Coleman v. City of Wilmington
| Docket Number | Civil Action 23-425-MAK |
| Decision Date | 11 September 2023 |
| Parties | FRAY COLEMAN v. CITY OF WILMINGTON |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
A police department fired a long-serving Black sergeant after an internal investigation into the sergeant's responses to inquiries regarding a murder investigation. She now sues her City employer, its Office of Public Safety, and Police Department for violating her civil rights by depriving her of the benefits of contracts due to race and by using information gained from her cell phone under a judicially approved search warrant as part of an older murder investigation. The City and its administrative bodies move to dismiss or for summary judgment. We must dismiss her claims as she cannot sue public entities for racial discrimination in connection with contracts and she pleads no basis to vacate the judicially approved search warrant allegedly obtaining information used in the investigation before terminating her. And she cannot sue the Office of Public Safety or Police Department for these claims as they are not separate from the City under the civil rights laws. But she may be able to plead other claims against the City or individual state actors. We grant her leave to timely amend if she can state claims within our limited jurisdiction in good faith.
Fray Coleman worked for the City of Wilmington in its Police Department beginning in June 1999. The City fired her on January 3, 2023 shortly after an internal investigation.[1] The firing allegedly arises from an investigation into a murder over fifteen years ago. Police officers interviewed Ms. Coleman in 2007 related to the then-recent murder of her daughter's biological father's friend.[2] Ms. Coleman then told the police officers it would not surprise her if someone killed a murder suspect named Ramadan because of Ramadan's connection to the murder.[3] Someone later murdered Ramadan in February 2008.[4] City detectives then questioned Ms. Coleman about Ramadan's murder in early 2008.[5] Ms. Coleman told the detectives she had no information about Ramadan's murder.[6]
The City renewed looking into this cold case last year. It hired a retired state trooper to twice interview Ms. Coleman about the 2008 Ramadan murder in 2022.[7] The state trooper told Ms. Coleman she had an inconsistent recollection of the murder after the second interview.[8] The state trooper applied for a search warrant to search Ms. Coleman's cell phone on December 7, 2022.[9] The search warrant covered the time between Ms. Coleman's first and second interviews in 2022[10] Judge LeGrow approved the warrant.[11]
A Delaware Department of Justice employee executed the search warrant for Ms. Coleman's cell phone on December 8, 2022.[12] The City thereafter placed her on Administrative Duty and prevented her from leaving the police building.[13] Wilmington police officers later discussed Ms. Coleman's personal information and pictures on her cell phone created outside the warrant's date range.[14]
The City fired Ms. Coleman on January 3, 2023.[15]
Ms. Coleman sued the City, its Office of Public Safety, and its Police Department under the civil rights laws arising from her January 3, 2023 termination. Ms. Coleman alleges the City violated federal civil rights law confirmed in section 1981 by treating Ms. Coleman and other Black officers differently than white officers in the terms of their employment. She alleges the Police Department fired her because the City, Office of Public Safety, and the Police Department engage in a policy of racial discrimination against Black officers.[16]
Ms. Coleman also alleges the City violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under section 1983 by executing on a racially-motivated search warrant. Ms. Coleman alleges the City, Office of Public Safety, and the Police Department conducted an unreasonable search by obtaining personal information and pictures from her cell phone beyond the search warrant's scope.[17] Ms. Coleman alleges the City has a practice of allowing its forensic examiners to download the entire contents of cell phones subject to a search warrant and give the extracted contents to the warrant's author.[18] Ms. Coleman alleges this practice allows the warrant's author to conduct a “fishing expedition” to review data outside the warrant's scope.[19] Ms. Coleman alleges detectives “routinely” review the information extracted from a cell phone and attempt to tie any “damning evidence” taken outside the warrant's date range to data found within the warrant's range.[20] Ms. Coleman does not allege something wrong with the warrant procedure as approved by Judge LeGrow; she instead alleges the City only sought the warrant because of her race.[21] She alleges this racial motivation stems from “long-standing racial problems” within the City's internal investigative practices.[22]
Ms. Coleman seemingly pins her improper termination on the practices of Inspector Cecilia Ashe.[23] Ms. Coleman alleges Inspector Ashe's Police Department “has a long history of discrimination against Black officers.”[24] Ms. Coleman alleges twenty-four separate instances of racial discrimination within the Police Department.[25] Ms. Coleman's allegations of racial discrimination include disparate disciplinary treatment of white and Black officers, promoting less qualified white officers over more qualified Black officers, and retaliation against complaining Black officers.[26] Ms. Coleman alleges this history of discrimination is part of a broader “pattern and practice” of discrimination in the Police Department.[27] But Ms. Coleman needs to tie this alleged pattern and practice to the City's decision to fire her after its investigation.
The City moves to dismiss Ms. Coleman's section 1981 claim and moves for summary judgment on her section 1983 claim. The City argues Ms. Coleman cannot sue the Office of Public Safety and the Police Department as they are not juridical entities.[28] The City argues Ms. Coleman fails to allege the City executed an invalid search warrant.[29]
We dismiss Ms. Coleman's section 1981 claim with prejudice as Ms. Coleman cannot sue state actors under section 1981. We dismiss her claims against the Office of Public Safety and the Police Department with prejudice. We dismiss Ms. Coleman's section 1983 claims because Ms. Coleman fails to allege facts allowing her to challenge the warrant's validity. We dismiss with leave for Ms. Coleman to timely amend her complaint if she can plead claims relating to alleged discrimination consistent with the facts and Rule 11.
We dismiss Ms. Coleman's claims against the Office of Public Safety and the Wilmington Police Department with prejudice. Our Court of Appeals does not permit civil rights suits against police departments and other administrative arms of a municipality like the Office of Public Safety.[30] The issues are whether Ms. Coleman can proceed on her pleaded civil rights claims against the City.
Ms. Coleman claims the City violated section 1981 based on her allegations the Wilmington Police Department under Inspector Ashe discriminated against Black police officers.[31] Ms. Coleman alleges the Wilmington Police Department favored white police officers over Black police officers for promotions.[32] Ms. Coleman alleges the Police Department disciplined white police officers more leniently than Black police officers.[33] The City moves to dismiss this section 1981 claim.[34] The City counters Ms. Coleman inappropriately sues state actors under section 1981.[35] Congress, through section 1981, only allows suits against private actors.[36]
Congress, through section 1981, prohibits private actors from engaging in racial discrimination.[37] Congress did not create a private cause of action under section 1981 against state actors.[38] Our Court of Appeals considers section 1983 as the “exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in [section] 1981 by state governmental units.”[39] Ms. Coleman cannot sue the City and its agencies under section 1981. We dismiss the section 1981 claims against state actors with prejudice. We dismiss Ms. Coleman's racial discrimination claims under section 1981 without prejudice as she did not sue a private actor but she may be able to plead racial discrimination claims under section 1983.
Ms. Coleman seeks damages from the City under section 1983 alleging the City had a racial motivation for issuing the search warrant for her cell phone seeking information about the 2008 murder.[40] Ms. Coleman alleges this motivation stems from the City's “long-standing racial problems” investigating its own police officers.[41] Ms. Coleman alleges the City has a practice allowing forensic examiners to download the entire contents of a cell phone subject to a search warrant irrespective of the warrant's date range.[42] The City moves for summary judgment on this section 1983 claim.[43] The City counters Ms. Coleman did not suffer a Fourth Amendment harm arising from the scope of the search warrant because Judge LeGrow validly issued the search warrant and Ms. Coleman pleads nor offers no basis to challenge Judge LeGrow's findings.[44]We agree with the City as to Ms. Coleman's failure to plead facts allowing us to disregard Judge LeGrow's decision to allow the City to obtain cell phone information through a warrant.
Valid search warrants must be “1) be based on probable cause 2) be supported by a sworn affidavit; 3) describe particularly the place of the...
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