Coleman v. Dist. of Columbia

Decision Date28 September 2012
Docket Number11–CV–1322 (RCL).,Nos. 09–CV–50,s. 09–CV–50
Citation893 F.Supp.2d 84
PartiesVanessa COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Richard E. Condit, Karen J. Gray, Government Accountability Project, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Juliane T. Demarco, Nicholas Coates, Office of the Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This action was filed by plaintiff Vanessa Coleman asserting claims against the District of Columbia, the chief of D.C.'s Fire and Emergency Medical Services (FEMS), Dennis Rubin in his official capacity, and the Assistant Fire Chief (AFC) Brian Lee in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights, and a common law claim for negligent hiring, training, and supervision. Docket No. 09–cv–50. Coleman subsequently filed an additional action naming only the District of Columbia as a defendant and asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and D.C. Human Rights Act (D.C. HRA) for retaliation and hostile workplace. Docket No. 11–cv1322. Several of plaintiff's initial claims were dismissed by this court in a December 7, 2011 Order, 828 F.Supp.2d 87 (D.D.C.2011), granting defendant's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, and the two cases were subsequently consolidated. [99, 100]. Now pending before this court is defendants' motion for summary judgment on all of plaintiff's remaining claims. For the reasons contained in this Memorandum Opinion, this Court GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment.

II. BACKGROUNDA. The Mount Pleasant Fire

Plaintiff, an African–American female, was a captain in FEMS 1 on March 12, 2008 when a fire broke out in a high-rise apartment building in the Mt. Pleasant neighborhood of Washington, D.C. See Pl. Br. at 2. The fire was one of the “largest in the Department's recent history, and drew a great deal of attention and criticism from the public.” Pl. Br. at 3. The fire was apparently not adequately controlled by FEMS, and led to a total loss of the building as well as damage to a neighboring church. Pl. Br. at 2–3.

An internal FEMS dispute over plaintiff's role at the scene of the fire triggered the main events leading to this litigation. Plaintiff claims that upon arrival at the scene, she began a check of the basement as required by the department's standard operating guidelines before being interrupted by the operations commander at the scene, Battalion Fire Chief (BFC) John Lee, who diverted her away from the basement and towards the third floor. Pl. Br. at 2–3. Later, an investigation revealed that FEMS' failure to check the basement first had been fatal to the department's efforts to control the fire, which had in fact begun in the basement. Pl. Br. at 2; Defs. Br. at 4.

In the months following the fire, FEMS began investigating the failure. Plaintiff filed a series of memoranda to superiors, providing her side of the story, contesting her innocence of misconduct, explaining that John Lee's tactical error had caused the failure to control the fire, and requesting a formal investigation into the events. Pl. Br. at 3–4; Pl. Ex. 8, 11, 12; Defs. Ex. A–07, A–13, A–14. Plaintiff also aired some of these grievances publicly, through a “personal journal” posted on a blog, and a phone interview that aired on a radio station. Pl. Ex. 95 at 2.

On April 17, BFC John Lee cited the plaintiff for violating Article VII, Section 2 of the D.C. Fire and EMS Order Book for violating the Standard Operating Guide and “fail[ing] to ensure that the basement check was completed.” Defs. Br. at 4; Defs. Ex. A–07; Pl. Ex. 8; see also Pl. Br. at 4. BFC Schaeffer offered to settle the charge against plaintiff with a written reprimand, but plaintiff declined this offer, and challenged the charges. Pl. Br. at 4; Defs. Br. at 4.

On April 25, BFC John Lee, whom plaintiff insists was responsible for the department's failure to control the Mount Pleasant fire, also received notice of an infraction for failing to “follow up with ... [plaintiff's Engine Company] regarding the lack of a basement report ...”. Defs. Br. at 5; Defs. Ex. J. Like plaintiff, Lee was offered a settlement of an official reprimand. Defs. Br. at 5. Unlike plaintiff, however, he accepted the settlement. Defs. Br. at 5.

On May 19, plaintiff's challenge was heard by BFC James Kane. Pl. Br. at 4. On May 30, Kane found plaintiff guilty and recommended a 24–hour suspension. Defs. Br. at 4; Pl. Br. at 4.

Plaintiff reacted to all this by filing a series of memoranda and appeals in June and July contesting her innocence, complaining that the hearing before Kane was procedurally defective, and seeking reversal. Pl. Br. at 4–5; Pl. Ex. 23, 45, p. 12, 29, 30, 42; Defs. Ex. A–29, A–37, A–41. Several of these memos contained unusual language. In one, plaintiff purported to cite a superior,2 claiming that he “ha[d] orchestrated a behavior of mutiny” and referred to a “conspiracy against her.” Defs. Br. at 7 (citing Defs. Ex. A–33). Another complained that a “pursuit to diabolically cripple [her] professional career” had “become the primary agenda of [her] chief officials.” Defs. Br. at 7 (citing Defs. Ex. A–25, A–26, A–28). The volume of these memoranda peaked when plaintiff filed six memoranda directed to a single officer (Chief Rubin) in the course of the single day—behavior which plaintiff acknowledges “a supervisor could perhaps find ... out of the ordinary.” Pl. Br. at 29. On July 28, Fire Chief Rubin affirmed Kane's decision and the 24–hour suspension as penalty. Pl. Br. at 5; Pl. Ex. 42, pp. 28–30.

B. Fitness For Duty Evaluation, Insubordination, and Termination

On July 25, defendant and assistant chief Brian Lee ordered plaintiff to undergo a fitness for duty evaluation at the Police and Firefighters Clinic (PFC), with both psychological and physical components. Pl. Br. at 9; Pl. Ex. 44, 77. At her July 31 appointment, plaintiff declined to sign the waiver form requesting to speak first with counsel. Pl. Br. at 9. The Coordinator of Behavioral Health Services at PFC, Dr. Jacqueline Jackson, initially decided to place plaintiff on limited duty pending completion of her evaluation. However, Dr. Jackson apparently conferred with several officials, including defendant Lee, and then informed plaintiff that she would be placed on sick leave. Pl. Br. at 9; Defs. Ex. N.

Next, BFC Begley told plaintiff that she would be charged with insubordination for disobeying the order to undergo the fitness for duty evaluation. Pl. Br. at 9–10. Plaintiff submitted a memorandum to Chief Rubin defending her actions in disobeying the order, alleging that the order was retaliatory. Pl. Br. at 10; Pl. Ex. 31; Defs. Ex. A–42. Begley endorsed the memorandum, and charged plaintiff with insubordination. Pl. Br. at 10; Pl. Ex. 47.

On August 7, plaintiff returned for a rescheduled appointment to undergo the psychological component of her fitness for duty evaluation. This time, she signed the waiver form only after making alterations to it, and noting that she was submitting to the evaluation “under duress and under the threat of further retaliation or adverse personnel action.” Pl. Br. at 10; Pl. Ex. 48. The attending psychologist informed plaintiff that PFC legal counsel would have to review the modified form before the evaluation was conducted, and sent plaintiff away. Pl. Br. at 10.

Later that month, plaintiff and her counsel met with defendant Lee and FEMS deputy general counsel, Thelma Chichester, to discuss the outstanding order to complete a fitness for duty evaluation and plaintiff's pending claims of discrimination. Pl. Br. at 10. The meeting resulted in an agreement, formalized in a September 3, 2008 memorandum by Ms. Chichester, that allowed plaintiff to return to work, referred plaintiff's complaints about racial and sex discrimination in FEMS to an outside EEO investigator, and promised to hold in abeyance both the order for plaintiff to undergo evaluation as well as any accompanying administrative action resulting from plaintiff's failure to comply with this order, pending resolution of plaintiff's EEO claims. Pl. Br. at 10. 3

The EEO investigation concluded with no action in late October. Pl. Br. at 15. Plaintiff began the process of filing a formal complaint with the D.C. Office of Human Rights on November 13. Defs. Br. at 11 (citing Pl. Ex. 73).

After the EEO investigation of plaintiff's complaints was concluded, plaintiff's obligations to complete the fitness for duty evaluation were no longer held in abeyance, and on November 20, plaintiff was informed that she was scheduled for a psychological evaluation on November 26. Pl. Br. at 11. On the morning of the appointment, plaintiff filed a complaint in D.C. Superior Court, seeking to enjoin defendants from compelling her to submit to a fitness for duty evaluation, and called the PFC to inform them she would not be able to appear for her appointment. Pl. Br. at 11.

On January 13, 2009 defendant Lee issued formal charges of insubordination against the plaintiff for challenging the order that she submit to a fitness for duty evaluation. Pl. Br. at 12.

In February, with charges pending, plaintiff was again ordered to report to the PFC for an evaluation. Pl. Br. at 12. On February 11, plaintiff attended the PFC appointment, signed the waiver without alteration, completed the written exam portion of her psychological evaluation. Pl. Br. at 12–13. Plaintiff returned on February 18 to complete the oral interview portion of the psychological evaluation, during which she informed the attending doctor, Dr. Morote, that she was at PFC under duress. Pl. Br. at 13. After hearing this statement, Morote stopped the interview, and requested that plaintiff submit a written statement clarifying her reasons for appearing at PFC. Pl. Br. at 13. On February 24, p...

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6 cases
  • Coleman v. Dist. of Columbia
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • July 17, 2015
    ...that only three categories of communications were even arguably protected by the Whistleblower Act. Coleman v. District of Columbia, 893 F.Supp.2d 84, 93, 101 (D.D.C.2012). Those three categories covered Coleman's internal and external communications and legal filings alleging race and sex ......
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    ...for the action, plaintiff then bears the burden of proving that the explanation for the action is a pretext.” Coleman v. District of Columbia, 893 F.Supp.2d 84, 101 (D.D.C.2012) (citing Crawford, 891 A.2d at 218). The defendants move for summary judgment arguing that most of Payne's claims ......
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    ...SeeD.C.Code § 1–615.51–54. DC WPA claims are analyzed under a burden shifting analytical framework. Coleman v. District of Columbia, 893 F.Supp.2d 84, 100–01 (D.D.C.2012) (citing Johnson v. District of Columbia, 935 A.2d 1113 (D.C.2007)). A plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he made a prot......
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