Coleman v. Board of Educ. of City of St. Louis, 4:02-CV-1712 CAS.
| Decision Date | 30 June 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:02-CV-1712 CAS.,4:02-CV-1712 CAS. |
| Citation | 324 F.Supp.2d 1048 |
| Parties | Carissa COLEMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
James Hetlage, Lashly & Baer, P.C., St. Louis, MO, for defendant.
This matter is before the Court on defendant Board of Education of the City of St. Louis' (the "Board") motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. For the following reasons, the Court will deny the motion with respect to Count I and grant the motion with respect to Count II.
Background.
Plaintiffs were formerly employed by the Board through the St. Louis Public School District (the "District") as Speech Language Implementors and later as Speech Language Pathologists. Plaintiffs bring this action against the Board asserting two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count I, plaintiffs assert that the Board violated their First Amendment rights by refusing to renew their employment contracts in retaliation for their conduct in challenging the propriety of the District's conduct in reassigning them from Speech Language Implementor to Speech Language Pathologist positions, as they were not qualified to perform the latter. In Count II, plaintiffs assert that the Board violated their rights under the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it engaged in a pattern of arbitrary and capricious conduct including its demand that they work as Speech Language Pathologists, which they could not do without violating state law.
Legal Standard.
The standards applicable to summary judgment motions are well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court shows "there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The initial burden is placed on the moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988) (). Once this burden is discharged, if the record shows that no genuine dispute exists, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party who must set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute on a material factual issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Once the burden shifts, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations in its pleadings, but by affidavit and other evidence must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Herring v. Canada Life Assur. Co., 207 F.3d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir.2000); Allen v. Entergy Corp., 181 F.3d 902, 904 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1063, 120 S.Ct. 618, 145 L.Ed.2d 512 (1999). The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Herring, 207 F.3d at 1029 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
Facts.
The Missouri Healing Arts Practices Act, Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 345.010 (2000) (the "Act"), regulates and defines the practice of Speech Language Pathology. The practice of this field includes screening, identifying, diagnosing and treating disorders of speech, language, and cognitive and social aspects of communication. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 345.015(9). The Act requires persons working as Speech Language Pathologists to be licensed by the State Board of Healing Arts Registration, Mo.Rev.Stat § 345.020.1, and sets out criteria which must be met before a person can be licensed as a Speech Language Pathologist, which include holding a master's degree in the field. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 345.050(1). It is a class B misdemeanor to perform the duties of a Speech Language Pathologist in Missouri without a valid license. Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 345.020.2, 345.075.
The Act contains an exception to the licensing requirement if the practitioner holds a valid certificate issued by Missouri's Department of Elementary and Secondary Education ("DESE") and practices speech language pathology only within the context of her employment with a school district. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 345.025(b). The DESE's requirements for certifying a Speech Language Pathologist are that the candidate either hold a license issued by the State Board of Healing Arts Registration or meet a set of criteria which includes a master's degree. Pls.' Ex. 2.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § § 1400-1491o ("IDEA"), requires school districts such as the District to provide special education services to students with disabilities, including speech and language services. The District's Speech and Language Department (the "Speech Department") offers services including screening students for speech and language disorders, diagnosing such disorders, developing Individualized Education Plans ("IEPs") for students, and providing special education and therapy in conformance with the IEP. Ms. Mabel Brown is the head of the Speech Department.
The District employs both Speech Language Pathologists and Speech Language Implementors in the Speech Department. The role of the Speech Language Implementor is to implement the IEPs, typically by providing speech or language therapy to students. In contrast, the Speech Language Pathologist occupies the "decision making" role of screening and diagnosing students, developing IEPs, and communicating with the students' parents and teachers. Speech Language Implementors must be supervised by a fully qualified Speech Language Pathologist. The District uses Speech Language Implementors to address its ten-year shortage of Speech Language Pathologists.
Plaintiffs Carissa Coleman and Deanna Scanlon each graduated from college with a Bachelor of Science degree in Communication Science and Disorders; Ms. Coleman in December 1998 and Ms. Scanlon in May 1999. In August 1999, plaintiffs began working for the District as Speech Language Implementors. In early 2000, plaintiffs began working toward their master's degrees through a Distance Education in Communication Sciences and Disorders program offered by Southwest Missouri State University. Plaintiffs anticipated completing their master's degree program in December 2000.
In June 2000, the District presented plaintiffs with Probationary Teacher Contracts for the 2000-01 school year. The District did not discuss with plaintiffs any change in their job duties, and as far as plaintiffs knew, they would be employed as Speech Language Implementors during the school year. Plaintiffs signed and returned the Probationary Teacher Contracts in June 2000. At the beginning of the 2000-01 school year, Speech Department head Ms. Brown informed plaintiffs and two other Speech Language Implementors, Kelley Harris and Marcia Hunt, that they would be performing the duties of Speech Language Pathologists, including the screening and diagnosis of students with speech language disorders and development of IEPs for such students. Earlier, in April 2000, Ms. Brown had prepared a memorandum to Gloria King of the District's Human Resources Division, informing her that plaintiffs and two other Speech Language Implementors should be immediately assigned as Speech Language Pathologists.
The plaintiffs believed they were required to have master's degrees in order to work as Speech Language Pathologists, and at the time had only completed one semester of work toward their master's degrees. Plaintiffs questioned Ms. Brown about whether they were authorized to perform all of the Speech Language Pathologist duties. Ms. Brown told them the District had obtained "provisional certification" from the DESE for them to perform Speech Language Pathologist duties. Plaintiffs performed the duties of Speech Language Pathologists throughout the 2000-01 school year in reliance on Ms. Brown's representation that she had obtained permission from the State of Missouri for them to do so.
Plaintiff Scanlon also asked District employees Pat Wood and Yvonne Tate about her job duties and whether she was authorized to perform those duties. Several times during the school year, plaintiff Scanlon brought her concerns and those of plaintiff Coleman to Ms. Brown, asking whether she was sure it was proper for them to be performing the duties of Speech Language Pathologists. Each time, Ms. Brown responded that "they" had obtained authorization from the State of Missouri. Plaintiff Coleman spoke to Linda Bennett, another District employee, and Ms. Brown, raising her concern about whether she was authorized to perform the duties of a Speech Language Pathologist.
In the fall of 2000, plaintiff Scanlon told Dr. Julie Stierwalt, head of the Distance Education in Speech and Communication Disorders program, that the District was requiring her and others without master's degrees to perform the duties of Speech Language Pathologists. Dr. Stierwalt told Ms. Scanlon she did not believe they should be performing those duties and would look into the matter. On September 29, 2000, Dr. Stierwalt wrote a letter to David Flieg, the District's Director of Human Resources which referred to her students (which included the plaintiffs) working as "implementors" in the District and stated, "I understand that there has been some confusion concerning job titles and supervision requirements." Dr....
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