Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schools

• Decision Date: 29 December 1994
• Docket Number: 92-2216,Nos. 92-2194,s. 92-2194
• Citation: 43 F.3d 1373
• Parties: 68 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 561, 30 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1522, 96 Ed. Law Rep. 937 Texanita COLE, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. RUIDOSO MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS, Ruidoso Board of Education, Sid Miller, individually and in his official capacity; W.R. Edwards, also known as Stormy Edwards, Board President, individually and in his official capacity; Don Swalander, Board Member, individually and in his official capacity; Rod Adamson, Board Member, individually and in his official capacity; Mike Morris, Board Member, individually and in his official capacity; Fred Lynn Willard, Board Member, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1373

43 F.3d 1373

68 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 561, 30

Fed.R.Serv.3d 1522,

96 Ed. Law Rep. 937

Texanita COLE, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. RUIDOSO MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS, Ruidoso Board of Education, Sid Miller, individually and in his official capacity; W.R Edwards, also known as Stormy Edwards, Board President individually and in his official capacity; Don Swalander Board Member, individually and in his official capacity Rod Adamson, Board Member, individually and in his official capacity; Mike Morris, Board Member, individually and in his official capacity; Fred Lynn Willard, Board Member, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Nos. 92-2194, 92-2216.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Dec. 29, 1994.

Susan G. Morrison, Austin, TX, for plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee.

Daniel H. Friedman, Santa Fe, NM, for defendants-appellees/cross-appellants.

Before BRORBY, HOLLOWAY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge.

Texanita Cole appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of Ruidoso Municipal Schools (School District or District) on claims arising from the termination of her employment as the principal of the Ruidoso Middle School (RMS). Cole also appeals the denial of her motion to disqualify defense counsel. We hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment for the School District on Cole's Equal Pay Act claim and her Title VII retaliation claim, but conclude that summary judgment for the District was not appropriate for Cole's Title VII claim of gender discrimination. We affirm the district court's denial of Cole's motion to disqualify defense counsel.

The School District and the individual defendants, who were dismissed from the case on a previous motion for summary judgment, appeal the district court's imposition of certain costs on them as a condition of granting a stay of discovery. We conclude that we have jurisdiction over this cross-appeal of the defendants and affirm the district court's imposition of costs.

I

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Deepwater Invs., Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (10 Cir.1991). Our record reveals the following facts:

Texanita Cole had been a certified teacher for the Ruidoso School District for approximately fourteen years when, in 1982, she became the District's first female administrator, the principal of RMS. She succeeded defendant Sid Miller who had been promoted to associate superintendent of the District. Under both principal Miller and principal Cole, there was a high degree of dissension among the faculty at RMS, allegedly due to difficult personalities among its members. See Appellant's App. II (App. II) at 448. The faculty discord continued throughout the six years Cole was principal. However, during those years, Cole always received excellent performance evaluations. None of these evaluations suggests that she was at fault for the faculty troubles; nor did her supervisors indicate that Cole would be replaced if a solution to the dissension was not found.

During the 1987-88 school year, the District faced budgetary problems and thus considered the elimination of an administrative position. A proposed budget recommended the elimination of the associate superintendent position. At that time the position was held by Mike Gladden, who had replaced defendant Miller when Miller became superintendent. In February 1988, Miller showed this budget recommendation to Cole and told her that he would "do anything" to save Gladden's job. Id. at 452. Later that month, the proposed budget was changed to suggest generally "the elimination of an administrative position," rather than specifically targeting the associate superintendent position. Id. On February 26, 1988, Miller told Cole that Gladden would be replacing her as principal. Miller suggested Cole resign in order to return to the classroom, but at that time Cole had no teaching certificate.

On the morning of March 8, 1988, the school board held an unannounced morning meeting in Miller's office. That night, at the official school board meeting, the board approved a reduction in force. The board voted not to renew Cole's contract and to assign associate superintendent Gladden the additional job of serving as principal of RMS. The board assigned Cole to a teaching position at the elementary school. Cole accepted the position at the elementary school, but resigned midyear to move to Florida.

Cole filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on June 13, 1988. In their response to the EEOC, apparently filed by August 25, 1988, the defendants alleged that the reason for Cole's discharge was the faculty problems at RMS, "which [Cole] had been unable to resolve herself over a period of six years, and which in recent years, had begun to affect the quality of education at the Middle School." Appellant's Appendix I (App. I) at 114. There were numerous very favorable evaluations of Cole by defendant Miller for academic years 1984-85, 1985-86, and 1986-87. App. II at 462-71. However, the defendants' response to the EEOC described Cole's performance as "clearly inferior to those of the four other principals in the district...." App. I at 115.

The EEOC made no finding as to the merits of Cole's claims. On September 8, 1989, the EEOC sent Cole a right to sue letter. App. II at 496. She filed this action on December 8, 1989, asserting eleven claims against the school board, the board of education, the superintendent, and five school board members. ¹ All but three of Cole's claims were dismissed by the district court. ² Cole does not challenge their dismissal in this appeal. The School District moved for summary judgment as to the three remaining claims--the Title VII gender discrimination claim, the Title VII retaliation claim, and the Equal Pay Act claim. The district judge granted this summary judgment motion and Cole filed a timely notice of appeal on September 24, 1992 (No. 92-2194).

The School District and the individual defendants filed a cross-appeal from four orders of the district court requiring them to pay certain costs as a condition of obtaining a stay of discovery following their motion for qualified immunity (No. 92-2216). ³ Because a final judgment has been rendered, we may now review these interlocutory orders. See Hooker v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 965 F.2d 903, 905 (10th Cir.1992); Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390 (10th Cir.1981).

II

Whether the School District was entitled to summary judgment is a question of law we review de novo. Durham v. Xerox Corp., 18 F.3d 836, 838 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 80, 130 L.Ed.2d 33 (1994). Summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Martin v. Nannie and the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1993). In reviewing the record for genuine issues of material fact, we construe the pleadings and documentary evidence liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Florum v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir.1989).

If the moving party satisfies its initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, identifying the portions of the pleadings, depositions and the like which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), then the nonmoving party must identify sufficient evidence that would require submission of the case to a jury.

Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 36 F.3d 1491, 1497 (10th Cir.1994).

A The Title VII Gender Discrimination Claim

In Title VII disparate treatment claims such as Cole's, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-54, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-94, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Ramsey v. City and County of Denver, 907 F.2d 1004, 1007 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 302, 121 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant can rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing some evidence that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. Sorensen v. City of Aurora, 984 F.2d 349, 352 (10th Cir.1993). If the defendant meets "its burden of production, the McDonnell Douglas framework--with its presumptions and burdens--is no longer relevant." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).

The plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were a pretext for discrimination. EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir.1992) ("Even a finding that the reason given for the [adverse employment action] was pretextual, does not compel [a finding of discrimination], unless it is shown to be a pretext for discrimination against a protected class." (Emphasis in original)).

The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination....

St. Mary's, --- U.S. at ----, ...