Colby v. Reed

Decision Date01 October 1878
Citation99 U.S. 560,25 L.Ed. 484
PartiesCOLBY v. REED
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. Edwin H. Abbot for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. Matt. H. Carpenter, contra.

MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

Tender, when the demand is of money, for a definite sum or for an amount capable of being made certain, may at common law be made on the very day the money becomes due, but it will constitute a defence only when made before the action is brought. Chitty, Contr. (10th ed.) 732, 733; 2 Pars. Contr. (6th ed.) 148; 9 Bac. Abr., Tender D. 321; Suffolk Bank v. Worcester Bank, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 106; Pitcher v. Bailey, 8 East, 171; Briggs v. Calverly, 8 T. R. 629.

In actions of debt and assumpsit the principle of the plea of tender is that the defendant has always been ready to perform the contract, and that he did perform it as far as he was able by tendering the requisite money, the plaintiff himself having prevented a complete performance by his refusal to accept the tender. Such a tender and refusal do not discharge the debt, and hence the plea must proceed to allege that the defendant is still ready to perform, and it must contain a profert in curia of the money tendered. Ayers v. Pease, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 393.

Arrangements were made between the parties to advance material aid in the construction of a certain land-grant railroad, and to promote that object the defendant agreed with the plaintiff, in writing under seal, that he would take stock in the company to the amount of $200,000, and that he would pay or deliver to the order of the plaintiff $45,000 of the proceeds of the subscription. Pursuant to the agreement, the defendant subsequently paid the agreed sum in money, and received the certificates of the stock to the same amount. Progress was made in the undertaking, but it turned out that more money was needed to complete the enterprise; which made it necessary that the same parties should subscribe for an additional hundred thousand dollars of the stock. It appears that they were willing to do so; but that the plaintiff could not furnish his proportion of the money for the new subscription, and that the defendant, in consideration of receiving $5,000 out of the plaintiff's stock, agreed to pay the entire amount of the additional subscription and to take the whole of the new stock, which left in his hands only $40,000 of the original stock belonging to the plaintiff. Money to the amount of $2,000 was, about the same time, borrowed for six months by the plaintiff of the defendant, on a pledge of $8,000 of plaintiff's stock in the hands of the defendant, which the record shows was never repaid, leaving in the possession of the defendant only $32,000 of the first subscription.

Throughout these transactions the relations between the parties were amicable; but they subsequently became hostile, and on the 28th of May, 1875, the plaintiff instituted the present suit in the Circuit Court, in which he claimed judgment against the defendant for the stock of the railroad in his hands to the amount of $45,000, with interest, as alleged in the complaint.

Service was made; and the defendant filed an answer, setting up several defences: 1. That the allegation that he refused to deliver the stock mentioned in the complaint is not true. 2. That no proper demand for the delivery of the same was ever made. 3. That the demand made was for the delivery of $45,000 of the stock when the defendant well knew that he was only entitled to demand $32,000 of the same, and the defendant avers that he always was and still is ready and willing to deliver the true amount. 4. That the plaintiff is indebted to the defendant in the sum of $2,000, for which he claims an allowance as a set-off or as a counter-claim. 5. That the value of the stock is much below par, and that the pledge to him for the loan is inadequate as security.

Preliminary matters being closed, the parties went to trial. Evidence was introduced on both sides, and the court submitted certain questions to the jury, to which they responded to the effect following: That the plaintiff before the commencement of the action made a demand of the stock from the defendant, and that the defendant refused to deliver the same. That the parties entered into the agreement set forth in the answer, by which the plaintiff was to deliver to the defendant the excess of the stock originally subscribed, above $40,000, in the event that it should become necessary to make the additional subscription of $100,000, and that the notice required of the defendant in that contingency was waived by the plaintiff; and the jury also found that the amount of stock which the plaintiff was entitled to demand and receive was only $32,000, and that the cash value of the same was and is $9,600, which finding appeared to be satisfactory to the plaintiff, as he moved for judgment in his favor; but the defendant filed two motions,—one that the plaintiff be ordered to accept the stock found to be due in mitigation of damages, and the other that a new trial be granted.

Hearing was had, and the court overruled the motions of the defendant and rendered judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $7,641.72. Before doing so, however, the court adjusted the equities between the parties as follows: Interest in favor of the plaintiff was added to the sum found due by the jury as the value of the stock, and the court, deducting therefrom the counter-claim and interest set up by the defendant, rendered judgment for the balance.

Seasonable exceptions were filed by the defendant and he sued out the pending writ of error.

Numerous errors are assigned by the defendant, but in the view taken of the case it will not be necessary to give them a separate examination. Attention will be called to the substantial issues presented in the pleadings and to the material questions which arose in the progress of the trial and in the rendition of the judgment.

Both parties agree that the controversy grew out of a contract between them, and that the redress sought by the plaintiff is compensation for the alleged breach of it and the failure of the defendant to comply with its terms. Every pretence of conversion, therefore, may be dismissed in the outset without the least consideration, as there is nothing either in the cause of action, or the form of the remedy, or in the allegations of the complainant, or in the averments of the answer, or in the evidence introduced by either party, which gives such a theory any support whatever. Instead of that, the plaintiff set up the agreement and alleges that the defendant broke it, and he claims compensation for the damage he suffered from its non-performance by the defendant. Demand of performance is also alleged by the plaintiff, which is explicitly denied by the defendant, who avers in his answer that he was always ready and willing to perform to the full extent of his obligation...

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27 cases
  • Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • January 20, 2016
    ...as well as before it commenced. Taylor v. Brooklyn Elevated R. Co., 119 N.Y. 561, 564, 23 N.E. 1106, 1107 (1890) ; cf. Colby v. Reed, 99 U.S. 560, 566, 25 L.Ed. 484 (1879) (at common law, generally no "right of tender after action brought"). Statutes also expanded the right of tender to cov......
  • Nakdimen v. Baker
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • May 27, 1940
    ...See Bryan v. Brazil, 52 Iowa 350, 3 N.W. 117; Benson v. Washington Leasing & Royalty Co., 173 Wash. 471, 23 P.2d 875; Colby v. Reed, 99 U.S. 560, 566, 25 L.Ed. 484; J. A. Schaefer Const. Co. v. Jones, Mo.App., 3 S.W.2d 286; California State Life Ins. Co. v. Elliott, Tex.Civ.App., 193 S.W. 1......
  • Paepcke-Leicht Lumber Co. v. Talley
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • February 3, 1913
    ...by defendant. Defendant's order for the thin stock at the quoted price, even if wrong, did not constitute a breach of the contract. 99 U.S. 560; 74 382; 42 A. 1061; 147 Ill. 504, 35 N.E. 741; 12 Col. App. 75, 54 P. 399; 3 Page on Contracts, § 1341; L. R. 45 Ch. D., 481; 72 F. 244; 20 Mont-3......
  • Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Duvall
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • May 18, 1939
    ...rule, a tender must include everything to which the creditor is entitled, and a tender of any less sum is ineffectual. Colby v. Reed, 99 U.S. 560, 25 L.Ed. 484; Henry v. Sansom, Tex.Civ.App., 36 S.W. 122; City of San Antonio v. Campbell, Tex.Civ.App., 56 S.W. 130; Bolton v. G. C. Gifford & ......
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