Coleman v. Frame
Decision Date | 10 May 1910 |
Docket Number | Case Number: 1261 |
Citation | 1910 OK 128,109 P. 928,26 Okla. 193 |
Parties | COLEMAN v. FRAME, County Clerk, et al. |
Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -- Indebtedness -- Constitutional Limitations -- "Public Utilities." Street improvements do not constitute "public utilities" within the meaning of the term as used in section 27, art. 10, of the Constitution, which provides that: "Any incorporated city or town in this state may, by a majority of the qualified property tax paying voters of such city or town, voting at an election to be held for that purpose be allowed to become indebted in a larger amount than that specified in section twenty-six, for the purpose of purchasing or constructing public utilities, or for repairing the same, to be owned exclusively by such city."
2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--Indebtedness -- Submission to Voters--Sufficiency of Proposition. A proposition attempting to refer to the qualified property tax paying voters of a city whether said city shall be allowed to become indebted for the purchase, construction, or repair of public utilities under section 27, art 10, of the Constitution, must be stated in such specific language as to apprise the voters of the nature of the public utility the city wishes to purchase, construct, or repair.
Error from District Court, Carter County; S. H. Russell, Judge.
Action by T. N. Coleman against W. B. Frame, County Clerk of Carter County, and another. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and remanded, with directions.
J. B. Moore, for plaintiff in error.
Ledbetter, Stuart & Bell, for defendants in error.
¶1 This was a suit instituted by T. N. Coleman, plaintiff in error, against W. B. Frame, county clerk of Carter county, and D. M. Rumph, treasurer of Carter county, defendants in error, defendants below, in which the plaintiff in error prayed for a writ of injunction to restrain the defendants, as county clerk and county treasurer, respectively, from performing any duty or doing any act imposed upon them by law tending to subject the property of plaintiff in error to the payment of taxes assessed for the purpose of paying the interest on certain street improvement, and fire department bonds, and creating a sinking fund for their final payment. The court below refused to grant the injunction, and to re. verse this order this proceeding in error was commenced.
¶2 It is conceded by the parties that the indebtedness sought to be created by the issuance of these bonds will exceed the limit placed upon such municipalities by section 26, art. 10, of the Constitution, and that if the city is allowed to incur further indebtedness it must be under section 27 of the same article, which provides that:
"Any incorporated city or town in this state may, by a majority of the qualified property tax paying voters of such city or town, voting at an election to be held for that purpose be allowed to become indebted in a larger amount than that specified in section twenty-six, for the purpose of purchasing or constructing public utilities, or for repairing the same, to be owned exclusively by such city."
¶3 The grounds upon which the plaintiff contends he is entitled to relief are that the purposes for which the bonds are to be issued, to wit, "improvement of its streets and alley crossings, to be owned exclusively by said city," and "the improvement of a fire department," do not fairly fall within any of the provisions of section 27, supra, granting the right to vote bonds, to wit: (a) For the purpose of purchasing public utilities; (b) for the purpose of constructing public utilities; (c) for the purpose of repairing the same.
¶4 The propositions presented to the voters were as follows:
¶5 The election was held in pursuance to the requirement of an ordinance passed by the mayor and city council of the city of Ardmore, known as "Ordinance No. 250," wherein it was ordained that:
¶6 After these propositions were submitted to the voters and duly approved, the mayor and board of commissioners of the city of Ardmore passed an ordinance entitled, "An ordinance authorizing and directing the execution and issuance of the negotiable coupon bonds of the city of Ardmore, Carter county, Oklahoma, for the purpose of providing the necessary funds for the construction of public utilities in and to be owned exclusively by said city, to wit: * * * In the amount of $ 35,000 for street improvements; in the amount of $ 20,000 for fire department improvements," etc., wherein it was provided that:
"For the purpose of providing the necessary funds for the construction of said additional * * * street improvements and fire department improvements, to be owned exclusively by said city as stated in the preamble hereof, there shall be and there are hereby ordered and directed to be issued the negotiable coupon bonds of said city as follows: * * * Street improvement bonds to the amount of $ 35,000, and fire department bonds to the amount of $ 20,000."
¶7 The sole question presented by counsel is: Do the above classes of improvements fall within the purview of "public utilities" as the term is used in section 27, supra? It has been held by this court that the following municipal improvements fall within the term "public utilities" as used in section 27, supra: "Waterworks and sewers," State v. Miller, Mayor, 21 Okla. 448, 96 P. 747; "a convention hall to be owned, controlled and used exclusively by a city to accommodate public gatherings of people," State v. Barnes, 22 Okla. 191, 97 P. 997; "a public park," and "the construction of sidewalks around the same, and a driveway through it and the pavement of the streets surrounding it, so as to make the same more convenient and serviceable as a public park," Barnes v. Hill, 23 Okla. 207, 99 P. 927.
¶8 Counsel for defendants in error insist that the questions raised by counsel for plaintiff in error have been determined adversely to them by the foregoing cases; that, applying the reasoning of the court therein to the case at bar, there can be no question that "street improvements" are public utilities within the meaning of the term as used in section 27, supra. Granting that streets and street improvements are public utilities, it does not follow that they are the class of public utilities referred to in said section. To fall within the meaning of the term as there used, they must not only be public utilities but they must also "be owned exclusively by said city." In State v....
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