Coleman v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 16 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 0223-22-2 |
| Parties | CHARLES EDMOND COLEMAN, III, SOMETIMES KNOWN AS CHARLES EDMUND COLEMAN, III v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KING WILLIAM COUNTY
B Elliott Bondurant, Judge Kevin Purnell (Kevin D. Purnell PLLC, on brief), for appellant.
Timothy J. Huffstutter, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: O'Brien, Ortiz and Raphael Judges Argued at Richmond, Virginia.
A jury convicted Charles Edmond Coleman, III (appellant) of first-degree murder, attempted robbery, armed burglary, discharging a firearm in an occupied building, conspiracy to commit burglary, conspiracy to commit robbery, and three counts of felonious use of a firearm. He assigns error to the court's rulings joining his trial with a co-defendant's, finding sufficient evidence to support his convictions, and denying his post-sentencing motion to stay his convictions. For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND[1]
O.A., an eight-year-old child, was shot and killed during a residential burglary and attempted robbery on January 21, 2019. O.A. lived with his father, Orlando Anderson, and his paternal grandmother, Linda, in King William County. In December and January, Anderson had posted on Facebook that he won "thousands" of dollars in the lottery.
On the night of January 21, O.A. and his grandmother were asleep in her bedroom, and Anderson was in his room. At approximately 11:30 p.m., Anderson heard a loud noise and discovered that two masked intruders had broken into his home. He grabbed a shotgun and attempted to shoot, but his gun jammed. The intruders fired "about six" shots at him before they turned and fled. He chased them outside and managed to fire one round from his shotgun. As Anderson returned inside, he heard Linda yell that O.A. had been shot. Anderson and Linda rushed O.A. to the hospital, where he later died from a single gunshot wound to the head.
Nine days after the crime, police arrested appellant's co-defendant, Keith Hargrove, on unrelated charges in Richmond. The arresting officers found Hargrove with a handgun that was later connected to a bullet and cartridge cases recovered from the King William County crime scene. Hargrove entered a no contest plea to the charges, including possessing the firearm as a felon.
The arresting officers also seized a Samsung cell phone from Hargrove that he admitted was his. A subsequent data extraction showed that on January 21, Hargrove and appellant exchanged several text messages about meeting that evening and discussed a planned "lick" or robbery. Police traced the movement of the phone on January 21 through cell tower records, and the phone was within a quarter mile of Anderson's home at 11:37 p.m.
Appellant and Hargrove were charged with the same offenses, and the Commonwealth moved to join their cases for trial. After a hearing, the court granted the motion over both defendants' objections.
At trial, several witnesses testified about inculpatory statements appellant made, including confessions. Trevin Holmes,[2] appellant's cousin, testified that he and appellant visited Anderson two weeks before the crime. Later that day, appellant told Holmes that he planned to rob Anderson and referred to "life-changing money."
According to Holmes, on January 21, he and appellant went to a residence on First Avenue in Richmond to buy marijuana from Hargrove. Donnell Downey[3] was there when they arrived. Holmes overheard appellant refer to "life-changing money" in a conversation with Downey. When Hargrove arrived, Holmes purchased the marijuana and left, leaving appellant, Hargrove, and Downey at the residence.
The next day, Holmes learned that O.A. had been shot. Holmes saw appellant later that day and asked about O.A. According to Holmes, appellant "got real emotional," stating that "[i]t won't supposed to go down like that." Two weeks later, they spoke again about O.A.'s murder, and appellant was "all tears." Appellant told Holmes that he had kicked in the door to Anderson's house on the night of the shooting.
Megan Jefferson, appellant's ex-girlfriend, testified that the day after the murder, appellant became upset when she showed him a news article about O.A., and he said, "It wasn't supposed to happen." In a later conversation, appellant told her "[t]hat the door was kicked in and that there was a shootout."
Knight agreed to cooperate with law enforcement and wore a wire during later conversations with appellant. At trial, State Police Special Agent Martin Kriz identified the recording, in which appellant told Knight that the murder weapon "was a Glock." According to Special Agent Kriz, that information had not yet been released to the public.
The jury found appellant guilty on each offense and imposed an aggregate sentence of 2 terms of life imprisonment and 49 years' incarceration. At the December 6, 2021 sentencing hearing, the court denied appellant's oral motion to continue, imposed the jury's sentence, and on December 9 entered a sentencing order. On December 16, the court entered an amended order granting the Commonwealth's motion to nolle prosse two charges severed from the trial and noting that it had denied appellant's motion for a continuance on December 6.
On January 6, 2022-21 days from the amended sentencing order entered on December 16-appellant filed a "Motion to Stay Convictions." The court scheduled a hearing but did not vacate or suspend the amended sentencing order while appellant's motion was pending.
In his motion, appellant proffered that he learned that a juror had taught Holmes and his brother, which was not disclosed in voir dire. The juror had "no current recall about teaching [Holmes]" but indicated that she realized during the trial that she may have known "someone mentioned in the case." Appellant also alleged that Jefferson had received an undisclosed promise of immunity for a potential misdemeanor charge in exchange for her testimony. In its written response, the Commonwealth denied that Jefferson was granted immunity for any potential charges in exchange for her testimony.
At a hearing on February 11, 2022, the court found that based on Rule 1:1, it did not have jurisdiction to rule on appellant's motion. The court did not enter an order from the hearing. This appeal followed.
Appellant contends that the court erred by joining his case for trial with that of his co-defendant, Hargrove. He asserts that joinder prejudiced him because he could not "confront or cross-examine evidence . . . solely applicable to Hargrove," as Hargrove himself did not testify. Appellant insists that "all the admissions or statements of Hargrove [were] attributed to [appellant] absent his ability to cross-examine or confront Hargrove."
Code § 19.2-262.1 provides that "for good cause shown, the court shall order persons charged with participating in contemporaneous and related acts or occurrences or in a series of acts or occurrences constituting an offense or offenses, to be tried jointly unless such joint trial would constitute prejudice to a defendant." See also Rule 3A:10(a). A criminal defendant must demonstrate that a joint trial caused "actual," "legally cognizable prejudice" to his rights. Allen v. Commonwealth, 58 Va.App. 618, 623 (2011) (). "This occurs only when 'there is a serious risk that a joint trial . . . compromise[d] a specific trial right of one of the defendants' or when the joinder . . . 'prevent[ed] the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.'" Id. at 623-24 (quoting Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539). The decision to join cases for trial "involve[s] a case-by-case exercise of the trial court's discretion" and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. at 622-23.
Appellant does not specify which prong of actual prejudice he is invoking: that a trial right was compromised or that the jury could not make a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. See id. at 623-24. Regardless of which prong applies, appellant's claims of prejudice are unpersuasive. First, he has not established why evidence introduced against Hargrove would have automatically been "attributed to [appellant] absent his ability to cross-examine or confront Hargrove." For example evidence of Hargrove's arrest for possessing a gun as a felon was not attributed or connected to appellant; to the contrary, the plea and conviction appellant complains of were introduced to prove Hargrove's possession of a gun used in the crimes. Further,...
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