Colello v. Baker Material Handling Corp., Civ. No. 94-33-P-C.
Citation | 849 F. Supp. 3 |
Decision Date | 22 March 1994 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 94-33-P-C. |
Parties | Ernest J. COLELLO and Brenda Colello, Plaintiffs, v. BAKER MATERIAL HANDLING CORPORATION, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Maurice A. Libner, McTeague, Higbee, Libner, Macadam, Case & Watson, Topsham, ME, for plaintiffs.
Robert H. Stier, Neal F. Pratt, Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, Portland, ME, for defendant.
This civil action arises from injuries suffered on the job by Plaintiff Ernest Colello on November 2, 1992, while operating a forklift that overturned and crushed his left foot and right knee. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was employed by the Park and Public Works Department of the City of Portland, Maine. The forklift was manufactured and sold by Defendant Baker Material Handling Corporation, an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in South Carolina. Plaintiffs filed a Complaint, comprised of three Counts alleging defective product design, negligence in manufacture, and loss of consortium, in Cumberland County Superior Court in the state of Maine on January 10, 1994. Plaintiffs' Complaint (Docket No. 1A).
Plaintiffs' attorney served C T Corporation, Defendant's agent for service in South Carolina, by certified mail on January 11, 1994. Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand Case to State Court ("Motion to Remand") (Docket No. 4) at Exhibit A. C T Corporation then forwarded Plaintiffs' Complaint and Summons to Defendant by overnight mail, with Defendant receiving the information on January 14, 1994. Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand ("Defendant's Memorandum") (Docket No. 6) at 1 and Exhibit B. Defendant filed a Notice of Removal with this Court on February 14, 1994, on the grounds of diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to section 1446(b). 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)1 and Defendant's Notice of Removal (Docket No. 1).
Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Remand (Docket No. 4) the case to Cumberland County Superior Court because Plaintiffs allege that Defendant filed the Notice of Removal more than thirty days after the Complaint was served. Plaintiffs argue that the thirty-day period for filing a notice of removal begins to run once defendant or defendant's agent receives a copy of the complaint. See, e.g., Maglio v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 542 F.Supp. 39 (E.D.Pa.1982) ( ); Percell's Inc. v. Central Telephone Co., 493 F.Supp. 156 (D.Minn.1980) ( ). In this case, Plaintiffs allege that service on Defendant's agent, C T Corporation, was effected on January 11, 1994, and that Defendant waived its right to remove the case by failing to file a Notice of Removal by February 10, 1994, in accordance with the thirty-day deadline.
Defendant asserts, on the other hand, that C T Corporation is not its own appointed agent but is "a statutory agent for service of process in South Carolina." Courts in most, if not all, jurisdictions have held that the thirty-day removal period does not commence with service on "statutory agents" who have been designated under state long-arm statutes. Instead, the general rule is that defendant or defendant's own agent must actually receive the summons and complaint before the period begins to run. See Skidaway Association, Ltd. v. Glens Falls Insurance Co., 738 F.Supp. 980 (D.S.C.1990) ( ); Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., 597 F.Supp. 1082, 1084-85 (E.D.Va.1984) ( ); Kurtz v. Harris, 245 F.Supp. 752 (S.D.Tex.1965) ( ); see also 14A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3732 at 515-16 (1985) )
In this case, Defendant alleges that it did not receive a copy of Plaintiffs' Complaint from its "statutory agent" until January 14, 1994, and that its Notice of Removal was filed on February 14, 1994, within thirty days of...
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Wilbert v. Unum Life Ins. Co.
...than defendant itself, is served, the law is well settled where the agent at issue is a statutory agent. Colello v. Baker Material Handling Corp., 849 F.Supp. 3, 4 (D.Me. 1994). A statutory agent is usually a government official authorized by the state's longarm statute to receive service o......
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Wilbert v. UNUM Life Insurance Company, C.A. No. 97-338L (D. R.I. 11/__/1997), C.A. No. 97-338L.
...than defendant itself, is served, the law is well settled where the agent at issue is a statutory agent. Colello v. Baker Material Handling Corp., 849 F. Supp. 3, 4 (D.Me. 1994). A statutory agent is usually a government official authorized by the state's long-arm statute to receive service......
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Perez-Aquino v. Bos. Mut. Life Ins. Co., CIVIL NO. 15-1095 (PAD)
...of nonresidents in order to facilitate the initiation of court proceedings by residents of the enacting state. Colello v. Baker Material, 849 F.Supp. 3, 5 (D.Me. 1994); Renaissance Marketing, Inc. v. Monitronics Intern., Inc., 606 F.Supp.2d 201, 206 (D.P.R. 2009). When the service is effect......