Colebaugh v. Yale New Haven Hospital, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 June 2017
• Docket Number: CV156057999S
• Parties: John Colebaugh v. Yale New Haven Hospital, Inc
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court

John Colebaugh v. Yale New Haven Hospital, Inc

No. CV156057999S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven, New Haven

June 12, 2017

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#117) STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Robin L. Wilson, J.

The plaintiff, John Colebaugh, filed a six-count complaint against his former employer, the defendant, Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc. (YNHH), on October 26, 2015. The complaint alleges the following facts. In March 2010, the plaintiff was hired as practice administrator at Cardiology Associates of New Haven (CANH). The plaintiff " exercised very broad authoritative, and comprehensive responsibilities" in his position as practice administrator, including: " oversight of human resources, employee benefits, legal compliance, [and] financial management, " amongst others. Compl., p. 3, ¶ 11. In or about May 2013, the defendant acquired CANH. At the time of the acquisition, the plaintiff and other full time employees, of which the plaintiff was the eldest, were absorbed by the defendant. The defendant promised the plaintiff that " he would remain employed following the acquisition if he would help in consummating the merger deal and if he would assist with the transition of the CANH practice to YNHH, " because the defendant knew that the plaintiff's " cooperation and knowledge was instrumental to the successful transition of the practice . . ." Compl., p. 3, ¶ ¶ 17 19. The plaintiff was employed with the defendant as the regional manager of the Heart and Vascular Center (HVC). Compl., p. 3, ¶ 19. Initially, the plaintiff's work for the defendant included winding up the affairs of CANH and merging that practice with the defendant's practice. This transition process took approximately three to four months to complete. Once the acquisition was completed, the plaintiff was assigned a job description which included the management of all operational activities, budgets, analysis, and performance reviews; however, the plaintiff was never given the assigned duties or position that matched this description. Almost immediately after the wind down of the transition, the plaintiff began to experience premeditated and unjustified criticism from his superiors. The plaintiff was assigned a mentor, Carla Carusone. Carusone never mentored the plaintiff but, rather, solely criticized his performance.

Additionally the complaint alleges that in September 2013, the defendant's vice president of professional development Tucker Leary, sent the plaintiff a memorandum which " recognized his contributions to the CANH wind down and integration into YNHH, but [predicted Leary's] concern that [the plaintiff] would not be able to meet YNHH's standards." Compl., p. 4, ¶ 29. Further, during one of the plaintiff's initial conversations with Leary, Leary asked when the plaintiff planned to retire. The plaintiff, however, had no intention to retire. Carusone issued performance evaluations in November and December 2013, that " were filled with inaccuracies, omissions, and factual distortions." Compl., p. 4, 30. In November 2013, the plaintiff was placed on an additional six month probationary period and was then terminated on May 23, 2014. At that time, the plaintiff was sixty-nine years old, and the plaintiff's duties are now performed by persons believed to be younger than him.

The plaintiff alleges the following claims against the defendant: (1) age discrimination in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-60 (a) et seq.; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) promissory estoppel; (4) breach of contract; (5) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (6) fraud/intentional misrepresentation arising out of the defendant's hiring and wrongful termination of the plaintiff. On January 15, 2016, the defendant filed an answer and special defenses to each of the plaintiff's claims, alleging, inter alia, that any of the plaintiff's damages resulted from his own acts or omissions. The plaintiff moved to strike the defendant's special defenses on February 10, 2016, and filed a memorandum in support, arguing that the defendant failed to plead sufficient facts supporting its claims. The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's motion to strike the affirmative defenses on February 17, 2016. The court, Wilson, J., sustained the defendant's objection on March 1, 2016. The plaintiff then replied to the defendant's special defenses on March 29, 2016, and denied the defendant's allegations.

On December 5, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment with a supporting memorandum of law and affidavit of Attorney Mary A. Gambardella, with attached exhibits, ^[1] and argued that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the defendant's liability for any of the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff objected to the defendant's motion for summary judgment on January 25, 2017, and filed a memorandum of law in opposition accompanied by supporting exhibits, ^[2] and argued, inter alia, that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the plaintiff was terminated based on his status as a member of a protected class and whether the defendant breached its contract with the plaintiff. On February 8, 2017, the defendant filed a reply memorandum. The court heard oral argument on the motion at short calendar on February 14, 2017.

DISCUSSION

" [S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cefaratti v. Aranow, 321 Conn. 637, 645, 138 A.3d 837 (2016). " A genuine issue has been variously described as a triable, substantial or real issue of fact . and has been defined as one which can be maintained by substantial evidence." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 378, 260 A.2d 596 (1969).

" In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 319-20, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). " To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]." Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 317 Conn. 223, 228, 116 A.3d 297 (2015). " The movant has the burden of showing the nonexistence of such issues but the evidence thus presented, if otherwise sufficient, is not rebutted by the bald statement that an issue of fact does exist . . . To oppose a motion for summary judgment successfully, the nonmovant must recite specific facts . . . which contradict those stated in the movant's affidavits and documents." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bank of America, N.A. v. Aubut, 167 Conn.App. 347, 358, 143 A.3d 638 (2016).

I Count One: Age Discrimination in Violation of CFEPA

In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated against and terminated by the defendant due to the plaintiff's status as a member of a protected class. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that his termination was based on his age in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1). The defendant argues that summary judgment should be granted as to the plaintiff's age discrimination claim because there are no genuine issues of material fact as to the plaintiff's ability to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and, if the plaintiff were to establish a prima facie case, no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the defendant's alleged pretexual reasons for terminating the plaintiff's employment.

General Statutes § 46a-60(a) provides in relevant part: " It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . (1) [f]or an employer, by the employer or the employer's agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual . . . because of the individual's race, color religious creed, age, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disability, intellectual disability, learning disability or physical disability . . ."

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