Coleman Co. v. International Union, United Auto., Aircraft and Agr. Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO)

• Decision Date: 09 November 1957
• Docket Number: UAW-CIO,No. 570,No. 40631,A,570,40631
• Citation: 317 P.2d 831,181 Kan. 969
• Parties: The COLEMAN COMPANY, Inc., a corporation, Appellee, v. The INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (), and its Unit, Localffiliated with American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, an unincorporated Labor Organization or Association; M. R. Lee, Individually, and as Area Director of the UAW for the region including Wichita, Kansas; E. L. Anderson, individually, and as President of Local; and all other members, agents and representatives of said Labor Organization, whose names are unkown to Plaintiff, and, therefore, cannot be given as individuals and representatives of said Labor Organizations, Appellants.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 831

317 P.2d 831

181 Kan. 969

The COLEMAN COMPANY, Inc., a corporation, Appellee, v. The INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW-CIO), and its

Unit, Local No. 570, Affiliated with American Federation of

Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, an

unincorporated Labor Organization or Association; M. R. Lee,

Individually, and as Area Director of the UAW for the region

including Wichita, Kansas; E. L. Anderson, individually, and

as President of Local No. 570; and all other members, agents

and representatives of said Labor Organization, whose names

are unkown to Plaintiff, and, therefore, cannot be given as

individuals and representatives of said Labor Organizations,

Appellants.

No. 40631.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Nov. 9, 1957.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 16, 1957.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement in a labor dispute is submitted to arbitration, state courts have jurisdiction to entertain an action which seeks to challenge the validity of the arbitration award, even though the business affects interstate commerce.

2. Where a collective bargaining agreement which provides for binding arbitration empowers the Arbitration Board to interpret the provisions of the Agreement, but provides that the Board shall have no power to add to or substract from, or to modify, extend or delete any of the terms of the Agreement, it is held, the construction of the Agreement to determine what questions the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration is a function of the court and not the arbitrators, and courts will not infer that it was the intention of the parties to empower the arbitrators to determine the extent of their own jurisdiction.

3. Under circumstances related in the foregoing syllabus, the court will apply pertinent rules of construction to the face of the instrument to determine whether the Agreement is ambiguous. If the portion of the Agreement is controversy is ambiguous, the parties are bound by their Agreement to submit the grievance to arbitration, and the Board is empowered to interpret the Agreement within the limits of the issue submitted.

4. Where parties have agreed to be bound by a submission to arbitration, errors of law and fact, or an erroneous decision of matters submitted to the judgment of the arbitrators, are insufficient to invalidate an award fairly and honestly made. Nothing in the award relative to the merits of the controversy as submitted, even though incorrectly decided, is ground for setting aside an award in the absence of fraud, misconduct or other valid objections.

5. When it can be consistently and reasonably done, the courts will construe everything in support of an award rendered strictly in pursuance and in conformity with the issue submitted for arbitration.

6. An award must be certain, definite and final as to all matters submitted, giving to the words used their ordinary meaning, including that which may be fairly inferred from the language used, and an award will be taken to be certain unless the contrary appears on its face, every fair presumption being in favor of its validity. An award will be so construed as to put one consistent sense on all its terms, the certainty required being a certainty of a common intent.

Harry C. Clark, Kansas City, Mo., and Fred A. Beaty, Wichita, argued the cause, and Sidney J. Brick, Yale W. Gifford and W. A. Bonwell, Jr., Wichita, were with them on the briefs for appellants.

John F. Eberhardt, Wichita, argued the cause, and George B. Powers, Carl T. Smith, Stuart R. Carter, Robert C. Foulston, Malcolm Miller, Robert N. Patridge, Robert M. Siefkin, Richard C. Harris, Wichita, Anthony T. Dealy and Gerald Sawatzky, Wichita, were with him on the briefs for appellee.

SCHROEDER, Justice.

This is an equitable action brought by The Coleman Company, Inc., to set aside an arbitration award made in favor of The International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO), and others, hereafter collectively referred to as the Union.

On the 9th day of May, 1955, Coleman and the Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement, hereafter referred to as the Agreement, which provided among other things that a grievance not satisfactorily settled under any one of the four preliminary steps outlined, could be appealed by the Union to arbitration. It provided that the decision of the majority of the Board, consisting of three members selected in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, shall be final and binding on both parties to the Agreement.

The Agreement specifies the limitation of the Arbitration Board's powers as follows:

'The function of the Arbitration Board shall be to interpret the provisions of this Agreement and to resolve by decision or to make recommendations concerning any appeals arising thereunder. This Board shall have no power to add or subtract from, or to modify, extend or delete any of the terms of this Agreement, or any agreement made supplementary hereto except by mutual consent of the Company and the Union.' Article V, Section 8. (Emphasis added.)

A dispute arose between Coleman and the Union as to the interpretation of Article XV, Section 8(b), of the Agreement. It provides:

'Whenever a temporary breakdown or trouble occurs with equipment, machines, jigs, fixtures or material, or when any other circumstances beyond the operator's control causes unusual delay to a bonus operation which has not been compensated for in the standard and the employee thinks that a special allowance should be made for such delay, he shall promptly notify his supervisor at the time such trouble occurs. The supervisor shall, with the cooperation of the Methods and Standards Department (if desired), estimate the amount of time being lost and shall make a special allowance at the base rate of the job to the employee for the time lost.' (Emphasis added.)

After extended preliminary procedures the parties were unable to settle their dispute and the matter was referred to a Board of Arbitration. Coleman objected to arbitration on the ground that a Board of Arbitration had no jurisdiction to determine the issue. The disputed Section 8(b) of the Agreement was, however, without litigation submitted to a Board of Arbitration. The sole issue submitted for determination was stipulated by the parties and reads as follows:

'Does Article XV, Section 8(b) permit the company to make special allowances to employees assigned to bonus operations at the base rate of to job for time lost whenever a temporary breakdown or trouble occurs with equipment, machines, jigs, fixtures or material, or when any other circumstances beyond the operator's control, such as scheduling of jobs, delay in receiving the next job, improper distribution of towmotor service, obtaining blueprints and obtaining instruction cards, causes unusual delay to a bonus operator which has not been compensated for in the standard.' (Emphasis added.)

The Board of Arbitration after hearing considerable testimony in November, 1955, took its decision under advisement upon the transcript of the record and briefs which it requested the parties to submit. The Award dated the 22nd day of January, 1956, in answer to the question submitted by the parties reads as follows:

'Upon the basis of all of the evidence submitted, the Arbitration Board finds and therefore rules that the position and contention of the Union must be sustained and that of the Company denied; that the language of Article XV, Section 8b, clearly permits and requires the Company to make special allowances as the term is understood by the Union and discussed in its brief; that if a matter of computation alone were involved, then the language used would seem to be ambiguous, if not meaningless. The Arbitration Board finds and rules that the intent of the parties is clearly expressed in the Union brief and its position as evidenced in the record. The Arbitration Board, therefore, has no alternative other than to sustain the Union contention and to deny the Company position. Ordered accordingly.'

Coleman brought an equitable action in the district court to set the arbitration award aside. After full hearing the lower court ruled that the award made by the Board of Arbitration was invalid and could not be enforced. The court therefore entered judgment for Coleman, the effect of which was to set the award aside and declare it void. The reasons set forth in the court's opinion are paraphrased as follows:

(1) That Article XV, Section 8(b), of the contract does not need, require or lend itself to interpretation because it is so simple and clear that no extended examination or interpretation is required to determine its meaning.

(2) That the Award modifies and changes the Agreement in that Section 8(b), which states that '* * * the supervisor * * * shall make a special allowance at the base rate of the job to the employee for the time lost', is changed to read 'The supervisor shall make a special allowance at the average bonus earnings of the employee for the time lost', and that had the signers of this Agreement intended to use the term 'average bonus earnings', as used in other places throughout the Agreement, in Section 8(b) in lieu of the term 'base rate' they would have done so.

(3) That the Board of Arbitration exceeded the authority granted to it in the Agreement, since its duty was to decide with definiteness and certainty the proposition submitted to it rather than to rewrite, change and add to the Agreement.

(4) That the Board of Arbitration did not state in its Award what average bonus earnings are or how they are to be computed and by reason thereof the Award is lacking for want of certainty.

Appeal was properly perfected by the Union to this court through procedures unnecessary to relate in detail, specifying as error questions suggested by the foregoing reasons...