Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals

• Decision Date: 10 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-1582,09-1582
• Citation: 626 F.3d 187
• Parties: Daniel COLEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS; Frank Broccolina, State Court Administrator; Larry Jones, Contract Administrator, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

626 F.3d 187

Daniel COLEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS; Frank Broccolina, State CourtAdministrator; Larry Jones, ContractAdministrator, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 09-1582.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: Sept. 23, 2010.

Decided: Nov. 10, 2010.

ARGUED:Edward Smith, Jr., Law Office of Edward Smith, Jr., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.Hugh Scott Curtis, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.ON BRIEF:Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General, Kendra Y. Ausby, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, SHEDD, Circuit Judge, and James C. DEVER III, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion.Chief Judge TRAXLER wrote the opinion, in which Judge SHEDD and Judge DEVER joined.

OPINION

TRAXLER, Chief Judge:

Daniel Coleman appeals the dismissal of his amended complaint in this suit alleging, as is relevant here, violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964("Title VII"), see42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17(West 2003& Supp.2010), and of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993("FMLA"), see29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-54(West 2009& Supp.2010).Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

Coleman's Title VII claim was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).In reviewing such a dismissal, we accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.SeeFlood v. New Hanover Cnty.,125 F.3d 249, 251(4th Cir.1997).Viewed through that lens, the facts for purposes of this appeal are as follows.

Coleman, an African-American male, was employed by the Maryland Court of Appeals from March 2001 to August 2007 and served as executive director of procurement and contract administration since early 2003.Coleman was supervised by Frank Broccolina, a white male, and Faye Gaskins, whose race is not specified.Larry Jones, whose race also is not specified, was a member of Coleman's staff and was related to Gaskins.In October 2005, Coleman investigated a matter involving Jones and Joyce Shue, a white female.Coleman's investigation "resulted in a five (5) day suspension" for Jones.J.A. 21.After Broccolina and Gaskins intervened, however, Jones's suspension was reduced to only one day.In retaliation for Coleman's investigation, Jones falsely alleged that Coleman had steered contracts to vendors in which Coleman had an interest, and Jones encouraged Broccolina to investigate.Broccolina, in turn, shared the allegations with others despite knowing that they were false.

During his employment, Coleman satisfied the performance standards of his position and received all applicable "raises and increments."J.A. 26.However, in early April 2007, he received a letter of reprimand from Gaskins concerning "a communication protocol."J.A. 25.Coleman's appeal of the reprimand was unsuccessful.Then, on August 2, 2007, Coleman sent Broccolina a sick-leave request "based upon a documented medical condition."J.A. 26.Broccolina contacted Coleman the next day and informed him that he would be terminated if he did not resign.Coleman alleges that he was fired for requesting sick leave and because he is black.He also alleges that the contract-steering charge played a role in his termination.

After exhausting his administrative remedies, Coleman initiated the present action.The complaint before us names Broccolina, Jones, and the Maryland Court of Appeals as defendants and alleges violations of Title VII and the FMLA.¹On defendants'motion, the district court dismissed the Title VII claim on the grounds that Coleman failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted, seeFed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and dismissed the FMLA claim on the basis that it was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, seeFed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).

II.

Arguing that the complaint properly alleged both a claim for disparate treatment and a claim for retaliation, Coleman maintains that the district court erred in dismissing his Title VII cause of action.We disagree.

We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).SeeSucampo Pharm., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc.,471 F.3d 544, 550(4th Cir.2006).When ruling on such a motion, "a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint."Erickson v. Pardus,551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081(2007)(per curiam)(citations omitted).A complaint "need only give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."Id. at 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).However, to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must "state[ ] a plausible claim for relief" that "permit[s]the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct" based upon "its judicial experience and common sense."Ashcroft v. Iqbal,--- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868(2009).In this regard, while a plaintiff is not required to plead facts that constitute a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss, seeSwierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,534 U.S. 506, 510-15, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1(2002), "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,"Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929(2007).See alsoFrancis v. Giacomelli,588 F.3d 186, 193(4th Cir.2009).

Title VII prohibits an employer from "discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise ... discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race."42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a).Absent direct evidence, the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII are: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.SeeWhite v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC,375 F.3d 288, 295(4th Cir.2004).Title VII also prohibits employers from "discriminat[ing] against any of [their] employees ... because [the employees] ha[ve] opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [the employees] ha[ve] ... participated in any manner in an investigation" under Title VII. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).The elements of a prima facie retaliation claim under Title VII are: (1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and the employment action.SeeMackey v. Shalala,360 F.3d 463, 469(4th Cir.2004).

Here, although Coleman's complaint conclusorily alleges that Colemanwas terminated based on his race, it does not assert facts establishing the plausibility of that allegation.The complaint alleges that Jones and Broccolina began their campaign against Coleman in retaliation for his investigation of Jones's conflict with Shue.The complaint further alleges that Coleman "was treated differently as a result of his race than whites" and specifically identifies Broccolina as a white person who was not disciplined despite having "outside business involvements."J.A. 21-22, 25(emphasis omitted).However, the complaint fails to establish a plausible basis for believing Broccolina and Coleman were actually similarly situated or that race was the true basis for Coleman's termination.²The complaint does not even allege that Broccolina's "outside business involvements" were improper, let alone that any impropriety was comparable to the acts Coleman was alleged to have committed.³Absent such support, the complaint's allegations of race discrimination do not rise above speculation.Thus, the district court correctly concluded that the complaint failed to state a Title VII race discrimination claim.SeeIqbal,129 S.Ct. at 1949("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.").

The district court also correctly ruled that Coleman failed to state a Title VII retaliation claim.No facts in the complaint identify any protected activity by Coleman that prompted the retaliation of which he complains.Coleman maintains that his protected activity was his intervention in the conflict between Jones and Shue.However, the complaint does not explain why Coleman's investigation would be considered protected activity.We therefore affirm the dismissal of the Title VII claim.

III.

Coleman next contends that the district court erred in dismissing his FMLA claim on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity.Specifically, he argues that the district court erred in concluding that Congress unconstitutionally abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the FMLA's self-care provision.We disagree.

The Eleventh Amendment bars suit in federal court against an unconsenting state and any governmental units that are arms of the state unless Congress has abrogated the immunity.SeeAlden v. Maine,527 U.S. 706, 755-57, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636(1999).In order to do so, Congress must unequivocally declare its intent to abrogate and must act pursuant to a valid exercise of its power.SeeSeminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,517 U.S. 44, 55, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252(1996).The first prong of this test is clearly satisfied here.SeeNevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs,538 U.S. 721, 726, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953(2003)(explaining that "[t]he clarity of Congress' intent" to abrogate the states' immunity to FMLA suits "is not fairly debatable").It is the second requirement that is at issue.

The Supreme Court has held that while Congress cannot validly abrogate a state's immunity from private suit under its Article I...