Coleman v. Akpakpan

• Decision Date: 30 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 1-09-2629.,1-09-2629.
• Citation: 402 Ill.App.3d 822,342 Ill.Dec. 293,932 N.E.2d 184
• Parties: Andrea COLEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nsikak AKPAKPAN, Individually, and doing business as NICA Management Services, Defendant (Christiana Udoh, Individually, and d/b/a NICA Management Services, Defendant-Appellant).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

402 Ill.App.3d 822

932 N.E.2d 184

342 Ill.Dec. 293

Andrea COLEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Nsikak AKPAKPAN, Individually, and doing business as NICA Management Services, Defendant (Christiana Udoh, Individually, and d/b/a NICA Management Services, Defendant-Appellant).

No. 1-09-2629.

Appellate Court of Illinois,First District, First Division.

June 30, 2010.

Christiana Udoh, pro se.

Daniel M. Starr, Michael J. Zink, Staff & Rowells, Chicago, Kristen M. Dunne, Goldberg, Weisman & Cairo, Ltd., Chicago, for Andrew Jones.

Presiding Justice HALL delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Christiana Udoh, filed a pro se appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County denying a motion to vacate a judgment in the amount of $20,627.63 entered in favor of the plaintiff, Andrea Coleman, and against Ms. Udoh and defendant Nsikak Akpakpan, Ms. Udoh's husband, as individuals and doing business as NICA Management Services. Ms. Udoh contends that the circuit court erred when it barred the defendants from rejecting an arbitration award and when it admitted the defendants' nonverified answer to the amended complaint and their nonverified response to the plaintiff's request to admit facts. Ms. Udoh also contends that the defendants were denied the effective assistance of counsel.

Before turning to the merits of this appeal, we must address two matters impacting our review. First, the plaintiff contends that this court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Akpakpan because he did not file a notice of appeal.

Failure to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the final judgment or within 30 days of the entry of an order disposing of the last posttrial motion deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal. In re Estate of K.E.J., 382 Ill.App.3d 401, 320 Ill.Dec. 560, 887 N.E.2d 704 (2008); see Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 11, 2007), R. 303(a)(1), eff. May 1, 2007. While Ms. Udoh maintains that Mr. Akpakpan filed a notice of appeal, a review of the record reveals only one notice of appeal.

Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(4) provides that the notice of appeal “shall contain the signature and address of each appellant or appellant's attorney.” Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 15, (July 16, 2008), R. 303(b)(4), eff. May 30, 2008. The notice of appeal contained in the record sets out “Christiana Udoh, et al,” in the caption. However, only Ms. Udoh is listed as the appellant, and only her signature appears on the notice of appeal.

Where the notice of appeal clearly names only one party as appellant, the court considers the appeal to be taken only by the named party. See Beneficial Development Corp. v. City of Highland Park, 239 Ill.App.3d 414, 416, 179 Ill.Dec. 1005, 606 N.E.2d 837 (1992), rev'd in part on other grounds, 161 Ill.2d 321, 204 Ill.Dec. 211, 641 N.E.2d 435 (1994). In the absence of a separate notice of appeal filed by Mr. Akpakpan and the failure of the notice of appeal filed by Ms. Udoh to name him as an appellant and to include his signature or the signature and address of his attorney, Mr. Akpakpan is not a party to this appeal. We will consider this appeal only as to Ms. Udoh, and the judgment against Mr. Akpakpan will not be affected by its outcome.

The second matter concerns Ms. Udoh's failure to comply with several of the supreme court rules governing appellate procedure. Ms. Udoh's appellant's brief violates Supreme Court Rule 342, in that it does not contain an appendix which includes a copy of the judgment appealed from, the notice of appeal and a complete table of contents. 210 Ill.2d R. 342(a). Ms. Udoh's brief also violates Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) (210 Ill.2d R. 341(h)(6)). Four out of the seven pages of her statement of facts contain factual allegations unsupported by references to the pages in the record on appeal. The statement itself is a mixture of fact, argument and comment. Her brief also violates Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (210 Ill.2d R. 341(h)(7)). In several instances, the argument portion of her brief fails to provide page citations to the portions of the record supporting her argument. Finally, Ms. Udoh's brief does not contain the applicable standards of review for the issues raised on appeal as required by Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(3) (210 Ill.2d R. 341(h)(3)).

Ms. Udoh's pro se status does not excuse her from complying with the appellate procedures required by our supreme court rules. Twardowski v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill.App.3d 509, 511, 254 Ill.Dec. 776, 748 N.E.2d 222 (2001); see Lill Coal Co. v. Bellario, 30 Ill.App.3d 384, 385, 332 N.E.2d 485 (1975) (while some deference is afforded to pro se litigants, the orderly administration of the appellate court requires that the rules of appellate procedure be followed). While Ms. Udoh's failure to comply with the rules hinders our review, since we are still able to understand the issues raised on appeal, it does not deprive this court of jurisdiction. Twardowski, 321 Ill.App.3d at 511, 254 Ill.Dec. 776, 748 N.E.2d 222. Therefore, we will consider the merits of the issues Ms. Udoh raises on appeal.

By way of background, the plaintiff filed a verified complaint against the defendants, ¹ alleging multiple violations of the Chicago Residential Landlords and Tenants Ordinance (Chicago Municipal Code § 5-12-010 et seq. (1990)). The defendants filed a nonverified answer and counterclaim. The plaintiff served the defendants with interrogatories, a production request and a request to admit facts.

On November 20, 2008, the plaintiff filed a verified amended complaint. On November 25, 2008, the circuit court ordered the defendants to answer all outstanding written discovery by December 23, 2008. The order provided that failure to comply with the specific terms of the order would result in the defendants being barred from testifying and presenting evidence at the arbitration hearing or at trial. On December 2, 2008, the defendants filed their response to the plaintiff's request to admit facts. The request to admit was signed by the defendants' attorney but was not verified by the defendants. On December 4, 2008, the defendants filed a nonverified answer to the verified amended complaint.

On December 24, 2008, the plaintiff filed a motion to bar the defendants from presenting any evidence or witnesses at the arbitration hearing as a sanction for failing to respond to the plaintiff's interrogatories and request to produce. On January 6, 2009, the circuit court granted the plaintiff's motion to bar. On January 13, 2009, the court granted the plaintiff's motion to deem admitted the facts in the plaintiff's request to admit facts. After the plaintiff moved to strike the defendants' unverified answer to the amended complaint, the defendants filed a verified answer, and the plaintiff withdrew her motion.

The arbitration hearing took place on February 20, 2009. The arbitrators found in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants and awarded the plaintiff $8,940.63 in damages, $687 in costs and $8,000 in attorney fees. The arbitration order stated that the defendants appeared through their attorney and included a finding that all parties participated in good faith. On March 16, 2009, the defendants filed a notice of rejection of the award. On March 26, 2009, the plaintiff filed a motion to bar the defendants from rejecting the award.

On June 2, 2009, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants in the amount of $17,627. 63. After striking the defendants' motion to reject the arbitration award, the court granted the plaintiff's motion to bar the defendants from rejecting the award. On July 1, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to vacate the judgment award.

On September 10, 2009, the circuit court entered an order denying the defendants' motion to vacate the June 2, 2009, judgment award. The court also granted the plaintiff's petition for additional attorney fees in the amount of $3,000, which increased the judgment amount to $20,627.63. On September 30, 2009, Ms. Udoh filed a notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. Debarment Order

Ms. Udoh contends that the circuit court erred when it barred her from rejecting the arbitration award.

A. Standard of Review

The circuit court's decision to bar a party from rejecting an arbitration award is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Campuzano v. Peritz, 376 Ill.App.3d 485, 487, 314 Ill.Dec. 947, 875 N.E.2d 1234 (2007). To the extent that the issue turns on the interpretation of a supreme court rule, de novo review applies. See Zietara v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 361 Ill.App.3d 819, 822, 297 Ill.Dec. 589, 838 N.E.2d 76 (2005).

B. Discussion

Supreme Court Rule 91 provides that a court may debar a party from rejecting an arbitration award as a sanction when the party either (1) fails to be present at the hearing, either in person or by counsel or (2) fails to participate in the hearing in good faith. 145 Ill.2d R. 91. Because it was undisputed that the defendants' attorney was present at the arbitration hearing and the arbitrators found that the parties had participated in good faith, Ms. Udoh maintains that the circuit court erred in debarring her from rejecting the award.

Despite a finding of good faith by the arbitrators, our courts have upheld an order debarring a party from rejecting an arbitration award where the party failed to comply with discovery. See Campuzano, 376 Ill.App.3d at 488-89, 314 Ill.Dec. 947, 875 N.E.2d 1234; Lopez v, Miller, 363 Ill.App.3d 773, 779, 300 Ill.Dec. 574, 844 N.E.2d 1017 (2006). In this case, the defendants failed to comply with the court's November 25, 2008, order to answer all outstanding written discovery by December 23, 2008. In accordance with its November 25, 2008, order, the circuit court barred the defendants from presenting any testimony or evidence at the arbitration hearing. The defendants' failure to take any action to vacate, modify or otherwise correct that...