Cole v. St. Joseph County
| Decision Date | 10 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:99CV0308RM.,3:99CV0308RM. |
| Citation | 114 F.Supp.2d 780 |
| Parties | Karen L. COLE and Stacey E. Spiegel, Plaintiffs, v. ST. JOSEPH COUNTY, Mahlon Wise and Tom Borowski, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Michael C Kendall, Michael L Schultz, Kendall Law Office, Indianapolis, IN, for Karen L Cole, Stacey E Spiegel, plaintiffs.
Peter J Agostino, Anderson Agostino & Keller, South Bend, IN, for St Joseph County, Mahlon Wise, Individually and in his representative and official capacities as the Director of the Court Substance Abuse Program, Tom Borowski, Individually and in his representative and official capacities as the Director of Human Resources for St Joseph County, defendants.
Karen L. Cole and Stacey E. Spiegel sue St. Joseph County, County Human Resources Director Tom Borowski, and Court Substance Abuse Program director Mahlon Wise, seeking compensatory, punitive, and declaratory relief for violations of the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985; retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; promissory estoppel; breach of contract; and violation of St. Joseph County Ordinance No. 39-97. The defendants seek summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, "a trial court must view the record and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party cannot rest on the mere allegations or denials contained in his pleadings, but "must present sufficient evidence to show the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial." However, neither presenting a scintilla of evidence, nor the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties or some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, is sufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment. The party must supply evidence sufficient to allow a jury to render a verdict in his favor.
Robin v. Espo Engineering Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1087-1088 (7th Cir.2000).
Because defendants have moved for summary judgment, the court views the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and draws reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor. See, e.g., DeValk Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 811 F.2d 326, 329 (7th Cir.1987). The defendants may disagree with some of the things the court assumes to be true, but the question at this stage is not what the facts are, but rather what a jury could find the facts to be.
The Court Substance Abuse Program (CSAP) provides the St. Joseph Superior Court with the resources necessary to monitor court-referred drug and alcohol offenders and to ensure the offenders' compliance with court orders. In 1998, CSAP consisted of a director, an assistant director, six case managers, one coordinator of support services, a lab director, two lab assistants and three secretaries. Mr. Wise had been the director of CSAP since 1993; Ms. Cole and Ms. Spiegel were case managers. Ms. Cole worked for CSAP for 11 years and had applied for the CSAP director's position in 1994. Ms. Spiegel worked for CSAP as an intern from January 1995 to August 1995 and as an employee from December 1995 to May 22, 1998.
Ms. Cole and Ms. Spiegel didn't like Mr. Wise's management style. Ms. Cole's problems with Mr. Wise started a year or so after Mr. Wise became CSAP director. It was at that time that he began to tell jokes sporadically that several women found offensive and changed rules regarding travel and training reimbursement. Other office irregularities that Ms. Cole perceived included personal use of the county van and disparate treatment between men and women regarding comp time, overtime, assignment of night work, timecard keeping, and county van use. Ms. Spiegel's problems with Mr. Wise generally mirrored Ms. Cole's; she also complained of not receiving a hepatitis shot at county expense and Mr. Wise's problems with her work attire.
Mr. Wise, in turn, had problems with Ms. Cole and Ms. Spiegel. He thought Ms. Cole undermined his authority with other staff members by accusing him of being on the take and telling other staff members to disregard his direction. He saw Ms. Cole and Ms. Spiegel as insubordinate and confrontational, and thought they refused to accept his authority as the CSAP director.
When in administering the day-to-day activities of CSAP, Mr. Wise referred to the St. Joseph County Human Resources Policies and Benefits Manual, which the county promulgated in 1997. The county ordinance adopting the manual specifically provides that "[n]othing herein is intended to constitute a contract of employment between the St. Joseph County government and any employee, including reference to introductory periods and standards and procedures for discipline." The county endorses a policy of progressive discipline, but the manual also recognizes that a supervisor may terminate without progressive discipline for conduct such as insubordination and possession of firearms on county property. The manual specifically provides that the "handbook does not constitute a contract or an offer to enter into a contract and nothing in the descriptions contained in this handbook confers any right to continued employment with St. Joseph County," and that it does not "form[] an expressed or implied contract or promises that the policies discussed in it will be applied in all cases."
In May 1997, Tom Borowski met with CSAP employees to explain the policy manual. Ms. Cole and Ms. Spiegel understood Mr. Borowski to say, in response to concerns about the handbook's "at will" provision, that the county doesn't use employment at will. Ms. Spiegel complained to Mr. Borowski at that meeting about a 15-minute time clock rule Mr. Wise had initiated.
Ms. Cole remembers Mr. Wise telling offensive jokes as early as 1995, when she confronted him about the jokes and threatened him with a sexual harassment claim. She couldn't remember any specific incidents or jokes from 1995, and Ms. Cole and Ms. Wise agree that any offensive jokes were sporadic and didn't affect or interfere with their abilities to do their work. Ms. Cole and other case managers (but not Ms. Spiegel) also told offensive jokes at work, but none as offensive as the ones Mr. Wise told. Ms. Cole and Ms. Spiegel recall two particularly offensive and gross jokes Mr. Wise told in early 1998, one just before a staff meeting. Some of the employees complained about the jokes among themselves, but no one complained to Mr. Wise (other than Ms. Cole saying something once in 1995) or anyone else in the chain of command until Ms. Spiegel complained to Judge Chamblee in April 1998 and to Mr. Borowski in May 1998 about the joke told at the staff meeting. During a May 1998 confrontation between Ms. Cole and Mr. Wise about mileage reimbursement, Ms. Cole again threatened to "get [Mr. Wise] on sexual harassment" because of the staff meeting joke.
When Mr. Wise came to CSAP, he was told that he was entitled to a vehicle and that he could choose a car or a van as long as his choice was within cost restraints. Mr. Wise chose a van, the use of which he believed to be a part of his compensation package from the county. At first, he let other CSAP employees use the van for CSAP business, but he discontinued that policy when he learned the van was used to transport employees to a tavern during a business trip. Later in 1996, Mr. Wise twice allowed CSAP employees to use the van for training sessions: once for a group of two men and a woman, and once for Jerry Clinton. Ms. Cole never asked to use the van, but she complained to Tom Borowski in May 1998 about men being able to use it when women weren't. Ms. Spiegel complained to Mr. Borowski in May 1998 and Judge Chamblee in April 1998 about Mr. Wise's trip to Florida.
Before Ms. Spiegel became a CSAP employee, CSAP staff received hepatitis vaccinations at county expense. After conferring with Pat Pasket of the county health department about the need of hepatitis vaccinations and concluding that CSAP employees didn't need them, Mr. Wise decided to eliminate the vaccinations from his budget. Ms. Spiegel had requested the vaccination on several occasions and Mr. Wise agreed to pay for half the cost, saying the whole cost was not in his budget. At the May 1997 meeting Ms. Spiegel complained to Mr. Borowski that she had worked at CSAP for a year and a half and still had not received a hepatitis vaccination after several requests to Mr. Wise. In or around September 1997, Ms. Spiegel wrote a letter to Mr. Wise and cited in that letter an OSHA standard that she believed required the vaccination. After Mr. Wise conferred with Mr. Borowski, Ms. Spiegel was provided the hepatitis vaccination at county expense.
Ms. Spiegel complained to Mr. Borowski in May 1997, and told him that she thought she would be punished for doing so, about the requirement the CSAP employees to clock in and out and that she was docked for being a minute late, but director Mr. Wise and his assistant Mr. Lawrence could come and go as they pleased. She thought it unfair that the two people in charge didn't have to account for their time the way the employees did. A few weeks after that meeting, Mr. Wise instituted a policy requiring everyone to punch a time clock and sent out a memo to all CSAP employees warning that failure to punch out would result in a 15-minute dock for not properly punching in and out. Ms. Spiegel was not punished, but complained to Mr. Borowski in May 1998 that she thought her May 1997 complaint prompted Mr. Wise's 15-minute rule. Mr....
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