Coleman v. Cnty. of Suffolk
| Decision Date | 31 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | 12 CV 3509 (DRH) (ARL) |
| Citation | 174 F.Supp.3d 747 |
| Parties | Phyllis Coleman, Individually and as the Administratrix of the Estate of Santia N. Williams, Plaintiff, v. County of Suffolk, Suffolk County Police Department, Suffolk County Sheriffs Department, and Police Officers, Deputy Sheriffs, and/or Detectives John and Jane Does 1–10, Christopher Verwys, badge #5459, in his individual and official capacities, Jason Morge, badge ID #1729, in his individual and official capacities, John Brunkard, badge #5692, in his individual and official capacities, Corrine Torres, badge ID #509, in her individual and official capacities, Miguel Vias, badge #5671, in his individual and official capacities, John Mcauley, badge #5534, in his individual and official capacities, John Mecurio, badge #5414, in his individual and official capacities, Nicholas Aspromgos, badge ID # 5683, in his individual and official capacities, James O'Callaghan, badge #1523, in his individual and official capacities, Sammy Saleh, badge #5657, in his individual and official capacities, Gregory Pouletsos, badge #549, in his individual and official capacities, Luis Ruiz, badge #5804, in his individual and official capacities, Valentin Rosado, badge #5801, in his individual and official capacities, Frank Ortiz, badge #5550, and Sergeant Christopher Love, in his individual and official capacities. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
LAW OFFICES OF FREDERICK K. BREWINGTON, 556 Peninsula Boulevard, Hempstead, NY 11550, BY: Frederick K. Brewington, Esq., Attorneys for Plaintiff.
SUFFOLK COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, 100 Veterans Memorial Highway, P.O Box 6100, Hauppauge, NY 11788, BY: Brian C. Mitchell, Esq., Arlene S. Zwilling, Esq., Attorneys for Defendants.
HURLEY
Plaintiff Phyllis Coleman (“plaintiff” or “Coleman”) commenced this action on behalf of her deceased daughter Santia Williams (“Williams”) against defendants County of Suffolk, Suffolk County Police Department, Suffolk County Sheriff's Department, and police officers, deputy sheriffs, and/or detectives John and Jane Does 1–10, Christopher Verwys (“Verwys”), Jason Morge (“Morge”), John Brunkard (“Brunkard”), Corrine Torres (“Torres”), Miguel Vias (“Vias”), John McAuley (“McAuley”), John Mecurio (“Mecurio”), Nicholas Aspromgos (“Aspromgos”), James O'Callaghan (“O'Callaghan”), Sammy Saleh (“Saleh”), Gregory Pouletsos (“Pouletsos”), Luis Ruiz (“Ruiz”), Valentin Rosado (“Rosado”), Frank Ortiz (“Ortiz”), and Sergeant Christopher Love (“Love”) (collectively, “defendants”) asserting, inter alia, due process claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
.1 The claims arise out of defendants' alleged conduct in response to various 911 calls placed by Williams regarding incidents with her former boyfriend Jason Jenkins (“Jenkins”), who ultimately shot and killed Williams and himself.
Presently before the Court is the defendants' motion seeking leave to file under seal documents filed in opposition to their motion for summary judgment. Additionally before the Court is the motion of Newsday LLC (“Newsday”) and News 12 Company (“News 12”) (collectively, the “Press Intervenors”) to intervene for the purpose of, inter alia, opposing that motion, and the motion of Suffolk County Police Benevolent Association (“PBA”) to intervene to oppose the Press Intervenors' motion. Also before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion to seal is denied, the Press Intervenors' motion to intervene is granted, the PBA's motion to intervene is granted, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
On September 3, 2013, Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay “So Ordered” a confidentiality agreement entered into between the parties (the “Confidentiality Order”). That agreement provided that “Suffolk County Police Department Internal Affairs Bureau investigation files and their attendant attachments” were to remain confidential. (DE 22 ¶ 2(b).) According to the agreement, counsel were to use confidential documents “solely for the purposes of this litigation ... and [were] not, without the prior consent of the defendants' counsel, [to] make the confidential documents available to any other person unrelated to the litigation.” (Id. ¶ 2(e).) The agreement also provided that “[i]n the event that a party wishes to use a document properly designated as confidential filed in this litigation, such document (or part thereof) shall be filed, upon proper notification and request to the court, under seal and maintained under seal by the Court pursuant to the Court's rules and procedures.” (Id. ¶ 2(g).) Moreover, pursuant to the agreement, “[c]ounsel for the plaintiff, at any time, may seek the designation of any document or documents previously designated as confidential to no longer be considered confidential and plaintiff does not waive any right to object, oppose, or undesignated[ ] any document designated as confidential.” (Id. ¶ 2(i)
On October 3, 2014, the defendants filed a letter request seeking a pre-motion conference with respect to defendants' anticipated motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry (“DE”) 47), and on October 9, 2014 plaintiff responded (DE 49). Subsequently, the parties jointly requested that the plaintiff's response be filed under seal, “as the letter references information which the parties agree should not be available for public viewing.” (DE 50 at 1.) The Court denied that motion with the right to renew because the parties failed to provide any legal analysis in support of their request. On November 7, 2014, the parties renewed their request to seal the plaintiff's opposition, (DE 51), and the Court granted that request on November 12, 2014.
On March 16, 2015, defendants made a letter request to “file portions of [plaintiff's opposition to their summary judgment motion] on the ECF in a redacted fashion.” (DE 57 at 1.) In the letter, defendants stated that “[t]he requested redactions appl[ied] to portions of the plaintiff's ... papers and exhibits that refer to the Internal Affairs [Unit] investigation and report [ (“IAU Report”) ] and the content thereof.” (Id. ) Indeed, defendants seek to redact portions of the plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, exhibits, and attached depositions discussing the internal investigation and charges against defendants. However, the defendants did not file their motion in accordance with the Eastern District's instructions contained on the EDNY website, and the Court directed the defendants to refile their motion in accordance with the instructions. Defendants refiled the motion on April 4, 2015. (DE 63.) Plaintiff opposed the motion and also sought that “the previously entered Order designating [as confidential] the [IAU Report] issued during the discovery period be lifted and the IAU [R]eport no longer be considered a confidential document.” (DE 59 at 7.) The motion to seal is presently before the Court.2
Additionally, on April 2, 2015, the Press Intervenors moved to intervene “for the limited purposes of (1) challenging the Court's November 12, 2014 order, sealing Plaintiff's opposition to [Defendants'] motion for a pre-motion conference (Docket No. 49); (2) opposing [Defendants'] application to seal or redact Plaintiff's opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 57); (3) unsealing any additional sealed judicial records or docket entries in this litigation; and (4) obtaining such other and further relief as may be just, proper, and equitable.” (Press Intervenors' Notice of Motion at 1–2.) Thereafter, the PBA moved to intervene “for the limited purpose of opposing Intervenor, Newsday, LLC/News 12 Company's motion to unseal documents that relate to [IAU Report], Case # 11–704i, and the contents thereof as well as unsealing all entries in the electronic docket as it pertains to the collectively bargained rights of the PBA and its members.” (PBA's Mem. at 1.)
Rule 24 allows for the intervention of third parties either as a matter of right or upon permission from the court. In order to establish intervention as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 24(a), “the applicant must (1) file a timely motion; (2) claim an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (3) be so situated that without intervention the disposition of the action may impair that interest; and (4) show that the interest is not already adequately represented by existing parties.” Butler, Fitzgerald & Potter v. Sequa Corp., 250 F.3d 171, 176 (2d Cir.2001)
. Alternatively, Rule 24(b) provides that on timely motion the court may permit anyone to intervene who “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” “Permissive intervention is wholly discretionary with the trial court.” U.S. Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir.1978). “In exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights.” Rule 24(b)(3). Courts may also consider “the nature and extent of the intervenors' interests, whether their interests are adequately represented by the other parties, and whether parties seeking intervention will significantly contribute to full development of the underlying factual issues in the suit and to the just and equitable adjudication of the legal questions presented.” Id. at 191–92 (internal quotations marks and citation omitted).
In this case, even if the Press Intervenors are entitled to intervene as a matter of right, the Court need not reach that issue because it grants them permission to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(b...
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