Coleman v. Curry
| Decision Date | 16 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:11-cv-01256-TWP-DKL |
| Parties | WAYDE COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. TERRY CURRY Marion County Prosecutor's Office, Final Policy Maker, in his official capacity, administrative and investigative capacity, REBECCA MEYER, in her administrative, investigative capacity and not official capacity, PAUL R CIESIELSKI official capacity as Chief of Police Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD), DENNY RANDALL JASON IMPD, D9879, in his individual and investigative capacity, JUDGE RUEBEN B. HILL Criminal Court Rm 18, in his official capacity for injunctive, declarative relief and consequential relief that the court deems applicable, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff, Wayde Coleman ("Mr. Coleman"), was arrested on October 21, 2010. Months later the charges were dropped and Mr. Coleman filed this civil rights action against five defendants1 for their role in arresting and prosecuting him for battery on a minor and criminal confinement. These defendants include arresting officer Randall Jason Denny ("Officer Denny"), Chief ofPolice of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD") Paul R. Ciesielski ("Chief Ciesielski"), Marion County Prosecutor Terry Curry ("Prosecutor Curry"), Deputy Prosecutor Rebecca Meyer ("Deputy Prosecutor Meyer"), and Judge Rueben B. Hill ("Judge Hill") (collectively, the "Defendants"). Mr. Coleman's claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons explained in this Entry, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 62) is GRANTED and Mr. Coleman's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 55) is DENIED.
The following facts are pertinent to the pending motions.
On October 21, 2010, Officer Denny responded to a non-emergency report of a battery near 10th Street and Cumberland Road in Indianapolis, Indiana. See Dkt. 64-1 Affidavit of Randall Jason Denny. When Officer Denny arrived at the scene, the parents of S.R., a minor, reported an assault on the S.R. by Wayde Coleman, who lives across the street.2
Officer Denny interviewed S.R. and his parents regarding the occurrence. S.R. stated that Mr. Coleman had placed him in a hold and refused to release him.3 Officer Denny observed and photographed marks on the skin of S.R., which appeared consistent with S.R's account of events. A third party, S.R.'s minor cousin witnessed the occurrence and corroborated S.R.'s version of events to Officer Denny as well.4
Officer Denny then interviewed Mr. Coleman in front of his residence. Mr. Coleman told Officer Denny that the witnesses at the scene were lying. Mr. Coleman did not deny placing the S.R. in a wrestling hold, but indicated he was just "playing around". Mr. Coleman's daughter also witnessed the occurrence and stated that Mr. Coleman had placed the S.R. in a hold against the S.R.'s apparent will. The arresting officer, Officer Denny did not personally witness the alleged battery.
After interviewing S.R., S.R.'s family, Mr. Coleman, and all witnesses to the occurrence, Officer Denny called and spoke with an IMPD district detective regarding what he had learned at the scene.5 With the IMPD detective's input, Officer Denny determined that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Coleman for battery and criminal confinement.6 Detective Smiley supported Officer Denny's conclusion that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Coleman.
Officer Denny arrested Mr. Coleman without incident, placed him in his police cruiser, and drove him to a police transport wagon, which took him to the Arrestee Processing Center for booking.
Deputy Prosecutor Meyer was assigned the prosecution of Mr. Coleman on behalf of the State of Indiana. See Dkt. 64-2, Affidavit of Rebecca Meyer. Deputy Prosecutor Meyerevaluated the incident in question and concluded based on her understanding of the facts that probable cause existed to proceed on the filed charges against Mr. Coleman for Battery, a Class A Misdemeanor, and Criminal Confinement, a Class D Felony.
On September 6-7, 2010, while being held in contempt, Mr. Coleman was denied medical attention by the on duty nurse and several unknown guards at the arrestee processing center.
On October 22, 2010, Mr. Coleman was advised by a magistrate judge that he was charged with battery and criminal confinement against a minor. The magistrate judge did not allow Mr. Coleman to make a statement. The magistrate judge stated that the evidence in front of him substantiated the arrest and he also found probable cause. Mr. Coleman was held on $5,000.00 bail and was unable to leave the Marion County Jail.
Five months later, on or about March 28, 2011, S.R. wrote a statement regarding his altercation with the Mr. Coleman, which minimized the occurrence7, but did not directly contradict the version of events he previously related to Officer Denny. See Dkt 57-8. On May 2, 2011, Deputy Prosecutor Meyer met with the S.R. and his stepfather. Based on this meeting, Deputy Prosecutor Meyer believed that they supported moving forward with the prosecution of Mr. Coleman for battery of the minor.8 Deputy Prosecutor Meyer then communicated with S.R. and his mother regarding the plea terms to be offered to Mr. Coleman, at which point both individuals expressed a reticence to be involved in Mr. Coleman's prosecution because he is the family's neighbor. Mr. Coleman ultimately rejected the proposed plea terms. After Mr. Colemanfiled the instant lawsuit naming Deputy Prosecutor Meyer, the prosecution of Mr. Coleman was reassigned to Deputy Prosecutor Amy Butz.
Deputy Prosecutor Butz spoke with the S.R.'s mother on February 2, 2012, and explained that Mr. Coleman had rejected all proposed plea terms, that trial was upcoming, and the cooperation and court testimony of the S.R. and his mother would be necessary. During Deputy Prosecutor Butz's conversation with S.R.'s mother, the mother expressed that she and her son were unwilling to testify at trial or otherwise participate in Mr. Coleman's prosecution any longer and stated that she and her son would prefer charges against Mr. Coleman be dismissed.
With the input of her supervisor, Deputy Prosecutor Butz determined that without the cooperation and testimony of S.R., the State would likely lack sufficient evidence to prove the Mr. Coleman's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial and therefore determined that dismissal of the charges was the most appropriate course of action.
On February 2, 2012, the prosecutor's office dismissed the battery and criminal confinement charges against Mr. Coleman.
"Summary judgment is appropriate where the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Westra v. Credit Control of Pinellas, 409 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). A "material fact" is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must set forth specific, admissibleevidence showing that there is a material issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
The key inquiry, then, is whether admissible evidence exists to support a plaintiff's claims, not the weight or credibility of that evidence, both of which are assessments reserved for the trier of fact. See Schacht v. Wis. Dep't of Corrections, 175 F.3d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 1999). Indeed, the existence of cross-motions for summary judgment does not necessarily mean that there are no genuine issues of material fact. R.J. Codman Derailment Serv., Inc. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng.'s., 335 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003). Rather, the process of taking the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving, first for one side and then for the other, may reveal that neither side has enough to prevail without a trial. Id. at 648. "With cross-motions, [the Court's] review of the record requires that [the Court] construe all inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is made." Oregon v. Arbitration Forums, Ins., 246 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 1998)).
Before, applying the standard set forth above to the claims in this case, it is appropriate to address the scope of the evidence considered. Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c)(1)(A). A party can also support a fact by showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c)(1)(B). Affidavits or declarations must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on matters stated. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c)(4). Failure to properly supporta fact in opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed, and potentially the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e).
The Court need only consider the cited materials, Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c)(3), and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has "repeatedly assured the district courts that they are not required to scour every inch of the record for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion before them." Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., 325 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2003)....
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