Cole v. Ralph

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Citation64 L.Ed. 567,252 U.S. 286,40 S.Ct. 321
Docket Number173,Nos. 172,s. 172
PartiesCOLE et al. v. RALPH (two cases)
Decision Date15 March 1920

[Syllabus from pages 286-288 intentionally omitted] Messrs. George B. Thacher and William C. Prentiss, of Washington, D. C., for petitioners.

Messrs. Samuel Herrick, of Washington, D. C., and P. G. Ellis, of Salt Lake City, Utah, for respondent.

Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

These suits relate to conflicting mining locations in Nevada and are what are commonly called adverse suits. The locations set up on one side are lode and those on the other placer, the former being designated as Salt Lake No. 3, Midas, and Evening Star and the latter as Guy Davis and Homestake. Joseph Ralph is the lode claimant and the other parties are the placer claimants.

Ralph made application at the local land office for the issue to him of a patent for the three lode claims, along with thirteen others not here in question, and in due time two adverse claims were filed in that proceeding, one based upon the Guy Davis and covering most of the ground within the Salt Lake No. 3, and the other based upon the Homestake and covering a considerable portion of the ground within the Midas and Evening Star. These suits were brought in a state court in support of the adverse claims, and Ralph, the sole defendant, caused them to be removed into the federal court, the parties being citizens of different states. Afterwards some of the original plaintiffs were eliminated and others brought in, but the citizenship remained diverse as bf ore.

The cases were tried together to the court and a jury, the latter returning general verdicts for the plaintiffs and special verdicts finding that when the placer locations were made no lode had been discovered within the limits of any of the lode locations. Judgments for the plaintiffs were entered upon the verdicts and motions by the defendant for a new trial were overruled. Upon writs of error the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgments and ordered a new trial, one judge dissenting. Ralph v. Cole, 249 Fed. 81, 161 C. C. A. 133. The cases are here upon writs of certiorari which were granted because the ground upon which the Circuit Court of Appeals put its decision—The construction and application of some of the mineral land laws—was deemed of general interest in the regions where those laws are operative.

The defendant does not rely entirely upon the ground of decision advanced by the Circuit Court of Appeals but urges at length that, if it be not well taken, the record discloses other grounds, not considered by that court, for reversing the judgments and ordering a new trial. And he further urges that, if the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals be right, it is not sufficiently comprehensive to serve as a guide to the court and the parties upon another trial. The plaintiffs insist that the judgments in the District Court were right and should be affirmed.

In the circumstances it is open to us to deal only with the matter considered by the Circuit Court of Appeals and to remand the cases to it for any needed action upon other questions, or to proceed ourselves to a complete decision. The latter course seems the better inasmuch as counsel have united in presenting to us all questions though to arise upon the record and the litigation already has covered a considerable period.

Criticism is made of the complaints. As presented in the state court they fully met the requirements of the local Code, Rev. Laws 1912, § 5526, and there was no request after the removal into the federal court that they be recast to meet any further requirements prevailing there. Apart from the local Code, each sufficiently stated a cause of action in the nature of ejectment, save as some allegations were wanting in precision and it was left uncertain whether the defendant was in possession. The latter defect was cured by an affirmative statement in the answer that the defendant was in possession. Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U. S. 408, 416, 31 Sup. Ct. 534, 55 L. Ed. 789. If the other defects embarrassed the defendant he should have interposed a timely objection, which doubtless would have resulted in appropriate amendments. Instead, he permitted the matter to pass until the trial was in progress and then sought to obtain some advantage from it. This he could not do; by his failure to make timely objection the defects had been waived. We here dispose of a related question by saying that, in our opinion, the complaints, with the answers, put in issue the validity of the lode locations, including the requisite mineral discovery.

The defendant insists that necessary parties did not join in filing the adverse claims in the land office, that in the suits there was a misjoinder of plaintiffs and a failure to joinessential plaintiffs, and that deeds showing title in some of the plaintiffs were erroneously admitted in evidence in that they were without the requisite revenue stamps. We think this insistence is untenable in all its phases.

As respects the guy Davis placer, Davis and Faubert were the original locators and Faubert soon conveyed a fraction of his interest to Thatcher. These three filed the adverse claim and brought the suit, the title being in them at the time. Thereafter Faubert transferred his remaining interest to Cole, Malley and Ross, and Thatcher conveyed a fraction of his interest to Healey. Because of these transfers, and with the court's approval, Faubert was eliminated as a party and Cole, Malley, Ross andH ealey came in as plaintiffs. Thus the changes in title pending the suit were followed by corresponding changes in the parties plaintiff.

At all the times mentioned the title was in a sense affected by an outstanding contract, executed by the original locators, which invested Thatcher and Forman with a right to a specified share in the output or proceeds of the claim, and possibly with a right to have it worked and thereby made productive. The contract was not recorded, but this is not material, for the contract was good between the parties and no subsequent purchaser is calling it in question. See Rev. Laws 1912, §§ 1038-1040. Unlike Thatcher, Forman had no interest in the claim other than under this contract. He did not join in filing the adverse claim or in bringing the suit, but with the court's approval came in as a plaintiff before the trial. We think his interest was not such as to make him an essential party to the adverse claim or to the suit, and yet was such as to make him an admissible party to either. Of course the acts of those having the title in filing the adverse claim and bringing the suit inured to his benefit. And had they proceeded in his absence to a judgment in their favor the same would have been true of it. But this does not prove that he could not be admitted as a plaintiff. He had an interest—a real interest—in the maintenance and protection of the claim which was the subject of the suit, and in view of the liberal provisions of the local statute, Rev. Laws 1912, §§ 4998, 5000, we think the court did not err in allowing him to come in as a plaintiff. It is not asserted that his presence was prejudicial to the defendant and we perceive no ground for thinking it could have been.

As respects the Homestake placer, Murray Scott and John J. Healey were the original locators and the title was still in them when the adverse claim was filed and when the suit was begun, unless there be merit in the defendant's contention that Scott's interest had then passed to others under attachment proceedings and that Healey's interest had then passed to his wife. Neither branch of the contention is, in our opinion, well grounded. The attachment proceedings, although commenced before the adverse claim was filed, did not result in a transfer of Scott's title until after the present suit was begun. The purported conveyance of Healey's interest to his wife, to which the defendant directs attention, recites that it was made upon a consideration paid in money at the time, and this is in no wise explained. There is no evidence that the consideration was paid out of any separate property of the wife, or that the conveyance was intended as a gift to her, or that she ever listed the subject of the conveyance as her separate property. In these circumstances, according to the laws of the state, the Healey interest was community property, of which the husband had the 'entire management and control' and the 'absolute power of disposition.' He could lease or convey it without the wife's concurrence and could sue in respect of it in his name alone. Rev. Laws 1912, §§ 2155-2160; Crow v. Van Sickle, 6 Nev. 146; Lake v. Bender, 18 Nev. 361, 384, 385, 4 Pac. 711, 7 Pac. 74; Adams v. Baker, 24 Nev. 375, 55 Pac. 362; Malstrom v. People's Ditch Co., 32 Nev. 246, 260, 107 Pac. 98.

There was here a contract with Thatcher and Forman like that relating to the Guy Davis, and this gave them a real interest in the claim, as already enplained.

The adverse claim was filed and the suit was brought by Scott, Healey, Thatcher and Forman. Afterwards, and following the consummation of the attachment proceedings, the entire interest of Scott was transferred to Cole, Malley, Ross and Davis, and by reason of this, and with the court's approval, Scott was eliminated as a party and Cole, Malley, Ross and Davis came in as plaintiffs. Thus there was no misjoinder of plaintiffs, nor any failure to join an essential party. Of course, those who succeeded to Scott's interestp ending the suit were entitled to the benefit of what he had done while he held the title.

In one of the adverse claims Healey's name was given as Frank J. instead of John J., but this was a mere inadvertence, did not mislead or prejudice any one, and rightly was disregarded by the District Court.

As to the absence of revenue stamps, it is true that the deeds showing title in some...

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    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • November 18, 2003
    ..."no right arises from an invalid claim of any kind"); accord Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 337 (1963); Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286, 296 (1920); United States v. Allen, 578 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1978); Clouser v. Madigan, 1992 WL 694368, at *16 (D. Or. Dec. 22, 1992); S......
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    • United States
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    • November 18, 2003
    ...claim of any kind"); accord Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 337, 83 S.Ct. 379, 9 L.Ed.2d 350 (1963); Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286, 296, 40 S.Ct. 321, 64 L.Ed. 567 (1920); United States v. Allen, 578 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir.1978); Clouser v. Madigan, 1992 WL 694368, at *16 (D......
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1 books & journal articles
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 96 Nbr. 1, November 2020
    • November 1, 2020
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