Coleman v. Bent

• Decision Date: 31 March 1924
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: COLEMAN v. BENT. WALKER v. BENT.

124 A. 224

100 Conn. 527

COLEMAN v. BENT.

WALKER v. BENT.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 31, 1924

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; James H. Webb, Judge.

Separate actions by Grace M. Coleman, executrix and Herbert Walker administrator, for damages for injuries resulting in deaths of plaintiffs' testate and intestate, respectively against Rupert G. Bent. A verdict was directed in each case for defendant, and, from orders setting them aside, defendant appeals. No error.

In actions for injuries from an automobile accident resulting in deaths of two members of a fishing party, evidence that defendant owner had invited decedents to go, declaring his desire to try out his new car, that, prior to starting back the parties agreed to share current expenses including gasoline, oil, garage bills, equally, and, while driving home, one occupant, whose negligence was alleged to have caused the accident, relieved the owner from driving because of fatigue and eye strain, held not to show a " joint adventure," as a matter of law, because not inconsistent with defendant's retention of his rights and obligations as owner.

These cases arose out of the same collision, and, the issues of fact being common to both actions, they were tried together. In each case the complaint alleges that the plaintiff's decedent was riding as a guest in the defendant's automobile, and that the injuries which resulted in his death were caused by the negligence of defendant's agent George Webb in bringing the automobile into collision with a truck traveling in the same direction upon the highway between Springfield and Hartford. The actions were tried on general denials of the allegations contained in the complaint.

All the testimony and rulings are made part of the appeal records. At the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant moved for nonsuit in each case, and the motions were denied. At the close of the trial the defendant moved for a directed verdict in each case, and the court in directing the verdicts charged the jury as follows:

" There is not very much important dispute about the facts in the case, and I have assumed that the jury would find that this collision was the result of some lack of caution or oversight on the part of Mr. Webb, who was driving the car. It by no means follows, as a matter of law, that Mr Bent, the defendant in this action, is responsible. I have indicated to counsel that the evidence discloses that this was a joint venture of all of these parties on this pleasure trip or fishing trip, and the mere fact that Mr. Bent was the owner of the car doesn't necessarily make him liable. You will therefore retire, gentlemen, and render and bring in these verdicts for the defendants in both cases."

Subsequently, the plaintiff moved in each case to set the directed verdicts aside, and the trial court granted the motions, and set the directed verdicts aside; expressing in a memorandum of decision the conviction based on further consideration, that the question whether, so far as the actual operation of the automobile was concerned, the parties were or were not engaged in a joint enterprise, should have been submitted to the jury.

Defendant appeals from the action of the court in setting aside the verdicts, and the plaintiff has filed bills of exceptions, excepting to the charge of the court in directing verdicts for the defendant.

Allan E. Brosmith and Robert C. Dickenson, both of Hartford, for appellant.

Benedict E. Lyons and George H. Cohen, both of Hartford, for appellee.

BEACH, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The only valid reason of appeal by the defendant is that the court erred in setting aside the directed verdicts for the defendant. The second and third reasons of appeal, which question the validity of the reasons given by the court for setting the verdicts aside, are of no avail. Error cannot be predicated on an expression of opinion contained in a memorandum of decision as to the facts or the law of the cause, unless such memorandum be made a part of the finding on appeal.

The defendant's claim is that the evidence shows that the occupants of the defendant's automobile were returning from a fishing excursion when the collision occured, and that after the party had reached their destination in Vermont, it was agreed that all current expenses of the trip, including gasoline, oil, and garage bills, should be shared equally. Other facts claimed are that the defendant drove his car all the way to Vermont, and back again as far as West Springfield, where he announced that he was tired of driving and that the headlights of passing automobiles affected his eyes. Mr. Webb and Mr. Coleman volunteered to relieve him, and Mr. Webb took the wheel with some understanding, not carried out, that he should drive as far as Springfield and that Mr. Coleman should drive the rest of the way. The collision occurred between...