Colegrove v. Cameron Machine Co.

Decision Date23 October 2001
Docket NumberNo. 99-CV-258 J.,99-CV-258 J.
Citation172 F.Supp.2d 611
PartiesCharles COLEGROVE, Plaintiff, v. CAMERON MACHINE CO.; Midland Ross Corp., Cameron-Waldron Division; Cameron Converting, Inc.; Allen-Bradley Company, Inc.; Allen-Bradley Company, LLC; Allied Signal, Inc.; Somerset Industries; and Kathabar, Inc., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

Edward F. Silva, Marc J. Syken, Jeffrey Nydick, Feinberg & Silva, Philadelphia, PA, for Charles Colegrove.

Michael D. Heintzman, Heintzman, Warren, Wise & Fornella, Pittsburgh, PA, John P. Shea, Kent & McBride, Philadelphia, PA, for Cameron.

Kenneth L. Salmon, David E. White, Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, Pittsburgh, PA, Bruce D. Lombardo, Sean G. Duffy, Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Larrle, Bowman & Lombardo, King of Prussia, PA, for Allen-Bradley.

OPINION AND ORDER

D. BROOKS SMITH, Chief Judge.

Before me is defendant Allen-Bradley's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial. Dkt. no. 92. Plaintiff Charles Colegrove brought a strict liability action against Allen-Bradley Company, Inc. and Allen-Bradley Company, LLC (collectively "A-B") for injuries he sustained while working on a paper winding machine at the Westvaco Paper Company, and the jury found in his favor. A-B is entitled to neither judgment as a matter of law nor a new trial in this matter, and I therefore deny their motion.

I.

On April 16, 1997, plaintiff Charles Colegrove was injured while working at the Westvaco Paper Company's plant in Tyrone, Pennsylvania. Colegrove was rethreading paper on a large paper winding machine when he accidently stepped on an electric foot switch that activated the machine, causing his hand and forearm to be pulled into the machine and crushed. Defendant Allen Bradley ("A B") manufactured the foot switch in question, a Number 805-A4, Series D, specifically for use around heavy machines operated in plants or factories. Westvaco had apparently purchased the foot switch some time in 1979, either from A-B or one of A-B's distributors. Although A-B produced some foot switches with safety cover guards over the switch to prevent accidental activation, the switch Westvaco purchased and installed lacked a safety guard.

Following his injury, Colegrove commenced a strict liability action against A-B.1 At trial, Colegrove pursued two design defect theories under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A: first, that the A-B foot switch was defective because it lacked the safety cover guard that would have prevented accidental contact, and second, that the A-B foot switch was defective because of A-B's failure to provide any warnings of the danger of using the unguarded model around heavy machinery in a plant or factory. The jury concluded that Colegrove's injuries resulted from A-B's failure to warn Westvaco of the dangers associated with the unguarded foot switch and awarded Colegrove $350,000 for pain, suffering, past medical expenses and lost wages.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), A-B has now moved for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, raising several issues with respect to each request. Most of A-B's arguments are meritless and provide no basis for granting their motion. Nevertheless, I address each of those arguments briefly below. I consider at length A-B's argument that, as a manufacturer of a mere component part, it could have no legal duty to warn Westvaco of the dangers associated with using an unguarded foot switch on the paper winding machine. As I did before trial, I conclude that A-B's duty to warn is not limited in this case. Because I have determined that A-B is entitled neither to judgment as a matter of law nor to a new trial, I will deny their motion.

II.

Any motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted if "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury" to find in favor of one party on any issue. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 50(a). "A motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted only if viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, no jury could decide in that party's favor." Alexander v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr. Sys., 185 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir.1999); see also Woodwind Estates v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118 (3d Cir.2000); Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 846 (3d Cir.1978) ("The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is directed but whether there is evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for that party."). Every legitimate inference from the evidence must be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Fultz v. Dunn, 165 F.3d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1998).

A-B raises several arguments in support of its request for judgment as a matter of law. First, A-B claims that Colegrove failed to prove at trial that A-B's alleged failure to warn of the danger from using its unguarded foot switch was a cause of Colegrove's accident. Second, A-B argues that it had no legal duty to warn Westvaco of any danger associated with the use of its unguarded foot switch on Westvaco's paper winding machine. Third, A-B argues that Westvaco's conduct here was a superseding cause of Colegrove's injuries. Finally, A-B claims that Colegrove failed to introduce any evidence at trial that an A-B foot switch was on the Westvaco machine at the time of Colegrove's injury.

A.

A-B first argues that Colegrove failed to prove at trial that the lack of a warning was a cause of his injuries, and without such proof, A-B cannot be liable to Colegrove. To recover under § 402A, Colegrove must establish that the alleged defect was the proximate cause of his injuries. See Pavlik v. Lane Limited/Tobacco Exporters International, 135 F.3d 876, 881 (3d Cir.1998). As the Third Circuit put it in Pavlik, "To reach a jury on a failure to warn theory of liability, the evidence must be such as to support a reasonable inference, rather than a guess, that the existence of an adequate warning might have prevented the injury." Id. (citing Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir.1984)). However, Colegrove is aided in making his case by a rebuttable presumption that a warning, if given, would have been heeded. Id. at 883 (predicting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will adopt this rule); see also Coward v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 729 A.2d 614, 621 (Pa.Super.1999) (holding that "a plaintiff should be afforded the use of the presumption that he or she would have followed an adequate warning"). To rebut this heeding presumption, A-B would need to introduce evidence that a warning would not have been heeded if it had been given; if A-B successfully rebutted the heeding presumption, then Colegrove would have to come forward with evidence that a warning would in fact have prevented his injuries. See Pavlik, 135 F.3d at 883-84.

A-B argues that it has rebutted the heeding presumption in two ways. First, it claims that Engineer George Snyder stated in his expert report that Westvaco was in violation of OSHA regulations regarding the unguarded foot switch. See dkt. no. 92 at 3; dkt. no. 98, at 2-3. According to A-B, this alleged OSHA violation rebutted the presumption that Westvaco would have heeded a warning about the foot switch if it had been given. Second, A-B argues that Colegrove himself was fully aware of the dangers posed by the foot switch and would not have modified his behavior had a warning been given. See dkt. no. 92 at 4-6; dkt. no. 98 at 4-5. In support of this argument, A-B cites several cases recognizing that the heeding presumption may be rebutted by evidence that a plaintiff was fully aware of the risk of bodily injury. See Pavlik, 135 F.3d at 881; Overpeck v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 823 F.2d 751, 755 (3d Cir.1987); Powell v. J.T. Posey Co., 766 F.2d 131, 134 (3d Cir.1985); Conti, 743 F.2d at 198. Having argued that the heeding presumption was rebutted and the burden of proof was shifted back to Colegrove, A-B then argues that Colegrove failed to introduce any additional evidence establishing that A-B's failure to warn was a substantial factor in his injury. See dkt. no. 92, at 4; dkt. no. 98, at 3-4. Specifically, A-B claims that the expert testimony stating that the failure to warn caused Colegrove's injuries was not sufficient to show causation because the expert's opinion was mere speculation. A-B thus contends that Colegrove has failed to establish causation and that A-B is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Neither of A-B's attempts to rebut the heeding presumption are successful. As for the failure to warn Westvaco, the only apparent evidence A-B cites is Westvaco's supposed violation of an OSHA regulation. This evidence is ineffective as a rebuttal to the heeding presumption because nothing demonstrates that Westvaco knew of the regulation and chose to ignore it. OSHA regulations and Westvaco's alleged violation of them were not admissible at trial because industry standards like OSHA regulations are not relevant to a § 402A action. See Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Division, 515 Pa. 334, 528 A.2d 590 (1987); Sheehan v. Cincinnati Shaper Co., 382 Pa.Super. 579, 555 A.2d 1352, 1355 (1989). As A-B admits, the only mention of OSHA regulations is in Engineer George Snyder's expert report.2 See dkt. no. 92, at 3 n. 2. In that report, Snyder suggests that Westvaco was in violation of an OSHA regulation prohibiting unguarded foot switches around mechanical power presses. See Defendant's Exhibit 1-K, dkt. no. 93, ex. 4, at 3 (citing 29 CFR § 1910.217(b)(7)(x) (2001)). Nothing in Snyder's report, however, indicates that Westvaco knew of this regulation and failed to heed its requirements.

A-B simply concludes from the fact that Westvaco may have been in violation of this OSHA regulation that Westvaco would not have heeded a warning about the unguarded foot switch...

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