Coleman v. Floyd

• Decision Date: 23 May 2023
• Docket Number: 2:20-CV-12084
• Parties: MICHAEL DORVALL COLEMAN, Petitioner, v. MICHELLE FLOYD, WARDEN,[1] Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

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MICHAEL DORVALL COLEMAN, Petitioner, v. MICHELLE FLOYD, WARDEN,^[1]Respondent.

No. 2:20-CV-12084

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

May 23, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION (ECF NO. 1) DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND GRANTING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

VICTORIA A. ROBERTS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On July 22, 2020, PetitionerMichael Dorvall Coleman, a prisoner currently confined at the Cooper Street Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan, filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.He challenges his convictions on drug and weapons charges.He raises seven grounds for relief.The Court finds that Petitioner's claims do not warrant relief and denies the petition.The Court also denies a certificate of appealability, but grants Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

I.Background

An Oakland County Circuit Court jury convicted Petitioner of two counts of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of a controlled substance, Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); one count of felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.224f; and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), third offense, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b(1).People v. Coleman, No. 336663, 2018 WL 6815123, at *1(Mich. Ct. App.Dec. 27, 2018).Petitioner was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender, Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.12, to concurrent prison terms of nineteen months to twenty years each for the controlled substance and felon-in-possession convictions, to be served consecutively to a ten-year determinate prison term for the felony-firearm convictions.Id.

The Michigan Court of Appeals summarized the facts underlying Petitioner's case as follows:

Defendant's convictions arise from the discovery of cocaine, heroin, and firearms during the execution of a search warrant at an apartment located at 674 Palmer in Pontiac.The police found defendant on the bed in a bedroom of the apartment when they executed the warrant.Baggies containing heroin and crack cocaine were found on a shelf in the bedroom, and two firearms were recovered from in between the mattress and the box spring of the bed.Additionally, there was mail addressed to defendant, as well as other drug paraphernalia, located in the bedroom.Two cell phones were also recovered from the bed's headboard.The phones contained text messages that were consistent with the buying and selling of heroin and crack cocaine.

Coleman, 2018 WL 6815123, at *1.

Following his jury trial conviction, Petitioner filed a direct appeal, raising three issues through appointed appellate counsel: (1), the trial court erred in denying his motion for a Franks hearing(challenging the basis for the search warrant and seeking to suppress the seized evidence pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154(1978)); (2), his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the authorization of an overly broad search warrant; and (3), the assessment of over $4,000 in costs and fees created a manifest hardship for Petitioner.Mich. Ct. App. Rec., ECF No. 9-15, PageID.892.In addition, Petitioner filed a “Standard 4”pro se brief,^[2] in which he challenged the prosecutor's refusal to extend a plea offer, the trial court's refusal to dismiss a biased juror, and the trial court's bias and interest in Petitioner's case.Id. at PageID.1070.He also sought to vacate his felony-firearm conviction due to Fourth Amendment violations and insufficiency of the evidence.Id.The court of appeals denied relief on all issues and affirmed Petitioner's convictions, Coleman, 2018 WL 6815123, at *14, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.People v. Coleman, 504 Mich. 901, 929 N.W.2d 340, 341(2019).

This timely habeas petition followed.Petitioner raises the following claims:

I.The trial court erred when it did not hold an evidentiary hearing after [Petitioner] motioned for a Franks hearing.

II.Mr. Coleman's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by the authorization of an overly broad search warrant.

III.The assessment of over $4000 in costs and fees creates a manifest hardship for Mr. Coleman.This Court should order that collection of the costs and fees be suspended until Mr. Coleman is paroled, or alternatively, remand to the trial court for a hearing on his ability to pay

IV.The prosecutor abused her discretion by refusing to offer a plea bargain.Coleman was more than willing to enter a plea bargain had an actual bargain been offered.

V. Coleman was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury where a biased juror was permitted to remain on the jury and decide the case.This juror was subject to removal for cause.

VI.The trial court had a strong interest in the outcome of Coleman's case, and the potential for bias was unconstitutionally impermissible.As a result, Coleman was denied his right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal.

VII.Coleman's conviction for felony firearm must be vacated where: (1) the guns were seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.

Respondent filed an answer to the petition.ECF No. 8.Respondent argues Petitioner procedurally defaulted all but two issues, the denial of a Franks hearing and the challenge to a biased juror.Id. at PageID.71.She also argues that Petitioner's claims are non-cognizable on habeas review and/or without merit.

II.Legal Standard

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)“circumscribe[s]” the standard of review that federal courts apply when considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus raising constitutional claims.SeeWiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520(2003).Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas relief to a state prisoner with respect to any claim that has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state-court adjudication

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state court's decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06(2000).An “unreasonable application” occurs when “a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case.”Id. at 409.“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.”Id. at 411.

“A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.”Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101(2011)(quotingYarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664(2004)).The focus of this standard “is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold.”Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473(2007).“AEDPA thus imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773(2010)(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).In addition, factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.§ 2254(e)(1);Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340(2003).The federal habeas court's review is “limited to the record that was before the state court.”Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181(2011).

III.Discussion

The Court notes preliminarily that although Respondent argues Petitioner has procedurally defaulted all but two of his claims of error, it is not obligated to address that defense because procedural default is not a jurisdictional bar to review of the merits.Smith v. Nagy, 962 F.3d 192, 207(6th Cir.), reh'g denied(July 1,2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 634(2020)(citingDay v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205(2006);Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89(1997));see alsoHudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 215(6th Cir.2003)(citingLambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525(1997))(“[F]ederal courts are not required to address a procedural default issue before deciding against the petitioner on the merits[.]”)The Sixth Circuit notes its own decisions “may sometimes reach the merits of a petitioner's claim, particularly when the merits are easily resolvable against the petitioner while the procedural issues are complicated.”Smith, 962 F.3d at 207(citingLambrix, 520 U.S. at 525);see alsoid.(finding“resolution of the procedural issues . . . not necessary [and] that the claim is better resolved on the merits”).

The procedural default analysis will not affect the outcome of this case, and it is more efficient for the Court to proceed directly to the merits of Petitioner's claims.

A.Fourth Amendment claims generally

It is well settled that the Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures,” and that “[a] search is unreasonable ...