Coleman v. Cycle Transformer Corp.

• Decision Date: 14 November 1986
• Parties: Judy COLEMAN, Petitioner-Respondent, v. CYCLE TRANSFORMER CORP., Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 285

105 N.J. 285

520 A.2d 1341

Judy COLEMAN, Petitioner-Respondent, v. CYCLE TRANSFORMER CORP., Respondent-Appellant.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued May 13, 1986.

Decided Nov. 14, 1986.

George J. Kenny, for respondent-appellant (Connell, Foley & Geiser, attorneys; Frank A. Lattal, on the brief).

David S. Sussman, for petitioner-respondent (Ralph B. Sussman, attorney).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

CLIFFORD, J.

In this workers' compensation case the judge of compensation dismissed the claim petition because "the accident did not arise out of the employment * * *." The Appellate Division, in an unreported opinion, reversed and remanded on the strength of Chen v. Federated Dep't Stores, 199 N.J.Super. 336, 489 A.2d 719 (App.Div.1985). We granted certification, 102 N.J. 399, 508 A.2d 257 (1986), to review that determination. We reverse.

I

On December 21, 1983, petitioner, Judy Coleman, was employed as an inspector-tester by respondent, Cycle Transformer Corporation (Cycle). As was her custom she had lunch, which she had brought with her from home, in the lunchroom set aside by her employer on its premises for that purpose. The dining area was not an elaborate facility: it contained only tables, chairs, a coffee and soda machine, and a refrigerator. The employer neither served nor provided any food. Petitioner, who was free to dine on or off the premises, was not paid for her half-hour lunch break. It was after she had finished her lunch that petitioner experienced a bizarre mishap, which she described as follows:

I was done eating. I went to light a cigarette. I struck the match and as I went to turn my head to the right to talk to one of my co-workers, you know, the tip of my hair caught the match and my hair went up in flames.

* * *

* * *

[A] couple of the co-workers there beat out the fire, put the fire out. Once the fire was out I--I had this chemical on my hair. I had a new growth of hair underneath, so the hair burned down so much and then burned out, the fire went out with them beating it.

The chemical to which petitioner referred was actually two products--one, called S Curl Activator, is "something like a perm" and had been applied by a beauty parlor some five months previously; the other, Stay Soft Flow Activator, had been put on by petitioner that morning, to "keep the curl in [her] hair in place." Although we gather that petitioner has brought suit against the manufacturers of those products, their role, if any, in causing the accident or injury is not evidenced by this record. We therefore attach no significance on this appeal to the presence of those preparations.

Petitioner's workers' compensation claim sought benefits for facial and head burns, scarring, and neuropsychiatric and dermatological disabilities. Judge McNatt concluded that the accidental touching of a lighted match to the petitioner's hair by the petitioner's own hand was not "reasonably incidental" to her employment. He concluded: "Neither the tasks of her employment, nor the place where she was eating her lunch at the time, nor any act on the part of any of her co-employees caused her injury," and therefore "the accident did not arise out of" the employment.

On appeal, the Appellate Division read Chen v. Federated Dep't Stores, supra, 199 N.J.Super. 336, 489 A.2d 719, to hold "unequivocally" that "injuries occurring on the employer's premises during a regular lunch hour arise in the course of employment and are solely remediable under the Workers' Compensation Act." Because the court below viewed the facts in this case as "legally indistinguishable" from those in Chen, in which plaintiff was injured while shopping on her employer's premises during a lunch break, it concluded that Chen was "dispositive" and held that "Coleman's injuries in this case arose out of and in the course of employment." The Appellate Division therefore reversed and remanded to the Division of Workers' Compensation for a determination of the nature and extent of disability.

II

Dean Larson reminds us that "[t]he heart of every compensation act, and the source of most litigation in the compensation field, is the coverage formula." 1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 6.10 (1985) (hereinafter Larson ). New Jersey, like most other states, adopted its formula from the British Compensation Act, with its requirement of "accident arising out of and in the course of employment." Larson, supra, at § 6.10. Our Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -127, provides in pertinent part:

When employer and employee shall by agreement, either express or implied, * * * accept the provisions of this article compensation for personal injuries to * * * such employee by accident arising out of and in the course of employment shall be made by the employer without regard to the negligence of the employer * * *.

[ N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 (emphasis supplied).]

According to Dean Larson, "[f]ew groups of statutory words in the history of law have had to bear the weight of such a mountain of interpretation as has been heaped upon this slender foundation." Larson, supra, at § 6.10.

The task of construction is made easier by breaking the phrase "in half, with the 'arising out of' portion construed to refer to causal origin, and the 'course of employment' portion to the time, place, and circumstances of the accident in relation to the employment." Ibid; see Rafferty v. Dairymen's League Coop. Ass'n, 16 N.J.Misc. 363, 200 A. 493 (Dep't of Labor, Workmen's Comp. Bureau 1938):

The words "out of" relate to the origin or cause of the accident; the words "in the course of," to time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. The former words relate to the character of the accident, while the latter words relate to the circumstances under which the accident takes place. An accident comes within the latter words if it occurs while the employee is doing what a man so employed may reasonably do within a time during which he is employed and at a place where he may reasonably be during the time to do that thing. The accident, in order to arise "out of" the employment, must be of such nature the risk of which might have been contemplated by a reasonable person when entering the employment, as incidental to it. A risk is incidental to the employment when it belongs to or is connected with what a workman has to do in fulfilling his contract of service.

[Id. at 366, 200 A. 493.]

As Dean Larson cautions, even though each test must be "independently applied and met[,] * * * it should never be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the term 'work connection.' " Larson, supra, at § 6.10.

III

The burden of construction is eased somewhat in this case, for we do not discern a difficult problem in respect of the "in the course of" component of the formula. We need pause on it only long enough to observe that our law on this point is well settled: "[a]n employee need not actually be working in order to meet the 'course of employment' test." Mikkelsen v. N.L. Indus., 72 N.J. 209, 212, 370 A.2d 5 (1977). The court in Mikkelsen cited with approval a line of New Jersey cases that have extended the protection of the Workers' Compensation Act to "injuries sustained within the scope of the work-period and the work-place while the employee was engaged in personally motivated, but customary, or reasonably expectable activities." Ibid. Here, petitioner's injuries were sustained on the employer's premises and during a regular lunch hour, circumstances that have long been held to fall within the course of employment. See Chen v. Federated Dep't Stores, supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 338, 489 A.2d 719, and authorities cited there. The mishap was occasioned by petitioner's smoking--a personally-motivated activity, to be sure, but one that was customary and reasonably to be expected. See Secor v. Penn Serv. Garage, 19 N.J. 315, 321, 117 A.2d 12 (1955) (injuries that occur during minor deviations such as smoking are generally sufficiently related to employment as not to be barred by the "in the course of" requirement); Larson, supra, at § 21.40 ("practically all cases hold that smoking does not constitute a departure from the employment * * *."). Hence, petitioner was "in the course of" her employment when the accident occurred.

IV

The more substantial question is whether petitioner's accident "arose out of" her employment. This simply worded phrase has given rise to "a mass of decisions turning upon nice distinctions and supported by refinements so subtle as to leave the mind of the reader in a maze of confusion." Note, "Arising 'out of, and 'in the Course of' the Employment Under the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act," 20 Rutgers L.Rev. 599 (1966) (hereinafter Note ) (quoting Herbert v. Samuel Fox & Co., [1916] 1 A.C. 405, 419). We view this appeal, however, as relatively straightforward, not encumbered by such distinctions, refinements, or confusion.

The requirement that a compensable accident arise out of the employment looks to a causal connection between the employment and the injury. It must be established that the work was at least a contributing cause of the injury and that the risk of the occurrence was reasonably incident to the employment. Note, supra, 20 Rutgers L.Rev. at 601. Although a number of tests have been devised for determining the requisite connection, see Larson, supra, at §§ 6.20 to 6.60, the "but for" or positional-risk test is now a fixture in New Jersey law. E.g., Howard v. Harwood's Restaurant Co., 25 N.J. 72, 82, 135 A.2d 161 (1957). Essentially, that test asks "whether it is more probably true than not that the injury would have occurred during the time and place of employment rather than elsewhere." Id. at 83, 135 A.2d 161. Unless it is more probable that the injury would not have occurred under the normal circumstances of everyday life outside of the...