Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Boise

• Decision Date: 10 March 1970
• Docket Number: COLE-COLLISTER,No. 10320,10320
• Citation: 93 Idaho 558,468 P.2d 290
• Parties: FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, a Corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CITY OF BOISE, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 290

468 P.2d 290

93 Idaho 558

COLE-COLLISTER FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, a Corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CITY OF BOISE, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10320.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

March 10, 1970.

Rehearing Denied May 1, 1970.

Clemons, Skiles & Green, Boise, for defendant-appellant.

Millar, Callister & Carter, Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

DONALDSON, Justice.

The plaintiff-respondent, Cole-Collister Fire Protection District, owns a vacant parcel of real property located on the Northwest corner of the interesection of Cole and Ustick Roads in the City of Boise. Pursuant to I.C. § 50-1201 et seq., Boise City zoned the property in question 'L-O' or Limited Office District.' ¹ This designation precludes the erection of a gasoline station on property situated within the 'L-O' zone. ² The respondent originally purchased the property in question for use as a fire station. However the need for a fire station in this area became obviated and at present respondent wishes to dispose of the property. Respondent received an offer from Standard Oil of California to purchase the parcel for $27,000.00 conditioned on the right of Standard Oil to construct a gasoline filling station thereon. As heretofore stated, a gas station is not a 'permissible use' in a zone designated 'L-O.' At the trial testimony was presented which indicated that respondent advertised the property for sale, but received no offers to purchase except the one from Standard Oil. There is no testimony of record that indicates respondent's property is useless or of no economic value if it is not used as a gasoline station; however there is testimony that respondent's land is worth only $12,000.00 to $15,000.00 so long as the restrictions of a 'L-O' zone apply while it is worth $27,000.00 to $30,000.00 if a gasoline station could be erected upon it. The record reveals that although Boise City has zoned the respondent's land in question and adjoining parcels 'L-O,' thus prohibiting the use of land so zoned for commercial purposes, it has in fact permitted commercial establishments (gas station, drive-in restaurant, health and beauty salon, animal hospital) to exist in proximity to the property in question under the doctrine of non-conforming use. ³ In fact all of the 'L-O' district except for the lot in question is made up of non-conforming establishments having life expectancies in excess of fifteen to twenty years. The record further reveals that both streets bordering the corner parcel in question are major traffic arterials and furthermore that the parcel would be unsuited and undesirable as residential property or as an office location.

The gravamen of the complaint was that because of the location of the property in question which is surrounded by commercial establishments (permitted to exist under the doctrine of non-conforming use) and roadways carrying heavy traffic, such property is not desirable as 'L-O' zone property, i. e., offices, accessory uses related to offices, mortuary, nor for any of the authorized conditional uses, assuming that a conditional use permit was applied for and approved. Thus the property has a limited value as long as it is classified 'L-O.' However the property does have considerably greater value as the location for a gasoline filling station. For this reason the 'L-O' zoning classification imposed on respondent's property was alleged to be unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious, depriving him of his property without due process of law in violation of rights afforded under both the United States and Idaho Constitutions.

The trial court sitting without a jury found merit in respondent's claim and made conclusions of law which stated that the zoning ordinance in question was confiscatory, arbitrary and unreasonable and void as to the property of the respondent and that the respondent or any subsequent owner of the property is entitled to erect and maintain on said property a service station selling petroleum products. Furthermore the trial court enjoined the appellant from bringing any civil or criminal action against the respondent or its successors arising out of the use of the subject property.

It is beyond dispute that a local legislative body has the right to enact zoning ordinances. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). However such an ordinance must bear a reasonable relationship to the goal or ends sought to be attained. The Court of Appeals of New York clearly stated the principle in holding invalid a zoning ordinance when it stated:

"The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.' (Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188, 48 S.Ct. 447, 448, 72 L.Ed. 842.)' Matter of Concordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189 at 196, 93 N.E.2d 632 at 636, 21 A.L.R.2d 544 (1950).

Furthermore, zoning ordinances cannot be arbitrary since they interfere with the free use of property and thus the validity of a zoning ordinance depends on a reasonable relation to the police power. Continental Oil Co. v. City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89 at 106, 286 P. 353 at 358 (1930); Appeal of Sawdey, 369 Pa. 19, 85 A.2d 28 (1951). In determining the question of reasonableness or unreasonableness of an ordinance, all the existing circumstances or contemporaneous conditions, the objects sought to be obtained, and the necessity or lack thereof for its adoption, will be considered by the court. White v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 176, 338 P.2d 778 (1959); Continental Oil Co. v. City of Twin Falls, supra.

The New York Court of Appeals in Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954) considered a problem almost identical to the one presented by the case at bar where a parcel of land was placed in a zoning classification which precluded its use for purposes to which it was most readily adopted.

'On this record, the plaintiff, having asserted an invasion of his property rights, cf. Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731, has met the burden of proof by establishing that the property is so situated that it has no possibilities for residential use and that the use added by the 1952 amendment does not improve the situation but, in fact, will operate to destroy the greater part of the value of the property since, in authorizing its use for parking and incidental services, it necessarily permanently precludes the use for which is most readily adapted, i. e., a business use such as permitted and actually carried on by the owners of all the surrounding property. Under such circumstances, the 1927 zoning ordinance and zoning map and the 1952 amendment, as they pertain to the plaintiff's property, are so unreasonable and arbitrary as to constitute an invasion of property rights, contrary to constitutional due process and, as such, are invalid, illegal and void enactments. U.S.Const. 5th and 14th Amends.; N.Y.Const. art. I, §§ 6, 7; Rockdale Construction Corporation v. Incorporated Village of Cedarhurst, Nassau County, 301 N.Y. 519, 93 N.E.2d 76; Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, supra (278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587, 117 A.L.R. 1110); Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, supra (257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427, 86 A.L.R. 642); Eaton v. Sweeny, supra (257 N.Y. 176, 177 N.E. 412); Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322; Town of Islip v. F. E. Summers Coal & Lumber Co., 257 N.Y. 167, 177 N.E. 409.' Vernon Park Realty v City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493 at 499, 121 N.E.2d 517 at 519, 520 (1954).

It is a firmly established principle of law that a presumption of validity must be accorded to the decisions of the municipal zoning board.

'Ordinances and resolutions of a municipal corporation are presumed valid until the contrary is shown. The burden is on the party who attacks such an act to show the illegality thereof. City of Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, supra (63 Idaho 90, 117 P.2d 461); Taos County Board of Education v. Sedillo, 44 N.M. 300, 101 P.2d 1027; Baxley v. City of Frederick, 133 Okl. 84, 271 P. 257; City of Spokane v. Coon, 3 Wash.2d 243, 100 P.2d 36; Hughes v. City of Carlsbad, 53 N.M. 150, 203 P.2d 995; Seifert v. City of Poplar Bluff, Mo.App., 112 S.W.2d 93; McQuillin, 3rd Ed., §§ 22.34, 24.31.' Boise City v. Better Homes, Inc., 72 Idaho 441 at 447, 243 P.2d 303 at 306 (1952).

See also, City of Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 91, 117 P.2d 461 (1941); 3 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, p. 584, § 21.16 (1968). However a presumption of law is merely a rule which requires that the court draw a particular inference from a fact unless and until the truth of such inference is disproved. Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4 ed. (1968); Lane v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 132 Mo. 4, 33 S.W. 645 (1895); 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, §§ 14, 33.

This court carefully considered the concept of 'presumption' in the case of Haman v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 91 Idaho 19, 415 P.2d 305 (1966) and stated:

'In Madron v. McCoy, 63 Idaho 703, 126 P.2d 566 (1942), it was held that if insufficient evidence is presented by the party against whom the presumption operates, the presumption will entitle the party relying on it to judgment. In Brown v. Graham, 62 Idaho 388, 112 P.2d 485 (1941), this court considered the other side of the evidentiary value to be attributed to such presumption and by a divided opinion held that clear, convincing and uncontradicted evidence in opposition to the presumption will prevail as a matter of law over the presumption, and that it was incorrect to instruct the jury, that in order to...