received information from defendant Maros to the effect that Colazzi (sic) and Indovina had suggested that if Zenith did not drop criminal charges against its employee, Esposito, Colaizzi would cause Zenith a lot of trouble.
When Zentih (sic) refused to drop the charges, Colaizzi, among other things, threatened to 'shut down' Zenith and ordered Zenith's Des Plaines Office to be closed. Subsequently, as both parties point out, Colaizzi conducted a series of administrative hearings regarding Zenith and its officers and employees. Zenith's attorney, Seymour Axelrood, provided Moore with documentary evidence in his possession, which corroborated this version of the events. Additionally, the documents in the PEA files confirm that a series of charges, including a charge by Colaizzi that Maros and Scully bribed a state's attorney, had been filed against Zenith by Colaizzi and that Colaizzi had appointed himself as the hearing officer.
After confronting Colaizzi and Indovina with these charges and receiving unsatisfactory answers, Moore reported the results of the OSI investigation and his recommendations to the Office of the Governor through William Goldberg, counsel to the Governor.
Additionally, Governor Walker, upon being informed of the results of the OSI...
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