Coleman ex rel. N.C. v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 03 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:17-CV-295-FL,5:17-CV-295-FL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | ELENA COLEMAN, on behalf of minor child N.C., Plaintiff, v. WAKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, and WAKE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM, Defendants. |
This matter comes before the court on defendants' motion for judgment on the administrative record (DE 78), defendants' corrected motion for summary judgment (DE 88), and plaintiff's motion to strike (DE 93). The issues raised have been fully briefed, and in this posture are ripe for ruling. For the reasons that follow, defendants' motion for judgment on the administrative record is granted, defendants' corrected motion for summary judgment is granted, and plaintiff's motion to strike is denied.
Plaintiff and N.C.'s father (collectively "parents") initially filed a petition for contested case under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., on October 3, 2014, when N.C. was in third grade at Root Elementary School. On November 4, 2014, N.C.'s parents filed a 37-page addendum to the October 2014 petition, with additional claims and requested remedies. N.C.'s parents voluntarily dismissed the October 2014 petition on January 15, 2015.
Several months later, N.C.'s parents filed another petition for contested hearing on January 14, 2016, after N.C. had completed third grade and had withdrawn from Wake County Public Schools. N.C.'s parents incorporated the October 2014 petition and addendum and raised new claims regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to N.C. through the end of the 2014-15 school year. While the January 2016 petition was pending, N.C.'s parents filed another petition on May 23, 2016, claiming that defendants failed to provide them with copies of a document generated by John Thomas ("Thomas"), an independent behavioral expert who observed N.C. at school in March 2014.
An administrative hearing was held on the January 2016 and May 2016 petitions over eleven days from August to October 2016. Both parties were represented by counsel at the hearing. Seventeen witnesses testified, and extensive exhibits were received into the record. After hearing, the administrative law judge ("ALJ") held that defendants had provided N.C. with a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") during the relevant time period. N.C.'s parents appealed the decision to a State Hearing Review Officer ("SHRO"), who reviewed the record and held for defendants on all issues.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced this action on June 16, 2017. After receiving leave to proceed in forma pauperis, plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 1, 2017, and second amended complaint with leave of court on March 30, 2018. Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to reasonably calculate and implement N.C.'s individualized education program ("IEP"), thereby denying him a FAPE. Plaintiff also alleges defendants committed a procedural violation of the IDEA by failing to provide copies of Thomas's observation of N.C. at school andaccompanying recommendations. Finally, plaintiff alleges retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12203, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. 794(d). Plaintiff seeks damages, an order requiring defendants to provide compensatory education to N.C., and an injunction nullifying the no-trespass letter issued by defendants prohibiting her from coming on to any Wake County Public Schools property.
On September 19, 2018, and November 6, 2018, defendants filed portions of the administrative record of state proceedings. The court finally settled the administrative record for the instant IDEA claims in this case on March 21, 2019. (Order (DE 74)). The record includes evidence lodged at docket entries 49, 50, 55, 56, 67, and manual filing of certain audio recordings noticed at docket entry 68. (See Order (DE 74) at 3).
After a contentious period of discovery, defendants filed their instant motions for judgment on the administrative record and motion for summary judgment. In support of their motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claims, defendants rely upon the administrative record, the documents attached to the pleadings, testimony of Russ Smith ("Smith"), defendant Wake County Board of Education's senior director of security; Kimberly Grant ("Grant"), principal of Lynn Road Elementary School from July 1, 2013, to April 1, 2017; and a findings letter from the United States Department of Education Office for Civil Rights ("OCR").
After defendants filed their respective dispositive motions, plaintiff did not file a response in opposition to defendants' motion for judgment on the administrative record. Plaintiff filed the instant motion to strike defendants' corrected motion for summary judgment, arguing that defendants' corrected motion does not comply with the court's rules. Plaintiff also filed herresponse in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment, relying upon voluminous documents and testimony pertaining to N.C.'s IDEA state administrative proceedings.1
North Carolina law provides a two-tiered administrative review process of IDEA claims. See E.L. ex rel. Lorsson v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 773 F.3d 509, 515 (4th Cir. 2014). First, an ALJ conducts an evidentiary hearing and renders a decision. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-109.6. A party may appeal the ALJ's decision to the State Board of Education, prompting review by a SHRO. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-109.9. After exhausting these administrative remedies, an aggrieved party2 may file a civil action in federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). Thereafter, the court "(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." Id. § 1415(i)(2)(C). The burden ofproof rests with plaintiff. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56-58 (2005); Barnett by Barnett v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 152 (4th Cir. 1991).
"[T]he provision that a reviewing court base its decision on the 'preponderance of the evidence' is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review." Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). "The district court must give 'due weight' to the administrative proceedings, but the findings of fact and ultimate decision as to whether the state has complied with the IDEA are made by the district court." Sumter Cty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan ex rel. TH, 642 F.3d 478, 484 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Doyle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100, 103 (4th Cir. 1991)). "Due weight" means "findings of fact by the hearing officers in cases such as these are entitled to be considered prima facie correct, akin to the traditional sense of permitting a result to be based on such fact-finding, but not requiring it." Doyle, 953 F.2d at 105; see also Cty. Sch. Bd. of Henrico Cty., Virginia v. Z.P. ex rel. R.P., 399 F.3d 298, 305 (4th Cir. 2005) (). Determinations of law are reviewed de novo. See A.K. ex rel. J.K. v. Alexandria City Sch. Bd., 484 F.3d 672, 679-80 (4th Cir. 2007).
Before turning to the analysis of plaintiff's IDEA claims, the court first addresses a threshold legal question: what statute of limitations applies to plaintiff's claims. See C.M. ex rel. J.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Henderson Cty., 241 F.3d 374, 384 (4th Cir. 2001) (). Specifically, the court considers whether and to what extent plaintiff's petitions filed on January 14, 2016, and on May 23, 2016 are time-barred.
"A parent or agency shall request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for requesting such a hearing under this subchapter, in such time as the State law allows." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C). North Carolina law in turn requires that, "notwithstanding any other law," a petition for due process hearing "set[] forth an alleged violation that occurred not more than one year before the party knew or reasonably should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the petition." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-109.6(b). The one-year statute of limitations "strikes an appropriate balance between the need for speedy resolution of disputes and the need to ensure that parties have a fair opportunity to obtain judicial review of administrative due process proceedings." Manning ex rel. Manning v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 176 F.3d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1999).
The limitations period for filing a petition for contested hearing is extended in two limited circumstances:
if the parent was prevented from requesting the hearing due to (i) specific misrepresentations by the local educational agency that it had resolved the problem forming the basis of the petition, or (ii) the local educational agency's withholding of information from the parent that was required under State or federal law to be provided to the parent.
Id. § 115C-109.6(c); see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6)(B), (f)(3)(D) ().
In the administrative proceedings below, the ALJ and the SHRO disagreed as to the applicability of the "savings clause" for voluntary dismissals...
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