Coleman v. Brandon

• Decision Date: 19 September 2012
• Docket Number: 5:11-cv-131-RJC
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
• Parties: DARRYL WILLIAM COLEMAN, Petitioner, v. JUDY BRANDON, Respondent.

DARRYL WILLIAM COLEMAN, Petitioner, v. JUDY BRANDON, Respondent.

5:11-cv-131-RJC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA STATESVILLE DIVISION

Signed: September 19, 2012

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on each claim raised by Petitioner in his Petition for Writ of Habeas of Corpus, filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons that follow, Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted. (Doc. No. 4).

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a prisoner in the custody of the State of North Carolina who is currently confined in the Caswell Correctional Institution. Petitioner was represented by counsel and convicted following a trial by jury in the Lincoln County Superior Court, the Honorable Jessie B. Caldwell, III, presiding. Petitioner was convicted of one count of statutory sex offense, one count of a sex act by a custodian, and four counts of indecent liberties with a minor child. Petitioner was sentenced to 230-285 months on the statutory rape charge; 29-44 months upon conviction of the charge of sex act by a custodian, to run consecutive to the first sentence; two of the indecent liberties convictions were consolidated for judgment with the statutory sex offense conviction. On the remaining two indecent liberties convictions, Petitioner was sentenced to a suspended term of 15-18 months, and Petitioner was ordered to be placed on supervisedprobation for 36-months upon his release, which is projected to occur on September 11, 2029, according to the website of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety. See State v. Coleman, 200 N.C. App. 696, 697-99, 684 S.E.2d 513, 514-16 (2009).

Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals and Petitioner's appellate counsel raised several arguments challenging his conviction and sentence which will be discussed in detail below. Following a review of the case, on November 3, 2009, the Court rejected all of Petitioner's arguments and affirmed his convictions and sentence in a published opinion. The Court of Appeals summarized the facts from Petitioner's trial:

In June 2006, defendant was employed by Kingspoint Academy ("Kingspoint") at a boys' group home ("the boys' home") in Lincolnton, North Carolina. Kingspoint also operated a girls' group home ("the girls' home") in Shelby, North Carolina. Defendant, who was 40 years old at the time, worked at the boys' home on the weekends.

On 25 and 26 June 2006, "Allen", who was 15 years old, and "Jordan," who was under 16 (collectively "the boys") lived in the boys' home along with five other boys. During the same time period, defendant worked the 8:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. shift and "Kelsey," "Dana," and "Taylor" (collectively "the girls") lived at the girls' home. Kelsey was 14 years old and Dana was 15 years old. On 25 June 2006, the girls left the girls' home without permission. The girls previously met Allen and some of the other boys from the boys' home at a Kingspoint summer camp. The girls called Jordan on the telephone, told him they were coming over to the boys' home, and defendant was informed of the girls' plans.

When the girls arrived at the boys' home, Allen and Jordan were outside playing basketball. Defendant was also present and told the girls to return when the rest of the staff was asleep. The girls went to a friend's house and got drunk. Later that evening, the girls, still intoxicated, returned to the boys' home. After the girls entered the boys' home through the downstairs windows, defendant told them they could spend the night but that they had to be quiet so they would not awaken the staff. Defendant, Kelsey, and Allen stayed in Allen's room on the first floor of the home.

During the evening, defendant told Dana that she had nice breasts and then touched her breasts. Defendant told Kelsey she had to show him her breasts if she wanted to spend the night. Defendant then touched her breasts. Next, he told Allen to leave the room and when Allen returned, Kelsey was naked. Kelsey performed fellatio on defendant. Subsequently, Allen had sexual intercourse with Kelsey in Allen's room. During the course of Allen and Kelsey's sexual activity with each other, defendant left andre-entered the room repeatedly and watched them having sex. Defendant told Allen, referencing Kelsey, "that's my baby[,] don't hurt her, ... do her right...."

Early in the morning of 26 June 2006, the girls left the boys' home by climbing out the back window. Taylor called her mother, who picked up the girls. When the girls returned to the girls' home, they went to the office. Dana eventually revealed that they went to the boys' home and described the sexual activity that took place between defendant and Kelsey and between the boys and girls.

Officers of the Lincolnton Police Department ("officers") interviewed the boys and girls. Kelsey admitted she had sex with Allen while defendant watched, that defendant fondled her breasts and that defendant asked for fellatio, which she performed on him. Dana told the officers that defendant told the girls to leave the boys' home and return after the staff was asleep. She further stated defendant felt her breasts, that she saw Kelsey and Allen having sex, and saw Kelsey perform fellatio on defendant and on Jordan. Allen admitted he had sex with Kelsey while defendant watched, and that he also saw defendant grab Kelsey's breast.

On 30 June 2006, defendant voluntarily contacted the officers to give a statement. He was advised of his Miranda rights and signed a written waiver. Defendant admitted that on the evening in question, he saw both Jordan and Allen each having sex with one of the girls in the boys' group home. Defendant added that after Allen finished having sex with one girl, defendant touched her breast and she performed fellatio on him. Defendant then stated he touched another girl's breast.

Defendant was arrested and charged with statutory rape, statutory sex offense, engaging in a sex act by a custodian, and four counts of indecent liberties with a minor. He was subsequently indicted on all charges except statutory rape. Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statement to the police. The trial court denied the motion.

All charges were joined for trial, which commenced on 19 May 2008 in Lincoln County Superior Court. At the close of the State's evidence and at the close of all the evidence, defendant moved to dismiss each of the charges due to the insufficiency of the evidence. The trial court denied both motions.

Coleman, 200 N.C. App. at 697-99, 684 S.E.2d at 513-16.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina denied discretionary review of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals on April 14, 2010. State v. Coleman, 364 N.C. 129, 696 S.E.2d 527 (2010).

On July 1, 2011, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for appropriate relief ("MAR") in the Lincoln County Superior Court. On July 20, 2011, the Honorable Forrest D. Bridges entered anOrder denying Petitioner's claims for relief. See (Doc. No. 6-13).¹ On August 9, 2011, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of certiorari with the North Carolina Court of Appeals, and this petition was denied by Order entered August 26, 2011. (Doc. Nos. 6-14, 6-16). On or about September 8, 2011, the Clerk's Office for the Western District reported receiving a Section 2254 petition from Petitioner on September 2, 2011. The petition was returned to Petitioner for failure to pay the $5.00 filing fee and Petitioner was informed that he would need to remit the filing fee or mail a completed motion to proceed in forma pauperis along with his Section 2254 petition. (Doc. No. 1-9).

On September 15, 2011 Petitioner again filed a Section 2254 petition, signed under penalty of perjury on August 30, 2011 (Doc . No. 1 at 14). The Court then conducted an initial review of the petition and ordered the Respondent to file a response or answer. Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, (Doc. No. 4), and Petitioner was advised, in accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (1975), of his obligation in responding to the motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 8). Petitioner filed his response and a cross-motion for summary judgment, (Doc. No. 13), and a motion to include additional pages in his response. (Doc. No. 11).

The Court has examined all pending motions, and as noted above, the Court finds that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED. The Court finds that Petitioner's Motion for Leave to File Excess pages should be ALLOWED, and Petitioner's cross-motion for summary judgment will be DENIED.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate in cases where there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact and it appears that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. United States v. Lee, 943 F.2d 366, 368 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying summary judgment to motion to vacate). Any permissible inferences which are drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). However, when the record taken as a whole could not lead a trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, granting summary judgment is appropriate. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).

B. Section § 2254 Review

In addition to the standard for summary judgment noted above, the Court notes the review of the federal courts is restricted by the express language of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), and the controlling Supreme Court precedents. Section 2254(d) provides the following:²

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted

...