Coleman v. Cnty. of Nassau

Decision Date22 November 2021
Docket NumberCV 16-6099 (JMW)
PartiesDAMIEN COLEMAN, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF NASSAU, MICHAEL T. MORGAN, JOHN SCHMITT, SAMUEL AUGELLO, RICHARD MAHEPATH, and JOHN and JANE DOES 1-10, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

JAMES M. WICKS, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Preliminary Statement

Plaintiff Damien Coleman ("Plaintiff) commenced this action against the County of Nassau and four Nassau County Police Officers, Michael Morgan ("Morgan"), John Schmitt ("Schmitt"), Samuel Augello ("Augello") and Richard Mahepath ("Mahepath") (collectively "Defendants"), alleging various violations of his federal and state constitutional and common law rights arising from a traffic stop and subsequent arrest and prosecution. See generally Complaint ("Compl.") (DE 1).

Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Defendants' Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defs.' Mem.") (DE 42-3); Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Further Support of their Motion ("Defs.' Reply") (DE 43). Needless to say, Plaintiff opposes the motion. See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pl.'s Opp'n.")

(DE 44). On March 29, 2019, Magistrate Judge A. Kathleen Tomlinson issued an order granting in part and denying in part the motion (see DE 55), with the proviso that "a written decision will be entered separately." The case was then reassigned to the undersigned on October 25, 2021 and this Memorandum Decision and Order implements the previously issued Order of Judge Tomlinson (DE 55).

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

II. Background
A. The Purported Material Facts

The following facts are drawn from Defendants' Rule 56.1(a) Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Defs.' SOMF") (DE 42-1), Plaintiffs Rule 56.1(b) Response to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Pl.'s 56.1(b) Response") (DE 47) and Plaintiffs Counterstatement of Additional Disputed Material Facts ("Pl.'s COMF") (DE 47), as well as the underlying factual record. The relevant facts in this case are not overly complex, however, the parties plainly disagree on several key events. Therefore, the Court first summarizes the facts which are clearly not in dispute, and then discusses those which are. All facts are construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Beyer v. Cty. of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2008); Capobianco v. New York, 422 F.3d 47, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2005).

1. The Undisputed Facts

On August 4, 2014, Plaintiff was driving in his vehicle with his cousin, Gregory Booker ("Booker"), who was seated in the passenger seat of the vehicle. Pl.'s COMF ¶¶ 2, 4. At approximately 11:55 p.m., Plaintiff and his cousin were pulled over by Defendant Police Officers Morgan and Schmitt. Id. ¶¶ 2, 9. Plaintiff was allegedly pulled over for failing to signal before turning. Id. ¶ 36. Defendant Morgan approached the passenger side and Defendant Schmitt approached the driver's side. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. Defendant Schmitt then asked Plaintiff for his license, registration, and keys, which Plaintiff provided. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Around this time, and before Plaintiff and Booker were asked to exit the vehicle, Defendant Police Officers Augello and Mahepath arrived at the scene. Id. ¶ 18. Defendant Schmitt instructed Plaintiff to exit the vehicle, which Plaintiff did. Id. ¶¶ 14-15; Defs.' SOMF ¶4; Pl.'s 56.1(b) Response ¶ 4. Around the same time, Booker also excited the vehicle. Pl.'s COMF ¶ 17. Plaintiff heard Defendant Morgan instruct Booker to stand at the rear of Plaintiff s vehicle so he could be searched. Id. ¶ 19. A search of both Plaintiff and Booker, as well as the car, was performed, and in the course of that search cocaine and marijuana were discovered. See Defs.' SOMF ¶¶ 1-3; Pl.'s 56.1(b) Response ¶¶ 1-3; Pl.'s COMF ¶¶ 21-22.

Both Plaintiff and Booker were subsequently arrested for narcotics possession. Defs.; SOMF ¶ 6; Pl.'s 56.1(b) Response ¶ 6; Pl.'s COMF ¶¶ 23, 27-28. Plaintiff was placed in the back of Defendants Augello and Mahepath's police vehicle and transported to the Nassau County Police Stations. Pl.'s COMF ¶ 25. Plaintiff was held in Nassau County Police Department's custody until he was arraigned two days later on August 6, 2014. Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff was charged with one count of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 220.16(2), and one count of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 220.16(1), for possession of cocaine. Id. ¶ 31; Defs.' SOMF ¶ 6; Pl.'s 56.1(b) Response ¶ 6. Plaintiff was not charged with possession of marijuana. Pl.'s COMF ¶ 44. Bail was set at $120, 000, and Plaintiff was held in custody until bail was posted on his behalf by a bail bondsman. Id. ¶¶ 38-39.

Plaintiff was indicted by a grand jury on December 5, 2014. Defs.' SOMF ¶ 7; Pl.'s 56.1(b) Response ¶ 7; Pl.'s COMF ¶ 41. He subsequently hired a criminal defense attorney and appeared in court on approximately ten occasions in connection with his prosecution. Pl.'s COMF ¶¶ 46-47. Plaintiffs car was also impounded ancillary to the prosecution. Id. ¶ 48. On March 9, 2015, in ruling on a motion challenging the sufficiency of Plaintiff s indictment, the Nassau County Supreme Court found that (1) the evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to provide "reasonable cause" to believe Plaintiff had committed the offenses with which he was charged, and (2) "the conclusion reached by the grand jury was within the permissible inferences to be drawn from the evidence presented." Defs.' SOMF ¶ 8; Pl.'s 56.1(b) Response ¶ 8.

On June 22, 2015, Booker pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and exculpated Plaintiff as part of his allocution. Defs.' SOMF ¶ 9; Pl.'s 56.1(b) Response ¶ 9; Pl.'s COMF ¶ 50. On August 4, 2015, the Nassau County District Attorney's Office moved to dismiss all charges against Plaintiff in furtherance of justice pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 210.40. Defs.' SOMF ¶ 10; Pl.'s 56.1(b) Response ¶ 10; Pl.'s COMF ¶ 49. The charges were dismissed and sealed on that same date. Defs.' SOMF ¶ 10; Pl.'s 56.1(b) Response ¶ 10; Pl.'s COMF ¶ 49.

2. The Disputed Facts

As becomes quickly apparent, the parties agree only as to a general chronology of events between the initial vehicle stop and the dismissal of Plaintiff s criminal prosecution. However, the factual details of several key events remain in dispute. The disputed facts generally concern two distinct sets of circumstances, including (1) those leading to Plaintiffs traffic stop, and (2) those surrounding the search of Plaintiff s vehicle. The Court examines the disputed facts surrounding each of these circumstances in turn.

a. The Traffic Stop

The parties sharply disagree over why Plaintiffs vehicle was pulled over on August 4, 2014. Plaintiff states that "[p]rior to his arrest, plaintiff was lawfully operating his motor vehicle, a gray Nissan Altima, on Brookside Avenue." Pl.'s COMF ¶ 3. He specifically asserts that "[j]ust prior to being pulled over, [he] activated his turn signal and thereafter turned left on W. Centennial Avenue," and that he "observed a black SUV tailgating him, prior to turning left." Id. ¶¶ 6-7. According to Plaintiff, this black SUV then activated its police lights and pulled over his vehicle. Id.¶8. Plaintiff asserts that the traffic stop leading to his arrest was pretextual. See Id. ¶¶ 36-37 ("Plaintiff was . . . issued a traffic ticket signed by defendant Morgan which falsely alleged that Plaintiff failed to signal before turning off Brookside Avenue. Plaintiff did in fact signal before turning.") (citations omitted).

Defendants did not responded to Plaintiffs Counterstatement, and their principal Rule 56.1(a) Statement of Material Facts does not assert any facts regarding the reason Plaintiffs vehicle was pulled over. Nevertheless, based on the underlying record, including the traffic ticket itself and the deposition testimony of Defendant Morgan, the Court finds that Defendants dispute Plaintiffs contentions regarding the pretextual nature of the stop. See Plaintiffs Traffic Ticket, attached as Exhibit 9 to the Declaration of Brett H. Klein, Esq. in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Klein Dec") (DE 45) (stating in the box designated "DESCRIPTION / NARRATIVE" "Fail to Signal Left Turn."); see also Deposition Transcript of Defendant Morgan ("Morgan Dep.") at 53, attached as Exhibit C to the Declaration of Scott J. Kreppein, Esq. in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Kreppein Decl.") (DE 42-2) ("[Plaintiffs] vehicle made a left turn to proceed eastbound on Centennial Avenue and it failed to signal its left turn.").

b. The Search of the Vehicle

The parties also disagree over how Plaintiffs vehicle was searched and what the search yielded. Plaintiff asserts that no narcotics were present in plain view of his vehicle. Pl.'s 56.1(b) Response ¶ 1; Pl.'s COMF ¶¶ 22, 33. Rather, Plaintiff asserts that the narcotics were located in Booker's pockets, and it was only through the search of Booker outside of Plaintiff s vehicle that Defendants discovered the bag of cocaine and the marijuana cigarette. Pl.'s COMF ¶ 22 ("Unbeknownst to plaintiff, Booker had a bag of cocaine and a marijuana cigarette concealed in his pants pockets, which defendant Morgan discovered during his search of Booker."[1]); see Id. ¶ 33.

Defendants on the other hand, maintain that the cocaine and marijuana were found inside Plaintiffs vehicle in plain view and...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT