Colbert v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 12 January 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13–531 RMC
• Parties: Jacqueline Colbert, as next friend of Katina Colbert, et al., Plaintiffs, v. District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

78 F.Supp.3d 1

Jacqueline Colbert, as next friend of Katina Colbert, et al., Plaintiffs

v.District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 13–531 RMC

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed January 12, 2015

Harvey S. Williams, Law Office of Harvey S. Williams, Catherine D. Bertram, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Alex Karpinski, Joseph Alfonso Gonzalez, Office of Attorney General/DC, Washington, DC, Robert W. Hesselbacher, Jr., Wright, Constable & Skeen, LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants.

OPINION

ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, United States District Judge

Jacqueline Colbert, mother of Katina Colbert (K.C.), brought this suit individually, as next friend of K.C., and as personal representative of the Estate of K.C.'s deceased infant child, T.C. Based on an alleged violation of K.C.'s constitutional rights as well as other grounds, Ms. Colbert claims a right to damages from the District of Columbia and its contractor, Total Care Services, Inc. K.C. is intellectually disabled. In 2008, K.C. was hospitalized and underwent a psychological assessment, which revealed that K.C. needed care and supervision twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. As a result, K.C. began residing in a group home operated by Total Care, under contract with the District.

Proper supervision and reasonable care allegedly were lacking. K.C. allegedly had unprotected, nonconsensual sex and became pregnant. With little or no prenatal care, she gave birth to T.C. in 2011. T.C. was born with significant medical problems and died when she was just over a year old. The District of Columbia moves to dismiss, or alternatively for summary judgment, arguing that it is not constitutionally liable because K.C. was voluntarily committed to its care. The Court finds that Ms. Colbert's constitutional claim is the only potentially viable basis for federal jurisdiction here and will order limited discovery to determine if the claim may proceed.

I. FACTS

In September 2008, K.C. was 31 years old and living in an emergency shelter for the homeless in the District of Columbia. Am. Compl. [Dkt. 29] ¶ 87. She had three small children who were in the custody of D.C. Child and Family Services. Id . For reasons that are unexplained, K.C. was hospitalized and referred for a psychological assessment by Words of Life Development Center. Id . Dr. Tonya Lockwood, a licensed psychologist, conducted the assessment on September 2 and 4, 2008. Surreply [Dkt. 51], Ex. 2 (Lockwood Report) at 1. Dr. Lockwood determined that K.C. had an IQ of 53; that she functioned “within the moderate range of mental retardation cognitively and adaptively;”¹ that she needed “medical and psychiatric stabilization;” that she needed to be referred to a neurologist to “rule out ... dementia ;” that she suffered from “symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ;” and that she had “symptoms of depression as well as grief related to the loss of her children and her own mortality.” Lockwood Report at 1, 8.² The psychologist determined that K.C. was “unable to make independent decisions with regard[ ] to her finances, medical treatment, housing, habilitation, and life planning,” and recommended “emergency residential placement in a community residential facility with on-site medical support as well as 24–hour supervision.” Id. at 8. Soon thereafter, K.C. moved into a group home operated by Total Care under contract with the District.

Ms. Colbert alleges that the District of Columbia “referred” K.C. for the psychological assessment; that upon receiving the assessment, the District “assumed custody” of K.C.; that the District began to act as K.C.'s “guardian;” and that K.C. “has not been free to leave the District's custody since September 2008.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 87–91.

Due to K.C.'s “retardation and low developmental age,” Ms. Colbert alleges that she was incapable of consenting to sexual activity.Id . ¶ 11. K.C. had a prior history of sexual abuse. Id . ¶ 10, 14, 18. According to the Amended Complaint, K.C. “was facilitated and encouraged by Defendants to have unprotected, nonconsensual sexual intercourse with various men in 2010” and thereby became pregnant. Id . ¶ 17. She delivered T.C. on April 3, 2011. K.C. and her mother, Ms. Colbert, shared joint legal custody of T.C., but because K.C. was unable to care for her child, Ms. Colbert was awarded sole physical custody of T.C. Id . ¶¶ 3, 5, 21. T.C. was born with medical conditions that required surgery, hospitalization, and medical care; T.C. died on April 18, 2012. Id . ¶¶ 17, 54.

Kelvin Martinez, an intellectually disabled man who lived in the same group home as K.C., claimed that he was T.C.'s father. See Mot. to Intervene [Dkt. 16]. Mr. Martinez, through his guardian, has asserted that K.C. and her mother acknowledged his paternity and identified him as T.C.'s father in the custody case regarding T.C. See Colbert v. Colbert, 2011 DRB 1427 (D.C. Superior Ct.). The D.C. Superior Court granted visitation rights to Mr. Martinez. Reply [Dkt. 21], Ex. 3 (Custody Order). However, paternity was never established because Mr. Martinez is indigent and he was unable to find a public source to pay for a paternity test.³ Reply [Dkt. 21] at 5.

Ms. Colbert, for herself, on behalf of K.C., and on behalf of the Estate of T.C., filed an Amended Complaint, which contains fifteen Counts asserted against both the District of Columbia and Total Care, unless otherwise noted:

Count I—Negligence;

Count II—Wrongful Birth;

Count III—Breach of Fiduciary Duty arising from special relationship;

Count IV—Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress;

Count V—Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;

Count VI—Wrongful Death;

Count VII—Survival Act;

Count VIII—Violation of D.C. Code § 44–504(a)(3) and (4) (negligence per se) (against Total Care);

Count IX—Violation of D.C. Code §§ 7–1301.02 et seq . and 71305.14 (right to care of persons with intellectual disabilities);

Count X—Violation of D.C. Code §§ 7–1301.02 et seq . and 71305.13 (right to adequate habilitation program) (against the District);

Count XI—Violation of the Fifth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against the District);

Count XII—Violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 ;

Count XIII—Violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 ;

Count XIV—Violation of the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code §§ 28–3901 et seq . (against Total Care); and

Count XV—Punitive Damages (against Total Care).

The District of Columbia filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, see Mot. to Dismiss or for Summ. J. [Dkt. 34] (MSJ) and Reply [Dkt. 49], and Ms. Colbert opposes, see Opp'n [Dkt. 47]; Surreply [Dkt. 51]. The District moves, inter alia, to dismiss all of the federal law claims, Counts XI, XII, and XIII. Total Care filed a motion for partial dismissal, including the federal law claims. See Mot. for Partial Dismissal [Dkt. 32]; Total Care Reply [Dkt. 44]. Ms. Colbert also opposes Total Care's motion. See Opp'n [Dkt. 39].

II. JURISDICTION AND LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Jurisdiction

Ms. Colbert alleges that the Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the D.C. law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).⁴ Am. Compl. ¶ 1. The Amended Complaint sets forth the following federal law claims: Count XI—Violation of the Fifth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against the District); Count XII—Violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (against the District and Total Care); and Count XIII—Violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (against the District and Total Care). All other Counts assert violations of D.C. law.

As explained below, the motions to dismiss will be granted as to two of the federal law claims (Counts XII and XIII). The Court will hold in abeyance its ruling on whether the sole remaining federal law claim (Count XI) will be dismissed, as limited discovery is needed to determine whether Count XI may go forward.

In cases where all of the federal law claims are dismissed before trial, courts usually decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining local law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) ; Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l, 409 F.3d 414, 423 (D.C.Cir.2005) ; see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) (“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.”); Araya v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 13–7036, 775 F.3d 409, 416, 2014 WL 7373492, at *6 (D.C.Cir. Dec. 30, 2014) (quoting Financial General Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 777 (D.C.Cir.1982) (“When a District Court reaches out to decide unsettled issues of state law despite the pretrial dismissal of all federal claims, its actions may be an abuse of discretion.”). Thus, the Court addresses only the federal law claims in this Opinion. In the event that all of the federal law claims are dismissed, the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the D.C. law claims, and those claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

B. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the adequacy of a complaint on its face. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint must be sufficient “to give a defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id . To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Id . at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A court must...