Colburn v. Upper Darby Tp.

Decision Date22 February 1988
Docket NumberNo. 86-1675,86-1675
PartiesSue Ann COLBURN, Administratrix of the Estate of Melinda Lee Stierheim, Deceased, Appellant, v. UPPER DARBY TOWNSHIP, Upper Darby Township Police Department, Diane Miller, Individually and as Police Officer-Matron of Upper Darby Township, Martin Kerns, Individually and as Police Commissioner of Upper Darby Township, and James J. Ward, Individually and as Mayor of Upper Darby Township.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Joseph R. Pozzuolo, Gary Perkiss (argued), Pozzuolo & Perkiss, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.

William F. Holsten, Holsten & White, Media, Pa., for appellees Upper Darby Tp. and James J. Ward, Individually and as Mayor of Upper Darby Tp.

Dean F. Murtagh (argued), German, Gallagher & Murtagh, Philadelphia, Pa., for all appellees.

Before SLOVITER, BECKER and GARTH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

I. Issue

This action was filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 alleging that the suicide of decedent by a self-inflicted gun wound while she was detained in police custody apparently for public drunkenness was a result of constitutional violations by the officials responsible for her custody and the municipality which employs them. The district court, without permitting amendment, dismissed the complaint. In determining whether the district court erred as a matter of law, we must look once again to our precedent on the extent of factual specificity required in civil rights complaints and on the nature of conduct which constitutes a constitutional deprivation.

II. Facts

Sue Ann Colburn, the administratrix of the estate of Melinda Lee Stierheim, filed this action against Upper Darby Township (Upper Darby); the Upper Darby police department; Diane Miller, both individually and in her official capacity as an Upper Darby police officer; Martin Kerns, both individually and in his official capacity as Upper Darby police commissioner; and James Ward, both individually and in his official capacity as Upper Darby mayor.

The facts, as set forth in the original complaint, are as follows. At approximately 5:00 p.m. on April 30, 1985, Stierheim, dressed in blue denim shorts and a halter top and "visibly intoxicated", was taken into custody by the Upper Darby police.

Before placing Stierheim in a jail cell, Miller, the police matron on duty at the time, searched Stierheim. Miller did not find any handgun concealed on Stierheim's person. Approximately four hours later, while in her cell, Stierheim shot herself with a handgun. Stierheim died later that night, becoming the third person since 1982 to have committed suicide while in Upper Darby police custody.

The complaint alleges that Miller's search and supervision of Stierheim was negligently and/or recklessly performed, that defendants have exhibited a "custom of laxity regarding the supervision and monitoring of their jail cells and in searching individuals taken into police custody," and that defendants' "failure to provide adequate supervision and monitoring of their jail cells and their failure to provide adequate training to police officers-matrons in searching individuals taken into police custody amounts to gross negligence and a deliberate indifference to the safety and lives of individuals taken into custody and detained." App. at 8. It is also alleged that defendants "knew or had reason to know from their observation that [Stierheim] was a suicidal risk." App. at 10. The inadequate search and supervision are alleged to have been the proximate cause of Stierheim's death. Recovery is sought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for deprivation of Stierheim's constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 1

Defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint. They argued, inter alia, that the complaint failed to plead with the requisite factual specificity a constitutional deprivation sufficient to support a due process claim against any of the defendants; that with respect to Kerns and Ward, the complaint failed to allege facts supporting individual liability; that the complaint failed to plead with requisite specificity an official custom or policy sufficient to support municipal liability; and that since Stierheim was not convicted of any crime, she could assert no Eighth Amendment claim.

The district court granted the motion to dismiss without opinion. After the court's order dismissing but within the time allowed by stipulation approved by the court, Colburn filed an answer to the motion to dismiss and a supporting memorandum. 2 Colburn also moved for reconsideration. In the court's opinion denying reconsideration, it explained that it dismissed the section 1983 due process claim against Miller individually because negligent actions cannot produce constitutional deprivations actionable under section 1983, and because "[t]he facts as stated lack sufficient specificity to tie together the allegedly inadequate frisk and the subsequent suicide." App. at 110. Similarly, the court dismissed the section 1983 due process claims against all defendants in their official capacities because "[a] conclusory allegation that a municipal police force is lax in carrying out its duties is the exact type of negligent behavior the Supreme Court intended to exclude from the scope of section 1983," and because "[t]he extension of municipal liability to cover unforeseeable and tragic events caused directly by the superseding actions of a third party is beyond the realm of cognizable section 1983 violations." App. at 111. The court also held that the Eighth Amendment was inapplicable since Stierheim was unconvicted.

Colburn appeals from the order that denied her motion for reconsideration and thereby granted defendants' motion to dismiss.

III. The Pleading Standard

To sustain the dismissal of a complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), " 'we must take all the well pleaded allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,' and determine whether, under any reasonable reading The heightened specificity requirement for section 1983 claims does not alter the general standard for ruling on motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Bartholomew v. Fischl, 782 F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d Cir.1986). As we stated in Frazier, "the crucial questions are whether sufficient facts are pleaded to determine that the complaint is not frivolous, and to provide defendants with adequate notice to frame an answer." 785 F.2d at 68; accord District Council 47, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 313 (3d Cir.1986). We have routinely held that complaints comply with this standard if they allege the specific conduct violating the plaintiff's rights, the time and the place of that conduct, and the identity of the responsible officials. See id. at 314; Frazier, 785 F.2d at 68-70; Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir.1978). A plaintiff is not required to provide either proof of her claims or "a proffer of all available evidence" because in civil rights cases "much of the evidence can be developed only through discovery" of materials held by defendant officials. Frazier, 785 F.2d at 68, quoted with approval in District Council 47, 795 F.2d at 313.

                of the pleadings, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief."    Estate of Bailey by Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 506 (3d Cir.1985) (quoting Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 564, 565 (3d Cir.1977) (per curiam)).  The dual policy concerns of protecting state officials from a deluge of frivolous claims and providing state officials with sufficient notice of the claims asserted to enable preparation of responsive pleadings have led us to impose on section 1983 claims the additional pleading requirement that the "complaint contain a modicum of factual specificity, identifying the particular conduct of defendants that is alleged to have harmed the plaintiffs."    Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646, 650 (3d Cir.1981);  see also Frazier v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 785 F.2d 65, 67 (3d Cir.1986);  Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir.1976)
                

Moreover, we have held that "failure to permit amendment of a complaint dismissed for want of specific allegations constitutes an abuse of discretion." Ross, 638 F.2d at 650; see also District Council 47, 795 F.2d at 316. Of course, the district court need not permit an amendment that would be insufficient to cure the deficiency in the original complaint. See Sooner Products Co. v. McBride, 708 F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)); 3 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice Sec. 15.10, at 15-106 & n. 5 (2d ed. 1985).

A review of the record provides ample explanation why plaintiff did not file a motion to amend her complaint. Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on May 16, 1986. Stipulations between counsel, approved by the court, extended plaintiff's time to answer or otherwise move with respect to defendants' motion to dismiss until June 27, 1986. Nonetheless, by order signed June 23, 1986 and entered June 24, 1986, the district court granted what it termed the "unopposed" motion to dismiss for the reasons stated therein.

On June 27, 1986, within the time of the extension previously approved by the court, plaintiff filed her answer and a forty page memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss which referred to additional facts in support of her cause of action. Plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the complaint was pled in sufficient detail, but also requested, if necessary, that the court "permit plaintiff to amend the complaint following completion of discovery." App. at 75. Because the court had already dismissed the complaint, plaintiff also filed on the same day a motion for...

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