Colbert v. Union Pacific R. Co.
| Citation | 485 F.Supp.2d 1236 |
| Decision Date | 30 April 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-4116-JAR.,06-4116-JAR. |
| Parties | Bernice COLBERT, individually, and for and on behalf of the Heirs at Law of Timothy Colbert, Plaintiff, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., Tyler Dee Baker, and Lyle R. Miller, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Norbert C. Marek, Jr., Myers, Pottroff & Ball, Manhattan, KS, for Plaintiff.
Christopher C. Confer, Craig M. Leff, Gregory F. Maher, James M. Yeretsky, Yeretsky & Maher, L.L.C., Overland Park, KS, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND
The Court now considers plaintiffs' Motion to Remand. (Doc. 4.) Plaintiff argues that this case was improperly removed from state court based on federal question jurisdiction. The motion is now fully briefed and the Court is prepared to rule. The Court grants plaintiffs motion to remand as described more fully below.
This case arises out of a collision at a private railroad crossing near Wamego, Kansas, A train owned by Union Pacific Railroad Co. ("Union Pacific") struck Timothy Colbert, who was riding as a passenger in a trash truck that was crossing the train tracks. Mr. Colbert's personal representative filed a wrongful death action in Pottawatomie district court against Union Pacific, Tyler Dee Baker and Lyle R. Miller. The Petition alleges that defendants had actual and constructive notice of a number of dangerous and defective conditions at the railroad crossing but failed to correct these conditions, erect warning devices, instruct employees about the conditions or take otherwise reasonable steps to avoid injury to the public. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants' failure to correct such dangerous and defective conditions caused Mr. Colbert's death.
In the Petition, plaintiff alleges that defendants breached a number of duties they owed to Mr. Colbert. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants had a duty to: (1) keep the crossings in good repair, in accordance with K.S.A. § 66-227; (2) maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing and assure that they function properly; (3) comply with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices governing railroad grades and crossings; (4) operate the train at a safe speed and be prepared to slow or stop for known hazards, as well as keep a proper lookout; and (5) adequately instruct, train and test members of the operating department on the safe operation of trains at crossings.
Defendants removed the action to this Court, claiming federal question jurisdiction under one of two theories: (1) several claims in the Petition are completely preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FRSA"); or (2) the Petition raises a substantial federal question that is actually in dispute and federal jurisdiction does not threaten any congressionally determined federal-state division of labor.1
Only state court actions that could have originally been filed in federal court are removable.2 The court is required to remand "if at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction."3 As the party invoking the federal court's jurisdiction, defendants carry the burden of demonstrating that the requirements for exercising jurisdiction are present.4 Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the law imposes a presumption against federal jurisdiction,5 and requires a court to deny its jurisdiction in all cases where such jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record.6 "Doubtful cases must be resolved in favor of remand."7
There are two statutory bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction. First, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal district courts have original jurisdiction of civil actions where complete diversity of citizenship and an amount in excess of $75,000 (exclusive of interest and costs) in controversy exist. Second, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts "have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States," or federal question jurisdiction. In addition, if the Court has federal question or diversity jurisdiction of some claims, it may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.8
Defendants removed this action on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. In order to determine whether a claim "arises under" federal law, the Court refers to the "well-pleaded complaint rule."9 That rule provides that "federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the facts of the plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint. The rule makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.10 The Court is equally mindful of the "artful pleading doctrine," which disallows a plaintiff from defeating removal by failing to plead federal questions even though they are essential elements of the plaintiff's claim.11 With this in mind, the Court turns to the potential grounds for federal question jurisdiction in this case: (1) complete preemption; and (2) the substantial federal question doctrine.
While conceding that plaintiffs Petition does not allege a federal claim, defendants argue that several of plaintiff s claims are completely preempted by the FRSA12 under the artful pleading doctrine. Removal is not appropriate on the basis of a federal defense, including preemption,13 but complete preemption functions as an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule.14 Under the complete' preemption doctrine, "federal courts may exercise federal question jurisdiction over complaints that, although not presenting federal questions on their face, nonetheless present state law claims that are preempted by federal law."15 Complete preemption as opposed to ordinary preemption, describes "the specific situation in which a federal law not only preempts a state law to some degree but also, substitutes a federal cause of action for the state cause of action, thereby manifesting Congress's intent to permit removal."16
The Supreme Court has recognized complete preemption as to three federal laws: (1) the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA");17 (2) the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA");18 and (3) the National Bank Act.19 In Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, the Court explained it had found complete preemption in two categories of cases — "certain causes of action under the LMRA and ERISA," — and that both of those statutes "provided the exclusive cause of action for the claim asserted and also set forth procedures and remedies governing that cause of action."20 Because the Court found that Congress intended for the National Bank Act to provide the exclusive causes of action for claims asserting usury against national banks, it held those, claims completely preempted, and thus, removable.21
The FRSA was enacted "to promote safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents."22 The FRSA contains both an express preemption clause and a savings clause:
Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety and laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad security shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security until the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters), or the Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security matters), prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement. A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security when the law, regulation, or order —
(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety or security hazard;
(2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the United States Government; and
(3) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.23
The Court looks both to Congress's and the Secretary of Transportation's intent in promulgating the FRSA and its regulations to determine if they intended for the statute to provide for the exclusive federal remedy in cases such as this.24
Unlike the provisions at issue in ERISA, the LMRA, and the National Bank Act, the FRSA savings clause provides evidence that Congress did not intend for the regulations to provide an exclusive federal remedy for cases involving railroad-related accidents, at least not when there is an applicable state law that is either additional or more stringent under the conditions set forth in the statute. "[T]he existence of this, type of `savings' clause which `contemplate[s] the application of state-law and the exercise of state-court jurisdiction to some degree' ... counsels against a conclusion that the purpose ... was to replicate the `unique preemptive force' of the LMRA and ERISA."25
Moreover, the FRSA does not provide a federal remedy for the claims asserted in this case. Defendants characterize plaintiffs claims in the Petition as follows: (1) Union Pacific negligently maintained and inspected its track, crossing and right-of-way; (2) Union Pacific negligently trained, instructed, and tested its employees responsible for track inspection and the maintenance of its track, crossing, and right-of-way; (3) Union Pacific failed to adequately instruct, train, and test members of its operating department; and (4) defendants failed to operate the train at a safe speed for then existing conditions. Plaintiff disagrees with these characterizations of the claims made in the Petition and urges that the wrongful death claim is based on alleged duties concerning private railroad crossings, which are not covered by the regulations relied on by defendants.
The Court agrees that the majority of the Petition pertains solely to defendants' duties at the private railroad...
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