Coleman v. City of Gary
| Decision Date | 13 October 1942 |
| Docket Number | 27717. |
| Parties | COLEMAN v. CITY OF GARY. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Appeal from Jasper Circuit Court; Moses Leopold, Judge.
Willis C. McMahan, and J. Edwin Smith, both of Gary, for appellant.
Stanton & Stanton and Oscar B. Thiel, all of Gary, for appellee.
The appellant instituted an action in the Lake Superior Court seeking to review the action of the civil service commission of the City of Gary, demoting him from the rank of sergeant to patrolman in the police department of said City; and praying that the appellee city be ordered and directed to restore him to the rank of sergeant. The venue of the action was changed to the Jasper Circuit Court where an amended complaint was filed.
The sole error relied upon by the appellant was the action of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer to the amended complaint.
Appellant's amended complaint alleged that on March 6, 1939, and prior thereto, he was a sergeant in the police department of the appellee city and continued to hold this rank until January 1, 1940, on which date the civil service commission of said City adopted a resolution declaring his position as sergeant of said police department vacated.
That thereafter the appellant, together with other members of said police department who had been likewise demoted by said resolution, filed an action in the Lake Superior Court, Room 4, seeking a declaratory judgment adjudging and declaring said action of the commission void and illegal. That cause of action culminated in a judgment adjudging and declaring that said resolution of said commission, in so far as it attempted to vacate the position of sergeant, then held by plaintiff (appellant), was illegal and void; and that Rule No. 21 of the Civil Service Commission, concerning demotions, was valid.
That said Rule No. 21, as amended, and as in force during all the times herein considered, provided that all demotions in the department should be made wholly for cause by the chief of police or the civil service commission; that the written reasons therefor should be forthwith certified by the chief of police to the commission and written notice of such action served on such person; that any person so demoted should have a right to appeal from such action to the commission, which should conduct a hearing thereon in the same manner as hearings are provided by law upon charges for dismissal of members of the police force.
That after the entry of the judgment of the Lake Superior Court declaring the demotion of the appellant void, the city attorney of said city and two of the three members of said civil service commission, in order to avoid and circumvent said judgment, entered into a conspiracy and agreement to take certain steps which would secure the demotion of the appellant; and they further agreed that they would carry out the steps and proceedings so agreed upon without respect to the legality of such proceedings; that pursuant to this conspiracy said city attorney prepared a resolution which was adopted by said commission on July 22, 1941, reinstating the appellant to the rank of sergeant. On the same day, and as a further step in said conspiracy, the chief of police of said city served notice on the appellant, which notice recited that the appellant was demoted from a sergeant to patrolman as of that date 'in the interest of efficiency and in the spirit of civil service'; that the chief of police desired that all ranking officers 'should hold their rank through competitive promotional examination' and that inasmuch as the appellant and the other officers of said department did not hold their rank through such an examination it was necessary that each of them be demoted to patrolmen. The chief of police advised the commission of this action in writing.
That prior to the meeting on July 22, 1941, said attorney and said two members of said commission met together and agreed that the third member of said commission should not be informed of their proposed action prior to the meeting; and that at the meeting said resolutions would be introduced and voted through by the two conspiring members constituting a majority of said commission, which plan was followed. On July 28, 1941, the appellant filed his notice of appeal from such demotion, together with his demand for hearing on said appeal, alleging in the notice of appeal that said demotion 'was arbitrary, capricious, illegal and void'; and that said notice failed to charge the appellant with any action which constituted a cause for demotion; that said demotion was made in an effort to avoid the decision rendered by the Lake Superior Court, Room 4, and was based purely upon political reasons and was the result of said conspiracy.
That thereafter the commission held a purported hearing on said appeal and on September 9, 1941, rendered a decision confirming the demotion and denying the appellant's demand for reinstatement; that said hearing on said appeal was illegal and void because two of the members of said commission prior to July 22, 1941, had agreed and decided that the appellant should be demoted and had, prior to said hearing, determined upon the plan of action which would result in the appellant's appeal to the commission being denied and the demotion confirmed; that the reasons and charges set out in the notice of demotion signed by the chief of police and served on the appellant did not constitute any real basis of foundation for demotion; that there was no evidence introduced at the hearing to sustain the action of the commission in confirming the demotion; that the only evidence introduced on the hearing was the testimony of the chief of police to the effect that he did not have any personal information as to any act of the appellant that would justify charges against him; that he (the chief of police) had never made any complaint to the civil service commission relative to the conduct of the appellant; that he was responsible for the appellant's appointment to sergeant because he then thought the appellant was capable of handling the position and that he still thought so; and that from the time the appellant was reinstated as sergeant on July 22, 1941, until he was later demoted on the same day, the chief of police had no occasion to find any fault with his work as a sergeant.
The appellant's amended complaint concluded with a prayer that the decision of said civil service commission be reversed and held to be void and of no effect; and that the defendant be ordered and directed to restore the appellant to the rank of sergeant of the police.
To this amended complaint the appellee city filed a demurrer on the grounds that: (1) The Jasper Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action; (2) there was a defect of parties defendant in this: the civil service commission for the police department of the City of Gary, Indiana, and William J. Linn, as chief of police, were necessary parties defendant; and (3) the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The appellee contends that if this action was an appeal the court had no jurisdiction because no statute authorized such an appeal and that if the amended complaint did not constitute an appeal it amounted to the commencement of a new cause of action in mandamus without filing an original complaint and the issuance of summons thereon and that it was not commenced in the county where the defendant resided.
The Jasper Circuit Court is a court of general jurisdiction and as such has jurisdiction of actions for mandatory injunctions. § 3-2101, Burns' 1933, § 1061, Baldwin's 1934.
A so-called 'appeal' from the action of a municipal board in dismissing a police officer has been described by this court as being in the nature of a mandatory injunction. City of Elkhart v. Minser, 1936, 211 Ind. 20, 25, 5 N.E.2d 501.
The fact that neither the rules of the civil service commission, nor any statute, authorized an 'appeal' to the courts, does not prevent the courts, in a proper action, from restraining such a commission or board from fraudulent, capricious and illegal actions. A court, in a proper action, may investigate the acts of such a commission to determine if such acts have been arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent and illegal. Such an investigation by the court is for the purpose of determining whether the commission acted within its legal jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the courts to so investigate the action of an administrative board is not dependent on statutory authorization of an 'appeal' to the courts from the decision of such a board. Roth et al. v. State ex rel. Kurtz et al., 1902, 158 Ind. 242, 63 N.E. 460; City of Elkhart v. Minser, supra; Lloyd v. City of Gary, 1938, 214 Ind. 700, 17 N.E.2d 836.
The appellee, by a writ of certiorari, has caused the original complaint in this action to be brought before us, thereby attempting to show that the action, as originally instituted, was only an appeal from the decision of the commission. The filing of the amended complaint without objection by the appellee took the original complaint out of the record and the amended complaint became the sole statement of the appellant's cause of action. Kempton Lodge, etc., v. Mozingo, 1913, 180 Ind. 566, 103 N.E. 411. Both the original and amended complaint, however, alleged illegal acts of the commission in demoting the appellant and praying for relief therefrom. Both complaints presented actions of which the Jasper Circuit Court had jurisdiction.
The third statutory ground for demurrer urged by the appellee is that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. As supporting this...
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