Colby v. Colby

• Decision Date: 21 May 2019
• Docket Number: AC 41102
• Citation: 190 Conn.App. 140,209 A.3d 1273
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Diane COLBY v. Arthur COLBY

190 Conn.App. 140

209 A.3d 1273

Diane COLBY

v.Arthur COLBY

AC 41102

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 8, 2019

Officially released May 21, 2019

Patrick W. Boatman, with whom, on the brief, was Erin E. Boatman, East Hartford, for the appellant (defendant).

Diane Frances Colby, self-represented, the appellee (plaintiff) filed a brief.

Lavine, Prescott and Elgo, Js.

LAVINE, J.

The defendant, Arthur Colby, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered after the plaintiff, Diane Colby, sought to enforce a California judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-70 et seq.¹ On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) denied him relief from the California judgment, (2) declined to order the plaintiff to produce receipts in support of child support expenditures,² and (3) calculated postjudgment interest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history underlie this appeal. The parties were married on February 23, 1980, and they have one child who was born in 1988. The marriage broke down, and they divorced. On April 19, 1996, the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement. On October 4, 1996, this agreement, which required the defendant to pay child and spousal support, was approved by and incorporated into a dissolution judgment in the California Superior Court. According to the judgment, the defendant was to pay $ 1080 per month to the plaintiff for child support until their child reached age nineteen, died, or was emancipated; to pay one half of child care costs, education expenses, and medical expenses; to pay a percentage of additional income he earned; and to maintain a life insurance policy. Additionally, the defendant was to pay the plaintiff spousal support of $ 120 per month.

The defendant sought a modification of the dissolution judgment due to a reduction in his income. On November 16, 2000, following a hearing, the dissolution judgment was modified by the California Superior Court. By the terms of the modification, the defendant was to pay child support of $ 531 per month until February, 2001, when child support was reduced to $ 497 per month; to pay $ 150 per month toward the child support arrearage; and to pay one half of the child's tutoring expenses with the plaintiff providing receipts.

The defendant failed to abide by the terms of the modification, and, on April 25, 2007, the plaintiff filed an application in the California Superior Court for an assignment order and determination of arrearages, alleging that the defendant had not paid the full amount of child support; had not contributed to medical expenses, child care costs, or education costs; did not maintain a life insurance policy or reimburse the plaintiff for life insurance premiums that she paid on his behalf; and had not paid spousal support.

On July 12, 2007, the parties entered into a stipulation that was approved and adopted as an order of the California Superior Court (2007 judgment). Pursuant to the 2007 judgment, the parties agreed that the defendant owed the plaintiff a total of $ 241,416 in past due child support payments plus interest.³ Included in the stipulation was an acknowledgement by the parties that the defendant was advised to seek legal counsel regarding the terms and execution of the stipulation, but that he "freely and voluntarily elected to represent himself ...." There were no further proceedings in the matter subsequent to the 2007 judgment.

In 2006, the plaintiff's dog bit the defendant's face, and he commenced a personal injury action against the plaintiff. The action was resolved by means of an August 27, 2009 settlement. Pursuant to the settlement, the defendant acknowledged the $ 241,416 debt he owed to the plaintiff pursuant to the 2007 judgment. When he entered into the settlement and signed the release, the defendant was represented by counsel who stated that he "fully explained the terms and conditions of the foregoing [r]elease ... to [the defendant], that [the defendant] acknowledged ... that he understands said [r]elease and the legal effects thereof, [and that counsel] believe[d] that [the defendant] understands the [r]elease and the legal effect of the [r]elease ...." Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the defendant received $ 48,000 in the form of credit toward the satisfaction of the 2007 judgment.

In March, 2016, the plaintiff filed the 2007 judgment in Connecticut pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-71. On April 7, 2016, she filed a motion for contempt, dated March 29, 2016, alleging various arrearages, and filed a motion to implead⁴ on August 10, 2016. On August 15, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for relief from the 2007 judgment on the grounds of fraud and duress.⁵

A hearing on the motions took place on December 9, 2016, and January 5, 6 and 31, 2017.

On August 2, 2017, the court denied the motions for contempt, to implead, and for relief, and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $ 465,498.29 in installments with interest accruing at a rate of 10 percent. In its memorandum of decision, the court detailed its application of California law, including California Code of Civil Procedure § 473⁶ and California Family Code § 2122,⁷ to the defendant's claims and found that, not only was there a "paucity of credible evidence that the defendant was under duress when he executed the stipulation," but that the defendant failed to apply for the relief or protections offered by the California provisions within the time limitations that California law provided.

The defendant filed a motion to reargue on August 22, 2017, challenging the court's calculation of the arrearage amount. The court granted the defendant's motion and heard oral argument on October 26, 2017. On November 6, 2017, the court determined that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff in the amount of $ 397,523.96. This total consisted of $ 241,416 pursuant to the 2007 judgment, less a $ 48,000 credit from the dog bite settlement, plus postjudgment interest. The defendant appealed to this court.⁸ Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff's claims, we set forth the standard for our review and relevant legal principles. "Foreign matrimonial judgments may be enforced, modified or otherwise dealt with in Connecticut pursuant to the provisions of General Statutes §§ 46b-70 through 46b-75. Section 46b-71 requires the filing of a certified copy of a foreign matrimonial judgment in the courts of this state where enforcement is sought and empowers the courts of this state to treat such a judgment in the same manner as any like judgment of a court of this state.... When modifying a foreign matrimonial judgment, a Connecticut court must apply the substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lindo v. Lindo , 48 Conn. App. 645, 649, 710 A.2d 1387 (1998).

Under California law, "[e]ither party [to a stipulation] may move the court to be relieved from the binding effect of a stipulation previously entered into, and it is within the sound discretion of the trial court whether or not such relief should be granted; in this regard the decision of the trial court will not be disturbed by an appellate court absent an abuse of discretion.... The grounds upon which the trial court may exercise its discretion [to grant relief from a stipulation] are that the stipulation was entered into as the result of fraud, misrepresentation, mistake of fact, or excusable neglect ... that the facts have changed, or that there is some other special circumstance rendering it unjust to enforce the stipulation." (Citations omitted.) People v. Trujillo , 67 Cal. App. 3d 547, 554–55, 136 Cal.Rptr. 672 (1977).

"[T]he standard of review in family matters is well settled. An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented.... In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.... Appellate review of a trial court's findings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review.... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.... Our deferential standard of review, however, does not extend to the court's interpretation of and application of the law to the facts. It is axiomatic that a matter of law is entitled to plenary review on appeal." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Princess Q.H. v. Robert H., 150 Conn. App. 105, 111–12, 89 A.3d 896 (2014).

I

The defendant claims that the court improperly (1) denied his request for relief from the 2007 judgment and (2) declined to order the plaintiff to produce receipts in support of the court's calculation of arrearage that was agreed to in the stipulation. In essence, the defendant argues that the court failed to engage in an analysis of the accuracy of the arrearage as agreed to in the stipulation, and, because the arrearage was inaccurate, the 2007 judgment should have been set aside due to extrinsic fraud. We disagree.

The court determined that, although there were protections available to the defendant under California Code of Civil Procedure § 473 and California Family Code § 2122,⁹ the defendant failed to timely raise any claims regarding the stipulation. The court found that after the stipulation was adopted as an order of the court on July 12, 2007, there were no further proceedings in the matter. Further, the defendant failed to articulate why he...