Cole v. Crow, CIV-20-655-G
| Decision Date | 30 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIV-20-655-G |
| Parties | STEVEN L. COLE, Plaintiff, v. SCOTT CROW, et. al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff a state prisoner appearing pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 43, to which Plaintiff has filed a Response. Doc. No. 46. Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion Requesting Certification of Class, Doc. No. 35, to which Defendants have filed a Response. Doc. No. 35. The matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the following reasons, it is recommended the Motion to Dismiss be granted as to Plaintiff's second claim and Plaintiff's Motion Requesting Certification of Class be denied.
Plaintiff is confined at the William S. Key Correctional Center located in Fort Supply, Oklahoma. Doc. No. 34 (“Am Comp.”) at 3. In 2013, he was convicted of, inter alia, Robbery with a Firearm. Doc. No. 23-2 at 2; see also Oklahoma State Courts Network, State v. Cole, Tulsa County District Court, Case No. CF-2012-5756.[1] On that conviction, the state court sentenced Plaintiff to 20 years imprisonment with eight years probation. Id.
Pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 13.1, Oklahoma law prohibits the application of earned credits to reduce sentences imposed for certain violent crimes, including robbery with a dangerous weapon, until the convicted individual has served 85% of his sentence. Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 13.1(8) (“Persons convicted of these offenses[, including robbery with a dangerous weapon, ] shall not be eligible for earned credits or any other type of credits which have the effect of reducing the length of the sentence to less than eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed.”). Based on Plaintiff's conviction for Robbery with a Firearm, he is not eligible for credits that reduce his sentence lower than 85%.
Construing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint liberally, Plaintiff raises several claims related to good time credits. In his first and third claims, Plaintiff explains that in order to participate in Re-Entry/Stepdown and Reintegration Programs, which are designed to prepare inmates for acclimating to life outside of prison, the inmate has to be within 760 days from his discharge date. Am. Comp. at 10-12, 17-19. As noted, 85% inmates cannot have their credits applied to their sentence until they have formally served 85% of the same. Id. Plaintiff contends this usually results in the inmates being released upon meeting their 85% date because the sudden application of their credits fulfills their 100% sentence, sometimes with extra credits remaining. Id. However, eligibility calculations for the Re-Entry/Stepdown and Reintegration Programs use the 100% sentence discharge date. Id. This means that unlike the non-85% inmates, the 85% inmates can never participate in these programs prior to their release.[2]
Plaintiff contends this disparate treatment between the 85% and non-85% inmates does not have a rational basis and is a violation of his equal protection rights. Id. at 5, 10-12. Relying on his Consolidated Record Card, Doc. No. 23-2 at 2, Plaintiff notes that he is accruing credits, though they cannot be applied until he reaches his 85% date, and that he can lose them before he reaches that date. Based on this, Plaintiff asserts both substantive and procedural due process claims, arguing that since he can lose the credits that could otherwise be applied in the future, he has a state created liberty interest in the same. Id. at 17-19.
In his second claim, Plaintiff asserts that the prohibition against his ability to apply good time credits to his sentence is a violation of his due process rights. Id. at 15-17. He contends it is a violation of due process and equal protection to not permit 85% inmates to receive the benefits of the credits they are allowed to earn. Id. at 15-17. Additionally, he asserts Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 13.1 does not place any limits on the number of good time credits the 85% inmates can earn before they reach their 85% discharge date, meaning that some inmates earn more credits than necessary to take their sentence to completion once they reach 85% and their credits are applied. Id. at 15-16. When that occurs, Plaintiff argues that he should receive monetary compensation for the extra credits earned. Id.
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss in which they only address Plaintiff's second claim. Doc. No. 43. They contend that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff's due process claim fails on its merits, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity, Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief invalidating his sentence, and Defendants did not personally participate in a constitutional violation. Id. at 3-11.
A motion to dismiss may be granted when the plaintiff has “failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In applying this standard the court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Leverington v. City of Colo. Springs, 643 F.3d 719, 723 (10th Cir. 2011); Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1063 (10th Cir. 2005). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must present factual allegations that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This review contemplates the assertion of “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. Thus, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a [plausible] claim of entitlement to relief, ” the cause of action should be dismissed. Id. at 558.
A pro se plaintiff's complaint must be broadly construed under this standard. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the generous construction to be given the pro se litigant's allegations “does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). See Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-1174 (10th Cir. 1997) (courts “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf”).
A court evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss may consider the complaint as well as any documents attached to it as exhibits. Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1112. Additionally, “[a] district court may consider documents (1) referenced in a complaint that are (2) central to a plaintiff's claims, and (3) indisputably authentic when resolving a motion to dismiss without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.” Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183, 1197 (10th Cir. 2014).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees certain procedural safeguards before a State may deprive an individual of his or her “life, liberty, or property.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). “We examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State, the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient[.]” Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted). Therefore, with respect to Plaintiff's claims of due process deprivation, Plaintiff must first establish that he had a constitutionally protected interest.
Protected liberty interests may be derived from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); see also White v. Kelly, 82 F.Supp.2d 1184, 1189 (D. Colo. 2000) (“[S]tates may create constitutionally protected liberty interests by enacting state statutes that place substantive limitations on the exercise of official discretion.” (citing Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 469-71; Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248-51 (1983); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1979)).
Oklahoma has created a liberty interest in earned sentence credits. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 138(A); Waldon v Evans, 861 P.2d 311, 313 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993). Thus, Oklahoma inmates are generally entitled to minimum due process protections prior to the revocation of their earned credits. However, Oklahoma law prohibits the application of earned credits to reduce sentences imposed for certain crimes, including robbery with a dangerous weapon, until the convicted individual has served 85% of his sentence. Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 13.1(8) . Although Plaintiff argues that he is already earning credits, as evidenced by his Consolidated Record Card, and that those credits will be applied when he reaches his 85% date, it is clear from the language of Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 13.1, Oklahoma law has not created a liberty interest in the earning of such...
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