Coleman v. Hillsborough Cnty.

Decision Date22 July 2022
Docket Number20-14091
Citation41 F.4th 1319
Parties Aaron COLEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, official capacity, et al., Defendants, John Riccardo, in their individual capacities, James Valentino, in their individual capacities, William Fair, in their individual capacities, Stephen Alexander Gady, in their individual capacities, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Jeremy Alexander McLymont, Asilia Law Firm, PA, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Ursula Danese Richardson, Office of the Tampa City Attorney, Tampa, FL, for Defendants-Appellants.

Before Jordan, Newsom, and Ed Carnes, Circuit Judges.

Ed Carnes, Circuit Judge:

An anonymous complaint to the Hillsborough County Animal Services Department resulted in a search warrant for Aaron Coleman's house. That search led to Coleman's arrest and trial on charges of aggravated animal cruelty, battery on an officer, and resisting arrest. After a jury acquitted Coleman, he sued the officers who arrested him. This appeal presents the narrow question of whether those officers are immune from suit under Florida law. The answer is that they are.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case began in February 2014 when Coleman noticed that his dog's front paw was missing a nail.1 Jennifer Williams lived with Coleman, and she took the dog, who was named JJ, to a veterinarian. The veterinarian initially suspected that JJ had an infection but eventually diagnosed him with bone cancer. After consulting several veterinarians, Coleman put JJ on "a palliative care program" and planned to "keep JJ comfortable until his quality of life had diminished to the point where euthanasia was appropriate."

While JJ was on that palliative care program, the Hillsborough County Animal Services Department received an anonymous complaint that JJ was not receiving medical treatment. The complaint included photos of JJ's injured paw and alleged that his injury had been caused by a gunshot. Animal Services sent out one of its investigators, Paris Dunkley, to follow up.

When investigator Dunkley arrived at Coleman's home on July 8, 2014, she spoke with Williams. Dunkley described the animal cruelty complaint to Williams who explained that the open sore was "a cancerous tumor that ruptured," not a gunshot wound. Dunkley issued Williams an "Official Notice" that gave her a week to take JJ back to a veterinarian for further care.

After Dunkley issued that notice and returned to her work van, Coleman came home. He and Dunkley spoke while she was sitting inside her van. It was raining, and when Dunkley ended the conversation, she rolled up her window, trapping the tip of Coleman's umbrella. Coleman tapped on the driver's side window of the van for several minutes, prompting Dunkley to call the police.

Two officers arrived in response to her call. After she discussed the situation with those officers, Dunkley shortened the amount of time she had given Coleman and Williams to take JJ to the veterinarian from a week to one day. She and the officers left.

Two days later, on July 10, 2014, Dunkley obtained a search warrant for Coleman's residence, saying in her supporting affidavit that she believed "animals" were being kept there "without veterinarian care" and "in a cruel and inhumane manner." No one was home later that day when approximately 15 Tampa Police Department officers accompanied Dunkley to execute the search warrant. Dunkley called Williams and explained that she was there with police officers to search the house, and Williams came home to let the officers in. Coleman's daughter called him and told him what was happening.

Coleman's relationship with the Tampa police was already strained when the officers served the search warrant. One Tampa police officer described Coleman as an activist, and Coleman testified that he plans to become a lawyer so that he can defend those "who have been entrapped" in what he calls "the criminal business system." He believes that the officers concocted the search warrant as part of a plan to kill or capture him.

About six months before they executed the search warrant at Coleman's house on July 10, 2014, Tampa police had arrested his son. James Valentino, one of the defendant officers in this case, suffered a broken ankle while chasing Coleman's son on that occasion. The charges against Coleman's son were later dismissed

In 2014, the year that they had arrested the younger Coleman, and the year they executed the search warrant at Coleman's house in July, Tampa police officers had showed up at his house on 16 days between February and May. Most of those visits were coded as either "Juvenile Home Detention Check," "Juvenile Curfew Check," or "Juvenile Curfew Law (Under 16yo)."

There is no evidence that any of the officers involved in this case were among the ones who made any of those previous house calls in 2014. Coleman testified that he had not had "any type of contact or encounter" with any of the defendant officers until they came to search his house on July 10, 2014. He had seen Valentino's name on his son's arrest paperwork before then but had never met or spoken to the officer. Valentino testified that he did not know Coleman before the day of the search and related events, and there is no evidence that Coleman knew about the police chase that resulted in Valentino's broken ankle.

Coleman arrived home while the search of his home was in progress on July 10. Valentino was there assisting with the search. He had never before served a search warrant for animal cruelty, and his shift was almost over when he decided to help the other officers conduct the search. He testified that his squad often serves search warrants and that he has assisted with search warrants "in the double digits" of times during his three years with the squad.

As he approached his home, Coleman stopped at the gated fence surrounding his house and spoke to Valentino, who told him that the officers were involved in "an active investigation." Coleman, who is hearing impaired and was not wearing his hearing aid, told Valentino that he did not "hear very well" and asked him: "Did you say this was an active investigation?" Instead of answering, Valentino asked Coleman his name and whether he lived at the house, and Coleman confirmed that he did.

Valentino also asked Coleman if he was "refusing to leave the yard," and when Coleman said that he was not, Valentino asked him to step outside of the gate. Coleman agreed, but before he could comply, Officers Stephen Gady, John Riccardo, and Valentino placed him under arrest.

During the arrest, Valentino grabbed Coleman's left arm and Gady used the "hammerlock escort position" to secure Coleman's right arm. The officers handcuffed Coleman and escorted him to a police cruiser where Riccardo "pushed and pressed [Coleman] against [the] police car." Valentino and Gady flanked Coleman, and Gady asked Coleman if he "had anything that might cut, poke, [or] stick him." Coleman answered that he didn't know, but added that he had just returned from community college where he had used pencils to take a math test.

Gady kicked one of Coleman's feet "at least two times" to spread Coleman's legs, and Valentino placed his foot against Coleman's other foot. While the two officers secured Coleman's feet "like you would chock a wheel," Gady searched Coleman. The officers then put him in the back of their car, where he remained for "nearly two hours."

While Coleman was in the police car, Officer William Fair arrived at the scene to transport Coleman to the police station. He took over supervision of Coleman and removed him from the first police car, searched him again, and put him in a different police car. Even after Coleman was handcuffed in the back of the second police car, Fair searched him "multiple times." Fair testified that he will search arrestees more than once if they are "moving around or [if] it look[s] like they might [be] concealing something," and that Coleman was "moving around a lot" in the back of the patrol car.

The parties stipulated that Fair caused Coleman "temporary testicular pain" while searching him. Fair testified that he performed "a thorough search" of Coleman. When conducting "a thorough search," Fair puts his "hand up in the genital area" because people sometimes hide "handcuff keys, weapons, other contraband, [and] drugs" in their underwear. Fair testified that he doesn't "recall ever" squeezing Coleman's or anyone's genitals during a search, and that his search of Coleman "was no different than any other search that [he'd] done, which does not include grabbing the genitals."

As we've mentioned, Coleman was charged with aggravated cruelty to animals, battery on a law enforcement officer, and resisting an officer without violence.2 A jury acquitted him of all charges.

After being acquitted, Coleman filed the lawsuit that led to this appeal, naming as defendants Hillsborough County, the City of Tampa, Dunkley, Fair, Gady, Riccardo, and Valentino. His complaint alleged federal claims against Dunkley, the County, and the City, but those claims are not at issue in this interlocutory appeal.3 The claims that are at issue are the state law tort claims that Coleman asserted against Fair, Gady, Riccardo, and Valentino in their individual capacities.

In the district court the officers asserted entitlement to Florida sovereign immunity on Coleman's state law claims: false arrest and false imprisonment against Gady, Riccardo, and Valentino; and battery against all four officers. The court denied the officers summary judgment on those claims, determining that there was a question involving disputed facts about whether they had probable cause to arrest Coleman, and ruling that if they didn't have probable cause they were not entitled to the protection of Florida's sovereign immunity statute, Florida Statute § 768.28(9)(a). The officers contend that the district court erred in that ruling.

II. DISCUSSION

Coleman has moved to...

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3 cases
  • Andrade v. Marceno
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • January 11, 2023
    ... ... probable cause to arrest” the plaintiff. Sosa v ... Martin Cnty. , 13 F.4th 1254, 1264 (11th Cir. 2021) ... Whether an officer possessed arguable probable ... labels for the same cause of action.” Coleman v ... Hillsborough Cnty. , 41 F. 4th 1319, 1326 (11th Cir ... 2022) (quoting Rankin ... ...
  • Waters v. City of Sunrise
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
    • January 5, 2023
    ...Another way to put it is that Florida courts have equated bad faith with ‘the actual malice standard.'” Coleman v. Hillsborough Cnty., 41 F.4th 1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Peterson v. Pollack, 290 So.3d 102, 109, 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)). “An officer acts maliciously when he acts wi......
  • O'Connor v. RMC
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • January 9, 2023
    ... ... have the capacity to be sued. See Maldonado v. Baker ... Cnty. Sheriff's Office , 513 F.Supp.3d 1339, 1348 ... (M.D. Fla. 2021) ("[A] sheriff's office, ... make his case for him. But that is his job, not ours." ... Coleman v. Hillsborough County , 41 F.4th 1319, 1328 ... (11th Cir. 2022); see Brown v. Crawford , ... ...

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