Cole v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co.

Citation186 Ala. 192,65 So. 177
Decision Date12 February 1914
Docket Number463
PartiesCOLE v. SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO.
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama

Rehearing Denied May 14, 1914

Appeal from City Court of Bessemer; J.C.B. Gwin, Judge.

Action by Joe Cole, as administrator, against the Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Company for damages for the death of his intestate. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Mayfield Sayre, and Somerville, JJ., dissenting in part.

Count 5 is as follows: "Plaintiff, suing as the administrator of Willie Cole, deceased, who was a minor under the age of 14 years, claims of defendant the sum of $1,999 as damages for that, heretofore on, to wit, the 17th day of June, 1911 while plaintiff's intestate was in the service or employment of defendant at its ore mines near Bessemer Jefferson county, Ala., and while in the discharge of his duties, in the course and line of his employment as such, and after he had been employed to work in said mine by defendant he was struck by one of defendant's tram cars, and thereby so injured that he died from the effects thereof, and plaintiff avers that said injuries and death of intestate were proximately caused by reason of defendant employing the said intestate to work in said mine in violation of the laws of the state of Alabama as embodied in section 1035, Code 1907 of the state, which prohibits the employment of boys under 14 years of age to work in or about mines in this state."

The following is plea 2: "(2) Defendant says that plaintiff's intestate himself was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to his alleged injuries and death, which negligence consisted in this: At the time said intestate suffered said injuries, there was in force and effect a rule of defendant prohibiting employés performing the duties that said intestate was employed to perform from riding on cars operated on the track on which the said car or tram that struck said intestate was being run when it struck him, and of which rule the said intestate well knew, and immediately before said intestate received said injury, he was riding on one of the cars being operated on said track, in violation of said rule."

Demurrer B to the second plea is as follows: "Said plea fails to aver or show that plaintiff's intestate was a boy of mature judgment and discretion, and therefore appreciated the risk or danger of riding on one of defendant's tram cars."

C: "It fails to aver that plaintiff's intestate or other employé in his position were required to conform to the rule prohibiting employes from riding on the cars as operated in said mine."

Estes, Jones & Welch, of Bessemer, for appellant.

Tillman, Bradley & Morrow, of Birmingham, for appellee.

McCLELLAN, J.

Count 5 of the amended complaint was, under the authority of De Soto Coal Co. v. Hill, 60 So. 583, not subject to demurrer, provided the provisions of Code 1907, § 1035, apply to ore mines--to mines other than coal mines. The report of the appeal will contain the count.

Code 1907, § 1035, is as follows: "1035 (2933). Women and boys under fourteen not to work in mines.--No woman, or boy under the age of fourteen years, shall be employed to work or labor in or about any mine in this state."

With the exceptions that or, before boy, was substituted for nor and fourteen was substituted for twelve, Code 1907, § 1035, is identical with section 2933 of the Code of 1896.

On February 16, 1897 (Acts 1896-97, pp. 1099-1112), an act entitled "An act to regulate the mining of coal in Alabama" was approved and became a law. [Italics supplied.] Section 27 of that act provided "that no women shall be employed to work or labor in or about the mines in this state, or any boy under the age of twelve years be so employed." In consequence of the title of the act wherein the subject of the act was restricted to coal mines, it is manifest that the provisions of (its) section 27 were only applicable to coal mines in this state. From this established premise, it is insisted that the codifications of 1896 (section 2933) and 1907 (section 1035) did not intend and did not effect such change in the legislative purpose as to extend the prohibitive provisions of the law to mines other than coal mines in this state. The question, therefore, is: Did the codifications mentioned expand the effect of the inhibition under consideration to comprehend all, every mine, whether coal, ore, or other kind of mine?

As appears, the inquiry presented requires that due account should be taken, as is done, of the rule of statutory construction thus set down in Landford v. Dunklin, 71 Ala. 609, and reiterated in Lindsay v. U.S. Savings Co., 127 Ala. 366, 371, 28 So. 717, 718, 51 L.R.A. 393, 394, among other of our cases: "No rule of statutory construction rests upon better reasoning than that in the revision of statutes, alteration of phraseology, the omission or addition of words, will not necessarily change the operation or construction of former statutes. The language of the statute as revised or the legislative intent to change the former statute must be clear before it can be pronounced that there is a change of such statute in construction and operation."

In our recent case of De Soto Coal Company v. Hill, supra, Justice, now Chief Justice, Anderson writing for the majority, forming the court's pronouncement, it was said of section 1035: "This statute was intended to protect women and children of a tender age from incurring the hazard and danger incident to the operation of mines by imperatively preventing the employment of same, *** and it should be liberally construed so as to effectuate the humane intent of the Legislature." And this from a New York case is there approvingly quoted: "This is a statute which makes an epoch in the progress of humanity, and the courts should not get in its way or whittle it down, as courts have done in the past."

Aside from the general recasting, in the Code of 1896, of the features of the section (27) whereby the objects of its solicitude were described, the chief changes in phraseology from the act to that employed in the codifications, was...

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15 cases
  • Tampa Shipbuilding & Engineering v. Adams
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 14 Abril 1938
    ... ... 424] liberally construed. Cole v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & ... Iron Co., 186 Ala. 192, 65 So. 177, ... ...
  • Ruth v. Eagle-Picher Company, 5072.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 18 Julio 1955
    ...Conn. 393, 161 A. 852; Lindsay v. United States Savings & Loan Co., 127 Ala. 366, 28 So. 717, 51 L.R.A. 393; Cole v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 186 Ala. 192, 65 So. 177. 9 80th Congress, Second Session, Report No. 1559, Title 28 United States Code Congressional Service Special Pamphl......
  • American Indemnity Co. v. City of Austin
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • 20 Diciembre 1922
    ...Christopher v. Mungen, 61 Fla. 513, 534, 55 South. 273, 280; Park v. Laurens Cotton Mills, 75 S. C. 560, 56 S. E. 234, 237; Cole v. Sloss, etc., Co., 186 Ala. 192, 65 South. 177, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 99; Curee v. Spokane, etc., R. Co., 32 Idaho, 643, 186 Pac. 1101; Anderson v. Great Northern Ry......
  • Carter Oil Co. v. Blair
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 21 Diciembre 1951
    ...applied. However, we have dealt with the meaning of the word 'mine' as it appeared in § 1035, Code 1907. In Cole v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 186 Ala. 192, 65 So. 177, we held that the word 'mine' as used in § 1035, Code 1907, included ore as well as coal mines. But in Sloss-Sheffie......
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